

B. I. MARUSHKIN

History and Politics

American Historiography
on Soviet Society

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PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW

Translated from the Russian

Б. И. МАРУШКИН
ИСТОРИЯ И ПОЛИТИКА
АМЕРИКАНСКАЯ ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ СОВЕТСКОГО
ОБЩЕСТВА

На английском языке

First printing 1975

© Издательство «Прогресс», 1975

© Translation into English. Progress Publishers 1975

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

М 10605-158
014(01)-76-84-75

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INTRODUCTION

The history of science is organically connected with the history of the society within which it develops. This relationship is most obvious in the case of the science of history and the social sciences as a whole. Socio-political processes ultimately determine the main trends in the development of historical science, but the reverse influence of historiography on the intellectual life of society is also quite significant. History, one of the oldest branches of human knowledge, has never been a neutral discipline standing outside of ideology and politics. It has always been not only an instrument of cognition but a means of struggle as well. The history of mankind is full of historiographic battles, at times no less fierce than those that become the subject of historical research.

American historiography of Soviet society, a special branch of bourgeois historical science in the United States and part of so-called sovietology,* provides a vivid example of the interaction of history and politics. It is in this crucial

* Sovietology is a kind of universal science dealing with all aspects of the "Soviet phenomenon". It takes in, therefore, several independent branches of knowledge—history, philosophy, law, economics, geography, sociology, art criticism, etc. In this book we shall use the term primarily in the sense of research into the history of the USSR.

and strategic field of study that the political and ideological objectives of the ruling class, as well as the internal trends in the social development of the United States, manifest themselves most vividly, fully and typically. The emergence of sovietology was prompted largely by political factors—the cold war atmosphere and the anti-communist tendencies prevailing in the US foreign policy at the time. On the whole, American sovietology has reflected the main stages in the development of US imperialism as well as the evolution of its attitude to the subject under study, thus providing additional evidence that historiography is like a mirror of society and that one may judge a society not only by the history it “makes” but also by the history it writes.

Sovietology emerged and has been developing in the era of transition from capitalism to socialism and against the background of the general crisis of capitalism. The Great October Socialist Revolution, which shook the old world to its foundations, rocked the foundations of bourgeois historiography as well. In an article written on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet state, George Kennan, a prominent American historian and politician, said: “One is obliged to concede to the Russian Revolution the status of the greatest political event of the present century.”¹ And American sovietologist Robert Tucker wrote: “It becomes increasingly clear that communism, despite its Russian origin, is not inherently a local phenomenon, hut a form of society or civilisation that can spread and take root in virtually every part of the globe when circumstances are propitious.”² These statements are a long way from the conviction formerly voiced by bourgeois ideologists that the capitalist system was unshakeable.

In a speech entitled “Assignment for the '70s”, made in December 1968 at an annual meeting of the American Historical Association, the association's president and prominent bourgeois historian, John Fairbank, called on his colleagues to work with doubled energy in their chosen field, emphasising that in the present “era of world crisis”

American historiography is charged with the mission of studying and evaluating the consequences of the scientific and technological revolution. He stated with concern that the ability of bourgeois historical science to find an effective response to the growing challenge of dynamic revolutionary changes showed “ominous” limitations. “...We historians,” he said, “must strive most of all to update our thinking.”³ Richard Miller, the author of a manual on anti-communism, was even more precise when he said that Americans need accurate knowledge of communism in order to fight it more effectively.⁴

US bourgeois historiography performs its ideological function energetically, striving to bring the broadest sections of the public into its sphere of influence. Gone are the days when the bourgeois historian locked himself up in an “ivory tower”, demonstrating his indifference to the social consequences of his work. Now he is a welcome, if not an indispensable, figure in government institutions, in policy planning departments, in the propaganda apparatus, and even at general military headquarters. History is becoming a practical, almost an applied, science. It has also been affected by competition with the “exact” sciences. Historiography has assimilated many of their achievements, as well as those of kindred disciplines, and is becoming a hybrid science, as it were. It makes extensive use of modern technology to exercise greater influence on society. Indeed, the evolution of American historiography reflects the adaptation of bourgeois science to the conditions of the political and ideological struggle between the two world systems.

The rapid growth of the ideological and political potential of historiography has expanded the scope of historical studies in the United States. As an important element of political strategy, historical science in the United States is being institutionalised. Through the efforts of various foundations, the government and the universities, a vast political-academic complex has been created. Within this complex, dozens of special institutes and centres and thousands of specialists

concentrate on sovietology alone, and a tremendous volume of literature in this field is published.

But the gnoseological aspect of the crisis of bourgeois historiography, along with social and political factors, has a far from positive effect on its approach to the study of the history of Soviet society. Above all, there is the negativism of the bourgeois historical thought and philosophy of history, which is manifested in the denial that the historical process is governed by laws, and the denial of the idea of progress in history. Some bourgeois historiographers strive to disprove that the experience of the proletarian revolution and of socialist construction in the Soviet Union is of world significance. Others, tendentiously interpreting the past, try to prove that the translation of Marxist-Leninist theory into practice is contrary to the natural course of social development and does violence to history, civilisation, nations and the individual.

"The bourgeoisie," wrote Engels, "turns everything into a commodity, hence also the writing of history. It is part of its being, of its condition for existence, to falsify all goods: it falsified the writing of history. And the best-paid historiography is that which is best falsified for the purposes of the bourgeoisie."⁵

The works of many bourgeois sovietologists provide confirmation of Engels' statement. "Understanding of this momentous [i.e., Soviet.—B.M.] period in Russia's history," one British writer notes, "has often been overcast by politics. Western historians have tended to write as protagonists in the cold war."⁶ Professional anti-communists are often at one with Right- and "Left"-wing revisionists of Marxism-Leninism in their assessment of the past and present history of the USSR.

The recent turn from cold war to détente has had a considerable effect on all spheres of socio-political life, including historiography. The first direct result of improved Soviet-American relations has been that many myths and dogmas created during the cold war years, the notorious

myth of a "Soviet menace", in particular, have been shattered. But, unfortunately, the cold war legacy has not all receded into the past. There are forces opposing international co-operation and advocating a return to the cold war, forces trying to apply any ideological brakes, including reactionary historical theories and concepts, to stop the process of détente. These forces hold important positions in sovietology, which emerged, as mentioned earlier, in the cold war atmosphere and has long been one of the chief suppliers of ideas and material for anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda.

Hence it is understandable why American historiography of Soviet society is a matter of more than academic interest. In the light of the struggle for relaxation of tension and international co-operation, the exposure of the unscientific nature of bourgeois sovietological concepts becomes a matter of special importance, a matter of historical necessity.

¹ George F. Kennan, "The Russian Revolution—Fifty Years After. Its Nature and Consequences", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 1, October 1967, p. 10.

² Robert C. Tucker, "On the Comparative Study of Communism", *World Politics*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, January 1967, p. 242.

³ John K. Fairbank, "Assignment for the '70s", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. LXXIV, No. 3, February 1969, pp. 861-63.

⁴ Richard Miller, *Teaching About Communism*, New York, 1966, p. 14.

⁵ Marx/Engels, *Ireland and the Irish Question*, Moscow, 1974, p. 211.

⁶ Ian Grey, *The First Fifty Years. Soviet Russia 1917-1967*, London, 1967, p. VII.

CHAPTER 1

SOVIETOLOGY: THE ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY OF SOVIET HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES

In its development American sovietology has been influenced by many factors connected with both the internal political life of the United States and the general state of international relations. An important role in intensifying Soviet studies was played by the cold war, unleashed by imperialist reaction against the socialist countries. At the same time, the intensive development of sovietology over the last two decades has reflected the increasing role of the Soviet Union in today's world. William Langer, a Harvard historian, stressed that "it is important, nay essential, to know as much as possible about so great a power".¹ The government apparatus' practical needs for more extensive information about a country exercising tremendous influence on the course of world events was one of the main reasons for the emergence and development of sovietology in the United States. "Since the end of the Second World War," wrote Arthur Adams of Michigan University, "a paramount problem for the Western world has been represented by the dynamic growth of the Soviet Union and by the continuing spread of world communism..." Hence, he went on, there was "great need" for studying the USSR. A sovietologist's task was "to inform and advise foreign ministries, prime ministers and presidents".²

The economic, scientific and cultural achievements of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries convincingly show

the advantages of the new socio-economic system and enhance the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideas. As a result, there has been increasing worldwide interest in the USSR. "...Indeed, people all over the world have a thirst for knowledge about Soviet affairs,"³ noted Robert Byrnes (Indiana University). "A generation ago," observes Michael Florinsky, "interest in Russia was limited to a relatively small group of specialists and intellectuals; today there is a widespread and mounting demand for authoritative, dependable, and clearly presented information on tsarist Russia and the USSR."⁴

The outstanding achievements of the Soviet people in space exploration stimulated the expansion of programmes of Soviet studies. As noted in a prominent American sovietological journal: "The first Soviet sputnik in 1957 had among its other effects the passage of the National Defence Education Act of 1958, which has contributed greatly to language and area instruction in this country by doubling the number studying Russian in the colleges and graduate schools over a decade".⁵

RESEARCH CENTRES AND INSTITUTES

The following figures show how fast Soviet studies have been developing in the United States since the end of the war. Whereas on the eve of the Second World War Russian history was taught at only a few leading universities, in 1964 courses in Soviet history were offered by 400 American universities and colleges.⁶ Between 1850 and 1950, a period of 100 years, some 250 doctoral dissertations on Russia and the Soviet Union had been approved in American universities. Between 1950 and 1963, a period of 13 years, approximately 1,000 dissertations on the same subject were approved.⁷

Mention should also be made of the torrent of publications which, to use the words of an employee of the library of

Congress, often leaves even the specialist, not to speak of the informed general reader and student, overwhelmed and disoriented. Between 1956 and 1962, some 9,000 books and articles on Russia and the Soviet Union were published in the United States.⁸

This "leap" became possible due to the financial support given by the country's major foundations. As pointed out in the book edited by Cyril Black and John Thompson foundations work closely with the universities. "...The development of Russian studies was largely a joint enterprise and neither partner in it could have succeeded without the guidance and assistance of the other."⁹

American research on the USSR and the People's Democracies is, in fact, financed mainly by foundations. Foundation grants have been responsible for the establishment of many East European and Russian institutes and centres and the publication of virtually all American works on the history of Soviet society or the People's Democracies. The same applies to the training of research personnel. In *A History of Slavic Studies in the United States*, Clarence Manning notes: "Most of these young men and women, who are today specialising actively, are persons who have received fellowships of some kind or value from one or another of the larger foundations (the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation)."¹⁰

With the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Russian Institute was established at Columbia University (New York) in 1946. The institute's objectives included the development of research in the social sciences and the humanities as they relate to Russia and the Soviet Union, and the training of well-qualified American Russian-Soviet specialists in business, finance, journalism, in various branches of government service for scholarly or professional careers and teaching.¹¹

This institute is the second largest Soviet studies centre in the United States after the Harvard Russian Research

Centre; however, between 1960 and 1964 it ranked first in number of doctoral dissertations approved (these two universities account for a third of all doctoral dissertations on Russia and the Soviet Union approved in the United States).¹² The institute produces hundreds of monographs and articles, and the emphasis in research work is on the history of the Soviet period.

In 1948, the Carnegie Corporation sponsored the founding of a Russian research centre at Harvard University. It was no accident that the corporation chose Harvard, for in 1946 the Harvard administration had begun regular studies of the USSR under a special research programme. The agreement between the Carnegie Corporation and Harvard University was bound to affect the activity of the new centre.¹³

The third major centre for Soviet and Slavic studies in the United States is the Centre for Slavic and East European Studies at the University of California (Berkeley). Other influential institutes of this kind include the Russian Research Centre at Yale University (New Haven, Connecticut), employing many specialists and producing a considerable number of publications, and the Russian and East European Institute at Indiana University (Bloomington). At Indiana University a special institute for studying Soviet law was established in 1963. The University of Washington (Seattle, Washington) has the Far Eastern and Russian Institute. There is a centre for Soviet studies at Niagara University, and a Russian research centre at Louisiana University. Various programmes of Russian and Soviet studies are being carried out at Stanford, Princeton, Syracuse, New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania State and Cornell universities, the universities of Chicago, Illinois, Kansas City, Minnesota, Pittsburgh, Wisconsin and other universities.

An important role in American sovietology is played by Catholic centres, such as the Centre for Soviet and East European Studies at the University of Notre Dame, the Institute of Contemporary Russian Studies at Fordham

University (New York), the Slavic Centre at Marquette University (Milwaukee, Wisconsin) and the Institute for Soviet and East European Studies at John Carroll University (Cleveland, Ohio).

To one extent or another nearly all American universities conduct research in the field of Soviet studies. There are specialists in Russian and Soviet history at the universities of Delaware, Oklahoma, Virginia, Vermont, Texas, Florida, South Carolina and Georgia and at Wayne State University. Major forces of sovietology are concentrated at Princeton University, one of the oldest universities in the United States. At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology research on the Soviet Union is conducted by the Centre for International Studies. Intensive studies of the USSR are conducted by the RAND Corporation and the Hudson Institute.

As socialist ideas became increasingly popular and the number of countries embarking on the road of socialist transformations grew, greater attention was paid in the United States to expanding the activity of "research institutes" designed to provide a "scientific" refutation of Marxism-Leninism. For example, Columbia University's Research Institute on Communist Affairs, established in 1961 with the objective of studying the world aspects of communism and the most important features of the internal development of the socialist countries, employs specialists on the Soviet Union and East European and Asian countries and conducts "comparative studies" of the politics, ideology, economics and law of the socialist countries. It also studies the influence of the attractive force of communism on different social and national groups in Asian, African and Latin American countries. In effect, one of the institute's objectives is to wage ideological struggle against the growing influence of communism. The importance of this task was demonstrated by the fact that Zbigniew Brzezinski, a specialist on relations within the "communist bloc", was invited to head the institute.

The Institute on Communist Strategy and Propaganda at the University of Southern California (Los Angeles) was also established in 1961. Its purpose was to conduct research into problems of interest to academic and government circles. R. Swearingen, an expert on the world communist movement and formerly with the State Department and the Russian Research Centre, became head of the institute.

Also in 1961, a special research centre for "communist studies" was organised at St. Louis University. The same period saw the emergence of the George Washington University Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies. Its objectives included training specialists, carrying out government assignments and organising courses for government officials.

There are now approximately 170 research establishments in the United States studying the Soviet Union and preparing various ideological action programmes. These institutes account for most of the sovietological literature, train most of the specialists and determine the general state of affairs in American sovietology. But one cannot overlook the work done by the numerous minor "research bodies", such as university departments, various courses, special programmes and committees.

PERIODICALS

An important part of the complicated machinery of sovietology is its periodical literature. In the United States there is a considerable number of historical journals of both a general and special nature. Moreover, American historians often write articles for political periodicals.

The most authoritative historical journal in the United States is the *American Historical Review*, published by the American Historical Association since 1884. It is basically an academic journal. Although fairly thick, it contains rather few articles; the greater part of its space being taken up by reviews of new historical publications coming out both in

the United States and abroad, including the USSR and other socialist countries. Occasionally, however, it carries articles on Soviet history.

The leading journal of Soviet and Slavic studies in the United States is the *Slavic Review*, a quarterly dealing with problems of the history of the USSR and East European countries, as well as with problems of sociology, philosophy, and literature. Its issues frequently contain reviews of works by Soviet historians.

The quarterly *Russian Review*, a superficial magazine even by the standards of American sovietology, publishes articles of a tendentious and anti-communist character. Similar to it is the journal *Communist Affairs*, published since July 1962 every two months by the Research Institute on Communist Strategy and Propaganda.

To these should be added the various university periodicals, such as the *Journal of Central European Affairs*, issued since 1941 by Colorado University and subsidised by the Ford Foundation; *Journal of East European History* (University of Chicago); *Pacific-Asiatic and Russian Studies* (Stanford University); *Russian Area Studies* (George Washington University); *Slavic Studies* (Institute of Slavic Studies, University of California); and *Russian Studies* (Syracuse University). The *Slavic and East European Journal*, published by the University of Wisconsin, is the organ of the American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages. The journal *Critique*, issued three times a year by Harvard University, is a review of Soviet publications on the history of the USSR.

A special information service in New York issues two bibliographical quarterlies with annotations: a review of current Soviet literature about Soviet society and a review of Soviet literature on Asia, Africa and Latin America. Similar reference books are published by some libraries, the Library of Congress among them.

Another group of periodicals are those issued by government agencies and departments. The best known among these

is the journal *Problems of Communism*, published by USIA. Materials on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe appear more or less frequently in official publications of the Department of Labour, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Commerce. The Bureau of Statistics and the State Department issue bibliographies of Soviet and East European studies. The Senate and House of Representatives occasionally issue publications dealing with socialist countries.

Articles on Soviet history are also published in other historical journals, such as the *Journal of Modern History*, issued jointly by the University of Chicago and the American Historical Association, and *Current History*, some issues of which are devoted to problems of Soviet history and foreign policy.

Articles on Soviet history are also printed in *Far Eastern Survey*, a monthly organ of the American Institute of Pacific Relations; the quarterly *American Political Science Review*, the organ of the American Political Science Association; the *World Affairs Quarterly*, issued by the University of California; and *World Politics*. Finally, the influential journal, *Foreign Affairs*, often carries articles not only on the foreign, but also on the home policy of the USSR.

American sovietology seeks to increase its influence on Western sovietology in general and to penetrate Asia, Africa and Latin America, as evidenced above all by the vast export of sovietological publications to foreign book markets. American libraries opened by the US Government in various countries offer a large variety of sovietological literature.

American sovietologists co-operate with their foreign colleagues also within the framework of a kind of "academic integration", which involves exchanging specialists, translating books by American and foreign authors, reviewing and discussing works published in America and abroad, and holding international conferences.

The contacts between American sovietology and West German Ostforschung are especially close. In the United States, books by West German authors such as Klaus Mehnert and Günther Nollau are translated and published, reviews of Ostforschung publications appear regularly, and West German researchers are invited to give lectures. The University of Oklahoma, for instance, maintains close ties with West German sovietologists; it arranges exchange lecture courses and co-ordinates research work.

American sovietologists have taken part in a number of conferences convened by West German "experts on the East", such as, for instance, the international symposium on the history of Soviet agriculture in February 1964 and the special conference on Soviet philosophy, ideology and society, held in the FRG in April 1964.

American sovietologists establish similar contacts with colleagues in Britain, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and other countries. They take an active part in foreign sovietological periodicals, both international (such as *Survey* or *Studies in Soviet Thought*) and national (such as the British *Soviet Studies* and West German *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*).

HISTORICAL STUDIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF "ORGANISED RESEARCH"

The classics of Marxism-Leninism always rejected the myth that social sciences were impartial and supraclass in character. "...No living person," wrote Lenin, "*can help taking the side of one class or another (once he has understood their interrelationships), can help rejoicing at the successes of that class and being disappointed by its failures. . .*"¹⁴ The position, aims, ideology and policies of a class determine the character of its science. This is partly admitted by bourgeois scholars themselves. Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago wrote that along with the military-industrial complex there is in the United States an academic-

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political complex in which the interests of the government circles are intertwined with the interests of large groups of academics.¹⁵

Of course, to say that American bourgeois historiography is a mere duplicate of US government doctrine would be an oversimplification. Historiography is a complex phenomenon, no less complex than the society whose processes it reflects. Its development and results are largely conditioned by its own inner laws and methodology. The facts show, however, that social control over historical science is quite strong. How is it exercised? What guarantees the fulfilment by American bourgeois historiography of the tasks assigned to it? As we know, the importance of science is growing in our day, and this, in turn, affects the status of the scientist. According to sociologist David Riesman, the status of the American intellectual today is different from what it was in the last century, when he "had to defer to the 'practical' men, the men of business and affairs".¹⁶ As observed in a book about the role of science in contemporary America, the American Government, in pursuing its political aims, "has found it necessary to call upon the skills and talents of intellectuals to a degree unmatched since the early days of the New Deal. Out of this need a new role for the intellectual has evolved in postwar American society."¹⁷ The rapidly increasing importance of science has brought into being a "new priesthood", a "breed of scientist-politician... a strange political animal".¹⁸

But as science gained in importance, it became subject to increasing pressure from the military-industrial complex, and in fact from all reactionary sections of American society, which regard with suspicion any manifestation of independence on the part of scientists and seek in every way to preserve and strengthen control over research activity. Henry K. Stanford, President of the University of Miami (Florida), wrote about interference in university affairs by certain groups whose speciality is "fighting communism". These groups, noted Stanford, "see in the integrity of a university

a possible threat [?!—B.M.] to the security of the United States".¹⁹

Lenin stressed that "imperialism is the epoch of finance capital and of monopolies, which introduce everywhere the striving for domination, not for freedom".²⁰ Whereas the pre-imperialist bourgeoisie, which had a certain amount of confidence in the stability of the bourgeois system, allowed a "free competition of ideas", nowadays, when the bankruptcy of bourgeois ideology and its inability to guide the masses are obvious, liberalism and carelessness are thrown overboard. What bourgeois society wants today is conformism. General indifference to formal ideology is curiously coupled with an emphasis on continuity of values, uniformity—if only outward—and fear of criticism even within the framework of "Americanism". An important form of preserving orthodoxy in American historiography is the system of organising research work.

The American professional historian usually works within a vast teaching and research system, and his material well-being, his career and his confidence in the morrow depend on his interrelationships with that system. Independent research is not easily achieved under the prevailing conditions; it is not only costly, but also needs special facilities, such as access to archives, etc.

It should also be borne in mind that the American academic system, though outwardly democratic, shows marked castelike features, and its brahmans sedulously guard its borders against incursion by the heterodox. Unwritten, but definite rules are observed which make for scientific orthodoxy. Writing about this, Lewis Feuer, a lecturer in philosophy and sociology from the University of California at Berkeley, added that this trend towards scientific orthodoxy inevitably leads to fruitlessness, routine and stagnation.²¹

James Billington, Professor of History at Princeton University, wrote that historians in the Anglo-American world "seem to seek to become purveyors of a consensus" rather than undertake original research.²²

Moreover, according to sociologist William Whyte, the contemporary social organisation of science in the United States "has been producing highly competent scientists, but scientists who are trained to work efficiently only in groups—and who are not acclimated to individual inquiry".²³ The existence of these enormous professional groups is fraught with serious consequences both for science and for scientists. Research (both in the exact sciences and in the social sciences) is becoming bureaucratised, mechanised and standardised. Social control, expressed in categories of the "generally accepted", is much more strongly felt here. "Organised science" creates possibilities for control over the subjects of research, although, formally, recommendations in this sphere do not have the force of law. According to Whyte, "the ambitious younger man takes his cues from these guides, and those who prefer (independently.—*B.M.*) to look into questions unasked by others need a good bit of intellectual fortitude to do so".²⁴

The whole system of training, placing and promoting researchers works to prevent "misfires", that is, the appearance in strategically important positions of people who do not do what is expected of them. As Morris Cohen wrote: "The conditions of scholarship in American universities at first resulted in the selection of teachers predominantly for their orthodox piety or their social acceptability, and today the pressure to publish rather than to engage in fundamental study is hardly favourable to the cultivation of profound scholarship."²⁵ The bureaucratisation in the American academic world has brought into being a new type of scholar, an academic bureaucrat-administrator, a kind of academic entrepreneur, who makes no particular contribution to research himself, but nonetheless is in charge of such affairs as selection of subjects for research and allocation of funds.

An important instrument of control over historical research in the United States is the policy of allocating funds for academic needs. Besides federal and state government

assistance, an important role is played by donations from individuals and from philanthropic, or non-commercial, institutions called foundations. The latter play an especially significant role in financing research and establishing new research centres.

There are about 11,000 foundations in the United States, the best known being the Rockefeller, Carnegie, Ford and Sloan foundations. Since the philanthropic foundations in America are tax exempt, they possess tremendous sums of money, part of which they give to universities and other research and educational institutions. For instance, the Ford Foundation gave approximately \$1,800 million to 5,000 educational institutions between 1936, when it was established, and 1963. In 1960, it granted over \$15 million to Harvard and Columbia universities and the University of California, and over \$3 million to ten other universities and colleges, four of which were located abroad. Another major foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, spends \$35 million annually for various philanthropic purposes, including the financing of research. This is what Arnold Rose, a professor of sociology at the University of Minnesota, had to say about the consequences of this state of affairs: "Control over educational policy is sometimes directly in the hands of those who wield financial control."²⁶ With respect to historical science, the foundations are not only patrons, but also controllers, taking far from a neutral position in what would seem purely academic questions.

A typical feature of the existing situation in American historical science is the merging of research organisations with the government apparatus. On the whole, this is part of the general process of "governmentalising" science in the United States, where science is being "institutionalised" as an important branch of government activity. American scholarship is directly represented in the government apparatus, and scholars are invited for various consultations, investigations, etc. "There is no doubt," wrote Avery Leiserson (Vanderbilt University), who had made a study of

the problem, "that the university scientists have acquired a strong position among the seats of the mighty."²⁷ The term "scientific establishment" may be the most appropriate to describe the existing state of affairs. The American Government gives financial and other support not only to programmes for training specialists but also to research projects in which it is interested, or places direct orders with research centres to conduct such projects.²⁸ Between 1959 and 1966, 145 scholarships were financed with federal funds in 30 different programmes of East European studies. Over those seven years the government contributed a total of \$2 million to these studies.²⁹ In June 1967, Robert Slusser (the Johns Hopkins University) wrote: "A noteworthy recent development in American scholarship in the fields of Soviet studies and the study of international communism has been the sharp increase in scope and importance of government-supported research."³⁰

The system whereby the government places direct orders with research institutes shows the extent to which American professional scholarship services the government's political needs. For instance, in the early 1960s, government agencies let twenty-five contracts to Princeton, Harvard, Yale, Stanford and other universities and research institutes.³¹

The military departments (the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force) also actively co-operate with research institutes specialising in the study of the USSR and other socialist countries. They conclude contracts with various institutes and centres with the aim of obtaining needed information or an assessment of certain processes or events. As stated by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, federal departments commissioned that institution to carry out special research plans.³² Its collections of literature and documents have been used by the State Department, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the FBI and the military departments. American universities took an active part in military and political research connected with the war in Vietnam.

Regarding the relationship between scholars and the government in the United States, Hans Morgenthau has pointed out that the government seeks either to silence and corrupt scholars, turning them into its agents, or, if this fails, to discredit them. To avoid conflict and save their careers many scholars prefer a compromise: in their writings, they either come to conclusions that suit the ruling circles or work on "safe", neutral subjects. "A future historian... will write the story of the far-flung, systematic, and largely successful efforts embarked upon by the government to suppress the truth and to bend it to its political interests." American intellectuals are subjected to constant pressure and become "either the tools or the victims" of such efforts."³³

In the period of McCarthyism some scholars holding independent views were ostracised, fired from their jobs and blacklisted. Obscurantist attacks on American scholarship came both from without and from within academia. In an article written at that time, Howard Beale, a liberal professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, observed: "We have our own witch-hunters..."³⁴ "Patriotically minded" guardians of order held the accusation of "pro-communism" like the sword of Damocles over the heads of real or potential deviators from the official line.

Although McCarthyism has receded into the past, not all of its consequences have been eliminated, as seen, for instance, from the Statement on Academic Freedom, approved unanimously at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association in December 1964, which reads: "There are individuals and groups in our society who periodically attack teachers of history and the social studies, textbooks, and other teaching materials on the grounds they are subversive of the American way of life.... Attacks frequently take the form of irresponsible and malicious charges injurious to the reputation of teachers and authors of teaching materials.... Unfounded attacks have led to the dismissal of competent teachers and the removal of useful teaching materials..."³⁵ "Anti-intellectualism in various

forms continues to pervade American life ..." observed Richard Hofstadter, a prominent American historian.³⁶

The American bourgeois society subjects all American citizens, including historians, to intensive ideological pressures. At the same time, it seeks to establish the political and ideological principles of the ruling circles in historical research. The predominant ideological and political trends serve both as blinders and guidelines for the scholar. In any case, an historian, especially one working on a subject of current political significance, feels the pressure of political and ideological factors quite sharply. Anatole Mazour, one of the oldest American specialists in Soviet history, made a very symptomatic statement on this score: "Writing in a tense atmosphere of ... the 'cold war', a writer exposes himself to further perils of seriously testing his non-partisanship."³⁷

In that period some bourgeois historians hastily cast away impartiality and objectivity, that old-fashioned ideal, considered the highest virtue of the old-time scholar. As Conyers Read, one of the presidents of the American Historical Association, wrote: "... Atomic bombs make quick decisions imperative. The liberal neutral attitude... will no longer suffice. ... Total war, whether it be hot or cold, enlists everyone and calls upon everyone to assume his part. The historian is no freer from this obligation than the physicist."³⁸ According to the "instrumentalist" view of historiography, observed another president, C. Vann Woodward, history is "an instrument of political or social action."³⁹

Political tendentiousness is especially typical of works on Soviet history. Some American sovietologists have written openly about it. The authors of books on Soviet history, observed Adam Ulam, are very biased because sovietology cannot be politically neutral.⁴⁰ In reviewing an essay by Stefan T. Possony, George Carson (Oregon State University) wrote: "In Stefan T. Possony's essay... politics seems more important than history, or, perhaps better, historical interests is a function of the author's place on the political spect-

rum... Lenin, the Bolsheviks, and all their works [the Soviet regime is of course the current incarnation] are anathema."⁴¹ According to Robert Warth, "a majority of historians [American.—B.M.], as befits their training and environments, betray an implicit distaste for the Bolsheviks as compared with their democratic [?!—B.M.] rivals."⁴² One cannot, of course, expect a historian who proceeds from an unobjective premise and political prejudices to do objective research.

Another important circumstance should be mentioned. The study of Soviet history in the United States has from its very beginning been under the influence of conservative elements since an important role in organising Soviet studies and training specialists was played by White Russian émigrés who occupied a prominent position in American universities. Many of today's American specialists on the USSR were taught by émigré historians. The influence of this school is still observable. In 1967, R. Beermann of Glasgow University wrote that in analysing the contribution made by the Russian post-1917 emigration to Western civilisation one should not forget "its importance for social sciences in general and sociology in particular".⁴³

¹ *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 99, No. 1, Philadelphia, 1955, p. 34.

² Arthur E. Adams, "The Hybrid Art of Sovietology", *Survey*, No. 50, January 1964, p. 154.

³ Robert F. Byrnes, "Reflections on American Training Programs on Russia", *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXI, No. 3, September 1962, p. 491.

⁴ Michael N. Florinsky's Introduction in Michael Rywkin's *Russia in Central Asia*, New York, London, 1963, p. 5.

⁵ Marshall D. Shulman, "The Future of Soviet Studies in the United States", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 1970, p. 585.

⁶ *The New York Times*, April 3, 1964, p. 19.

⁷ Walter Laqueur, "In Search of Russia", *Survey*, No. 50, January 1964, p. 47.

⁸ *Russia and the Soviet Union. Bibliographic Guide to Western-Language Publications*. Ed. by Paul Horecky, Chicago, London, 1965, p. VI.

- ⁹ *American Teaching About Russia*. Ed. by Cyril E. Black and John M. Thompson, Bloomington, 1959, p. 53.
- ¹⁰ Clarence A. Manning, *A History of Slavic Studies in the United States*, Milwaukee, 1957, p. 81.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 76.
- ¹² See *Slavic Review*, December 1964, p. 797.
- ¹³ *Russian Research Center, Harvard University. Ten-Year Report and Current Projects, 1948-1958*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1958, p. 5.
- ¹⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 531.
- ¹⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Truth and Power. The Intellectuals and the Johnson Administration", *The New Republic*, November 26, 1966, p. 13. Other American writers note this process. See, for example, W. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man*, New York, 1957, pp. 239-53.
- ¹⁶ David Riesman, *Individualism Reconsidered*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1955, p. 127.
- ¹⁷ Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, *Schools for Strategy. Education and Research in National Security Affairs*, New York, Washington, London, 1965, p. IX.
- ¹⁸ Ralph E. Lapp, *The New Priesthood. The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power*, New York, Evanston, London, 1965, p. 189.
- ¹⁹ *School and Society*, March 5, 1966, pp. 123-25.
- ²⁰ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 297.
- ²¹ Lewis S. Feuer, "American Philosophy Is Dead", *The New York Times Magazine*, April 24, 1966, p. 31.
- ²² James R. Billington, "Six Views of the Russian Revolution", *World Politics*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, April 1966, p. 458.
- ²³ William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man*, Garden City, New York, 1957, p. 264.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 244.
- ²⁵ Morris R. Cohen, *American Thought: A Critical Sketch*, New York, 1962, p. 37.
- ²⁶ Arnold M. Rose, *Sociology. The Study of Human Relations*, New York, 1965, p. 284. Rose writes further that "in American universities the president is appointed by the board of trustees.... He is conceived of as equivalent to the president of a corporation...." (*Ibid.*, p. 285).
- ²⁷ Avery Leiserson, "Scientists and the Policy Process", *The American Political Science Review*, June 1965, pp. 413, 415.
- ²⁸ See Lyman Legters, "The Government Stake in East European Studies", *The Russian Review*, October 1966, pp. 383-84.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 389. For instance, the National Science Foundation financed the works by Nicholas de Witt and Alexander Korol on the Soviet education system.
- ³⁰ *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, June 1967, p. 324.
- ³¹ Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, *Schools for Strategy. Education*

- and Research in National Security Affairs*, New York, 1965, pp. 9-10.
- ³² As stated in special publication of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, 1963, p. 18.
- ³³ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Truth and Power", *The New Republic*, November 26, 1966, pp. 11, 13.
- ³⁴ Howard K. Beale, "The Professional Historian: 'His Theory and His Practice'", *Pacific Historical Review*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, August 1953, p. 253.
- ³⁵ *The American Historical Review*, April 1965, pp. 972-73.
- ³⁶ Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, New York, 1963, p. 393.
- ³⁷ Anatole G. Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography*, New York, 1958, p. VII.
- ³⁸ *The American Historical Review*, New York, January 1950, p. 283.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, February 1970, p. 724.
- ⁴⁰ Adam Ulam, "USA: Some Critical Reflections", *Survey*, January 1964, pp. 53-61.
- ⁴¹ *The American Historical Review*, December 1967, p. 441.
- ⁴² Robert D. Warth, "On the Historiography of the Russian Revolution", *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, June 1967, p. 257.
- ⁴³ *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, April 1967, p. 532.

CHAPTER 2
SOVIET STUDIES:
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

In defining the nature and practice of sovietology, Arthur Adams of the University of Michigan made a comparison with the ancient augurs of Rome on the one hand, and with electronic computers on the other.¹ His comparison should be understood in the sense that the sovietologists—these modern augurs with electronic computers—base their predictions on modern technology. The old Roman augurs depended basically on their own cleverness plus a small collection of ceremonial accessories; the sovietologists often claim to be using scientific methods. But is the assumed difference so great?

The authors of a collection of articles entitled *The State of Soviet Studies*, published in 1965 in the United States, essentially establish the fact that the theoretical foundations of Soviet studies are in a state of crisis. Adams wrote that "such theories have created a bad image for sovietology by making it seem to be a field of study where irresponsible guesswork and the wildest theorising are standard practice".² Touching on the same question, James Billington of Princeton expressed surprise "that this well-subsidised and well-populated area of scholarship has produced so few works of comparable scholarly thoroughness and detail".³

In discussing the tasks of bourgeois historiography with regard to the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution,

Dimitri von Mohrenschildt, the editor of *The Russian Review*, stressed: "The time has come to draw up a balance sheet of the fifty years of Soviet rule and assess the forces of stability as well as those that seem to be indicative of the system's disruption and decline."⁴ During the past few decades bourgeois scholars worked hard seeking to "prove" either the "instability" and "transiency" or the "degeneration" and "erosion" of the Soviet socialist system. Life has disproved their "scientific forecasts". Ignoring the historical facts, bourgeois ideologists persistently spoke of the "disruption and decline" of the system which today determines the main content, the main direction and the main features of mankind's historical development.

In an article written on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Soviet power, T. H. von Laue of Washington University claimed that the past years had proved the vitality of the capitalist system, certain ingredients of which are in his view "basic to a successful urban industrial society anywhere, even under 'socialism' ". In this connection he declared that the basic contradiction of this epoch, the contradiction between socialism and capitalism (or, to use his words, the contrast between a young Russia and an old West) had lost its significance, having given way to the contrast between the economically advanced and the developing countries.⁵ The social meaning of many sovietological works amounted to asserting the thesis that the capitalist system, as the "leading model" and "global prototype" for all mankind, was superior to socialism. To prove this thesis was the primary aim of the modern augurs armed with computers.

THE "RUSSIAN EXCLUSIVENESS" THEORY

American bourgeois historiography offered two basic interpretations of Russian and Soviet history. One took as its starting point the idea that there was a fundamental

difference and even contrast between the Russian historical process and the development of the Western countries. The other, on the contrary, regarded Russian history as the history of a backward European country which was destined to repeat the development of the more advanced Western countries. These theories, though representing the two extreme poles in the development of bourgeois historiographical thought, had certain features in common. Both the theory of "Russian exclusiveness" and its antipode, the theory of the "non-independence" of Russia's historical development, essentially followed from the same premise—the idea that Russia had a special historical fate: she was destined either to stand outside the general laws of the development of "Western civilisation" or always to follow the West in vain hopes of catching up with it. American sovietologists made extensive use of the idea of "Russian exclusiveness" (in various degrees of concentration) as an important element of numerous schemes interpreting the history of Soviet society.

In the accumulation and hypertrophy of borrowed ideas used by American sovietology, the idea of "Russia's exclusiveness", of the dissimilarity between the historical development of Russia and that of the West, is no exception. Essentially it was part of the ideological baggage brought over to the United States by the émigré professoriat (émigré historians helped not only to organise the study of Soviet history in the United States but also to "conceptualise" it).⁶ The thesis that Russia's historical destinies were of an "exclusive" nature, that her past was allegedly totally different from the past of the rest of the world, originated in reactionary monarchist historiography (N. M. Karamzin, M. P. Pogodin, and others). It was preached by the Slavophiles (K. S. Aksakov, A. S. Khomyakov, I. V. Kireyevsky) and their followers (N. Y. Danilevsky, K. N. Leontyev and V. S. Solovyov). The contrasting of Russia and Western Europe is also found in works by other bourgeois historiographers of prerevolutionary Russia.

The adherents of this view proceeded either from the peculiarity of Russia's geography and specific features of her historical development (her position as "Europe's outskirts", the need to fight nomads and to colonise vast lands, "the struggle between the forest and the steppe", the adoption of Orthodox Christianity, and the Tatar invasion), or from specific features of the national character, represented as being diametrically opposite to the character of other peoples (F. Dostoyevsky, V. Solovyov and N. Berdyaev).

An important role in developing the American variety of the "Russian exclusiveness" theory was played by the so-called Eurasian school, a representative of which, the White émigré Vernadsky, was one of the founders of American sovietology.

This school emerged in the turmoil of emigration. Its origins are connected with the publication in 1921, in Sofia, of a collection of articles by N. Trubetskoy, P. Savitsky, P. Suvchinsky and G. Florinsky, entitled *Exodus to the East. Presentiments and Accomplishments. Self-Assertion of Eurasians*. Later this group was joined by L. Karsavin, G. Vernadsky, N. Tol and others. In the 1920s and 1930s, the new school became very popular in the émigré world. The Eurasians published seven collections of works by various authors (the last one came out in 1931), a few individual works and several issues of the journal *Eurasian Chronicle*.

The Eurasian school represented a peculiar combination of the ideas of the Slavophiles and a kind of geopolitical mysticism. Its members viewed Russian history from the standpoint of Russia's ties with Europe and Asia. Vernadsky emphasised that Asia was as much an integral part of Russia as was Europe, if not more so. According to the Eurasians, this geographical factor had tremendous consequences for history: the original Mongol expansion to the West and the subsequent expansion of the Russians to the East were dictated, they said, by geopolitical conditions, by the struggle to implement the idea of creating a "Eurasian" state.

In developing the historical theory of the Eurasian school Vernadsky stressed the crucial significance to Russian history of the relations between the "steppe" and "forest" societies in the vast expanses of the "Eurasian" plain, the ethnic and cultural diversity of Russia, and the "fundamental organic contribution" of the Eastern peoples, above all the Mongols. At the same time, the Eurasian school sharply condemned the Western orientation of Russian thought and culture, declaring that Russia's development after the reforms of Peter the Great was a tragic error. Ignoring scientifically established facts, they held that the peoples of the "Russian world" were neither Europeans nor Asians, but "Eurasians". Although this theory did not deny the diversity of factors involved in shaping the "Eurasian" character of Russian history, it stressed the predominant influence of Asia, of the East.

By focussing attention to the "specific features" of Russian geography, history and national character, the adherents of the "Russian exclusiveness" theory sought to prove that the October Revolution and its consequences were not at all manifestations of general historical laws but merely reflected strictly Russian peculiarities. In other words, the ideological crux of this theory amounts to denying the world historical significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the building of socialism and communism in the USSR.

In studying the past of the United States, some American historians also proceed from the idea of exclusiveness. But what a different meaning this idea assumes when applied to the United States! The "American exclusiveness" theory is based on the postulate that, by virtue of the specific character of her geography and history, America is "God's chosen" country, that the American way of life is the greatest achievement of civilisation, and that the unique combination of economic strength and intellectual and practical genius enables America to build a new world, better than the "sinful" societies of the Old World.

It need not be repeated here that when in the late eighteenth century the Americans, having challenged the monarchies, won and strengthened their independence, their state and social system was more advanced than that of Europe (although one should not forget that the democracy of Jefferson and Jackson was limited, to say nothing of the fact that Negro slavery existed). Irreversible changes have taken place in American society since those days. Nevertheless, the dogma of the moral and political "superiority" of American society still occupies a central place in many works of American bourgeois historiography.

It is from this standpoint (the standpoint of Americo-Centrism) that many bourgeois historians view the past of other peoples. "American values" are the criterion for making assessments; the level of one or another country's development is determined by the degree to which it corresponds with the "American model". It is clear that the American version of the "Russian exclusiveness" theory was conceived as an antithesis to "American exclusiveness" and ultimately boiled down to a concentration of false notions about Russia and the Russian people.

The unscientific character of the "Russian exclusiveness" theory manifests itself not only in the marked exaggeration of the influence on the historical process of such factors as geographical environment or national character, but also in the arbitrary, subjectivist interpretation of these factors. Most characteristic is the approach used in studying the specific features of the "Russian national spirit". The "enigmatic Russian soul", this inevitable accessory of a vast anti-communist literature, is nothing other than an idealist construct which is regarded as an eternal and immutable category. Moreover, this literature endows the "Russian soul" with traits and features that have little relation to reality.

For instance, Hans Kohn, one of the better-known students of the mystical "Russian spirit", citing isolated statements by F. Dostoyevsky and N. Danilevsky, asserts that expan-

sionism, messianism and totalitarianism are highly characteristic of the Russian people.⁷ Stuart Tompkins says that distinctive of the "Russian spirit", in contrast to the national features of the West European peoples, are fanaticism, intolerance, the habit of obeying and, at the same time, anarchism.⁸ Janko Lavrin ascribes to the Russian people highly contradictory national features ranging from a love of extremes to fatalism and the cult of suffering.⁹

The thesis of the "exclusiveness" of Russian history is the same as the philosophy of stagnation in history, the assertion of the immutable predominance of primordial, eternal and, in fact, mythical factors.

Our turbulent epoch with its rapid changes sweeps away the metaphysical and idealist concepts of immutability of the world, society, nature and man.

Instead of engaging in fantasies about the special features of the "Russian or Slavic soul", of the "Slavic mind", Soviet historians study the historical, political and cultural life of the Slavic peoples from the standpoint of the general laws of the world historical process, without opposing the Slavs to other peoples. Marxist students of Slavic history explain the common features in the history, culture and language of the Slavic peoples as the result of their common ethnic origins, the contiguity of their territories, and their economic, political and cultural ties throughout the centuries. The spirit of nationalistic self-isolation and all idealist tendencies to seek out and overemphasise some kind of specific psychological traits supposedly characteristic only of Slavdom are alien to Soviet Slavic studies. Developing as a branch of Marxist-Leninist social science, Soviet Slavic studies are by their very essence permeated with the noble ideals of proletarian, socialist internationalism; they are meant to serve the cause of strengthening the friendship between peoples and to cultivate socialist ideology and morality.¹⁰

The theoretical exercises of the sovietologists have nothing to do with learning the laws of social development or

ascertaining Russia's real place in the course of world history. On the contrary, all the energies of these theoreticians are directed towards historically substantiating the proposition that there is a fundamental contrast between Russia and the West, and thereby substituting an imaginary opposition of Western and Eastern "cultures" for the real opposition of two socio-political systems (socialism and capitalism).

In order to somehow make both ends meet, the exponents of the theory of East-West opposition wrongly interpreted Marxism-Leninism, developing the thesis that Leninism was "anti-West" in essence. As a result of a fusion with the national spirit, declared Robert Daniels, Lenin's theory lost its class content and turned into a theory of the struggle of the less developed countries of the East against the industrial West. "In the context of East-West relations communism represents a specific form of the rebellious Eastern reaction to Westernisation."¹¹

Adherents within American sovietology to the notion that Russian history was non-European in nature also drew on the conclusions of German sovietologists, particularly their conclusion regarding Russia's "innate backwardness". A book by Werner Keller, translated from the German and published in New York under the ostentatious title of *East Minus West=Zero*, stated, for example, that from the very beginning of their history the Russians displayed an inaptitude for scientific and technological progress and were forced to borrow knowledge from the West. However, after the Soviet successes in space exploration, little faith is placed in such fabrications. Even the translator of Keller's book into English described it as "part of the cold war".¹²

Myths about a fundamental opposition and hostility between "two destinies"—Russia and the West—collapse when an elementary juxtaposition with the facts is made. After all, historians could not have been unaware that the "antagonist" country more than once saved European civilisation, and in particular from a threat of such patently

"Western" origin as German and Italian fascism. Students of Russian literature and art, for example, found it impossible to squeeze their subject into the narrow framework of an Asiatic scheme. To whom do Tolstoy, Chekhov, Dostoyevsky, Russian ballet, Russian painting, Russian music belong? To the East or to the West? The artificiality of the scheme is so obvious here that a detailed argument is pointless. In an article entitled "Russian Literature and the West", Rufus Mathewson wrote that although there were periods of mutual isolation between Russia and the West there is "a common logic of development, a shared process of evolution. . . . Russian culture has no vital existence of its own apart from Europe".¹³

Some American writers (S. V. Utechin, Jesse Clarkson) long ago expressed disagreement with opposing Russia and the West.¹⁴ Others advanced a "compromise" concept: Russia is a symbiosis, a mixture of elements of the East and the West. Henry Roberts suggested replacing the "Russia-West polarity" by the conception of a "European spectrum": its various parts differ one from the other, but they are parts of a single whole.¹⁵ In criticising the unjustified opposition of Russian and Western destinies, some American historians (Jesse Clarkson, for example) have gone to extremes, coming out with the idea of the "non-independence" of Russia's historical development.¹⁶ Graham Stephenson even suggested that modern Russian history should be interpreted from the point of view of Western influence.¹⁷

Marxist historical science has shown the scientific untenability of the theory of "Russian exclusiveness". In studies based on concrete material, Marxist historians have revealed the unity of the world historical process; they have proved that however specific the conditions in different countries may be, social development is everywhere governed by the same general laws. With all of Russia's specific features, her historical development is an integral part of the world historical process. All the basic historical patterns have manifested themselves in the history of Russia. The unsci-

entific nature of the theory of "Russian exclusiveness" also becomes obvious when the basic problems of the history of the USSR are analysed concretely.

THE CONTINUITY CONCEPT

Underlying the sovietological theses on the "immanence of the Russian spirit", "the stability of geography" and "the predetermination of destiny" is an invariable, static principle lending Russian history the character of immobility and stagnation. But the concept of continuity, which implies the equivalence (in the broadest sense of the word) of all the periods in the history of the USSR, appeared much later than the theory of "Russian exclusiveness", actually in the 1950s, at the height of the cold war. Its appearance was partly conditioned by the desire of anti-communist ideologists to counter the universal spread of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism after the Second World War, the formation of the socialist community, and the growth of the Soviet Union's influence and prestige. By associating the USSR with tsarist Russia, some sovietologists were trying not only to discredit the Soviet socialist system, but to portray the growth of the forces of socialism as being the result of a Soviet "expansionist policy" that allegedly continued the expansionist traditions of tsarism.

The propaganda quality of the continuity concept could be seen from the fact that one of the first to spread it was *Life* magazine, which in the early 1950s reproduced the diary of the Marquis de Custine, a French monarchist who visited the Russia of Nicholas I in 1839. The obvious purpose was to prove that in comparison with the former bourgeois-landowner society there was nothing new in Soviet society except new slogans and a few names and terms.

In the 1950s and 1960s, special conferences were held in a number of American universities, including Harvard, Yale

and the University of Indiana, on the theme of "continuity and change" in the history of the USSR. Collections of articles and individual books were published.¹⁸ It was characteristic that in the materials of the conference at Yale University in 1961, it was emphasised that these works should give American politicians a new perspective on Soviet foreign policy. As Henry Roberts noted, "the phrase 'continuity and change' . . . gained popularity as a neat formula for avoiding serious thought about a most difficult historical problem".¹⁹ In its time, the "continuity" concept was used in anti-socialist propaganda and became one of the anti-communist dogmas justifying the cold war.

In an article "On the Concept of Continuity in History", Alexander Gerschenkron of Harvard University formulated the problem as follows. Continuity in history, he stressed, refers to a) the stability of certain elements in a world which, as a whole, is changing and b) something that is characteristic of the entire history of mankind. In other words, Gerschenkron continued, this is "history à la Schopenhauer", in the course of which nothing "essential" ever changes except names and dates. As we can see, within the framework of the concept of "continuity", complex problems of historical development are amazingly simplified: after all, only names and dates change, that is, the outward form, the "façade"; the essence is immutable. This peculiar conservation of the "essential" in history made it possible to draw any conclusions whatever in the interests of current propaganda.

The principle of continuity is not a new idea in historical science. In Western historical literature one of the applications of this principle to the history of the USSR is contained in a voluminous history of Soviet Russia by Edward Carr, who wrote that "the tension between the opposed principles of continuity and change is the ground work of history" and that "no change, however violent and abrupt in appearance, wholly breaks the continuity between

past and present. Great revolutions . . . represent this tension in its most acute form".²⁰

At first glance, this proposition, taken in its general form, does not evoke any doubts. As we know, Marxist dialectics proceeds from the fact that the new is born in the old and, as a consequence, the new contains elements of the old. The great revolutions of the past were prepared by and grew out of the whole preceding economic, social and political development. We also know that the "legacy of the past" makes itself felt in our present. All this is quite so, but nonetheless the continuity theory advanced by bourgeois historiography not only failed to reflect the essence of the real historical process, but also substantially distorted it. The point is not, of course, that there is no continuity, but that exaggerated, all-determining and all-overshadowing significance in the historical process was attached to it.

Although many bourgeois sovietologists spoke not only of continuity, but of change as well, they accented the first to the detriment of the second. In *The Course of Russian History*, Montana State University Professor Melvin Wren wrote: "Many Westerners, particularly many Americans cling to the view that the Soviet Union is something entirely new and that it can be understood by examining its present character and its development since 1917. This view is extremely unrealistic. . . . Modern Russia can no more wash away the imprint of her past than can any other nation."²¹ Developing this thought, Gerschenkron wrote in *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*: "It is the tragedy of today's Russia that patterns of economic behaviour and trains of thought that should have remained confined to long-bygone ages have been revitalised and reproduced in contemporary Soviet reality."²² Some sovietologists looked for just the kind of "patterns and trains of thought" in the history of the USSR that Gerschenkron wrote about, and selected precisely the kind of material that was needed to "explain" Soviet reality as depicted in the

most sombre colours. The Soviet Union, Robert Daniels asserted, is simply a "modern" version of tsarist Russia.²³

What kind of a system of proofs was used to show the operation of the continuity principle in the history of the USSR? It was not complicated and was characterised by its focus on those same "immutable factors" of Russian history of which we spoke in the preceding section. Bourgeois sovietologists cited the "specific conditions" of the country, the "national spirit" and "national traditions" as the unconquerable forces which ultimately led to the "degeneration of revolution" and to the practical reconstruction of "the former content in a new form". Since old Russia was an autocracy, declared Daniels, "it was natural that successful reformers could only be autocratic aspirants to total power".²⁴ Pursuing the same logic, Kohn and Tomasič wrote almost in terms of a revival of Byzantine, Turco-Mongol and imperial traditions in Soviet society.²⁵

The proponents of the continuity theory used a methodology based on a kind of distorted "dialectics of opposites"; it amounted to searching the past for precedents for a tendentious interpretation of the present. According to their formula, the Soviet system "derives from tsarist autocracy" and "Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Stalin are all fundamentally the same thing..."²⁶

All this has absolutely no relation to a scientific elucidation of the causes of any given phenomena. Indeed, any country embarking on the road of revolution has its specific conditions and national traditions, but can the conclusion be drawn from this that the principle of continuity will inevitably be operative? If we proceed from the concept of continuity, we could never explain mankind's progress over its centuries-long history. To be sure, specific unfavourable material conditions, as well as specific reactionary national traditions, can retard social development. But they cannot stop it or reverse the course of history.

Speaking specifically of the history of the USSR in the post-October period, it should be stressed that the Great

October Socialist Revolution differed from all previous revolutions in that its goal did not end with the abolition of the old order. Seizure of power by the proletariat and the poor peasantry was not an end in itself. The October Revolution opened a new era of revolutionary transformations, an era of a radical alteration of the society. Whereas in the bourgeois revolution, to borrow a phrase from Marx, "the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living", the socialist revolution breaks with traditions of exploitation. This revolution "cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future."²⁷

The concept of "continuity" simply does not fit into the framework of the actual history of the USSR. The October Revolution was a cardinal break with the old order. Nor can post-October development provide material for analogies, say, with French history after the Revolution of 1789, and even someone with a rich imagination would find it hard to discern signs of socialism or communism in medieval or imperial Russia. Nonetheless, some sovietologists stubbornly harped on the "ties that bind Bolsheviks to Romanovs", saying that what unites Russians today "with their predecessors of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is far more important than the creedal differences that divide them from those forebears".²⁸ The idea of continuity was pursued with special fervour in comparing the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with that of tsarist Russia. On the whole, this accorded with the methodological principles of bourgeois historiography, which felt that it was precisely in the foreign policy sphere "that continuity with the policy of previous governments is most rapidly and conspicuously asserted".²⁹

What factors determine foreign policy? The most consistent answer to this question was given by the school of "real politics", headed by Hans Morgenthau. Every nation, said the adherents of this school, has, by virtue of its geographic location, historical conditions and relations with

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other "power centres", important vital interests which its statesmen must take into account. These real "national interests", and not public slogans and declarations, are what is most important for a nation—they depend neither on changes in governments nor even on changes in regimes. Since the geographical factors are "constant", they are attended by "constancy" in policy. Russia's geography, whether under the tsars or "under the commissars", did not change; neither did the foreign policy problems change, they asserted.

The continuity of national interest notion unequivocally denied the class character of foreign policy and the consequent fundamental difference between the foreign policies of socialist and capitalist states. Bourgeois scholars quite definitely stressed that there was no fundamental difference between the systems with respect to pursuing the "national interest"; that the policy of a socialist state is made in the same way as that of any other state, and that it is shaped under the influence of the same geopolitical factors.

In the historiography of Soviet foreign policy the concept of continuity was employed in a large number of works, where the very presentation of the material was designed to lead to the required conclusion. Its adherents emphasised that there was no essential difference between the aims and methods of the foreign policy of the USSR and the policy of the Russian Empire. But if Soviet policy is wholly "traditional", what traditions were they referring to? An examination of the relevant literature clearly shows that here too political objectives turned out to be a decisive consideration. The stress was made on "Russia's historical expansionist tendencies",³⁰ on a special "messianism" allegedly characteristic of Russians. Some writers tried to establish "Russian expansionism" as a kind of predetermination of destiny reflected in the geography and mental make-up of the nation.³¹ Characteristic in this connection were works on the foreign policy of tsarist Russia, written in such a way

as to evoke associations with the present-day policy of the USSR.

A large-scale effort to reveal the role of continuity in the foreign policy of the USSR was undertaken by Yale University, which organised a special conference in December 1961. The materials of the conference were published in a book entitled *Russian Foreign Policy. Essays in Historical Perspective*, consisting of 18 articles in which a review was made of the foreign policy of Russia and the USSR over the last 100 years. This in itself raises some questions. A lot of water has flown under the bridge in the past century, and much has changed. The socio-economic system in Russia underwent fundamental changes. Tsarist Russia and St. Petersburg diplomacy are long gone, and the foreign policy of the USSR, as a socialist power, has nothing in common either in terms of its goals or its methods with prerevolutionary Russian diplomacy. Any comparison between the foreign policy of tsarism and the foreign policy of the socialist state is patently groundless.

Apparently, the authors of the essays could not help seeing the contradictions between the concept of continuity and historical facts. Ivo Lederer, the editor of the publication, noted, for example, that historical parallels between Russia's past and present "may be striking and in some cases [?—B.M.] valid, but one must consider qualitative differences in all internal and external factors for each phase of Russia's development as a great power".³² "The Communists are not and never were *simply* Russian nationalists and imperialists in Marxist clothes," wrote Adam Ulam, the author of one of the essays.³³ At first glance, such statements might look like a repudiation of the concept of continuity. However, the historians contributing to the Yale publication were not so much refuting this concept as developing it.

Cyril Black, for example, wrote: "The Bolsheviks had a theory of international relations completely at variance with that of their predecessors, but they were in charge of

the same country and faced most of the same (?!—*B.M.*) problems."³⁴ Leaving aside the reference to "the same" problems (the tsarist and the Provisional governments wanted to continue the war, pursuing imperialist aims; immediately after the victory of the October Revolution, the Soviet Government came out for the conclusion of a just and democratic peace without annexations and indemnities), the important thing in this case is to get at the essence of the position taken by this group of scholars.

In his Foreword to the collection of articles, George Vernadsky said: "In the process of revolution [the October Revolution.—*B.M.*], the doctrine [reference here is to Marxist-Leninist theory.—*B.M.*] could not but become twisted by its contact with Russian realities, but in its turn it has deeply affected the life of the people." According to Adam Ulam, there was neither complete continuity nor complete change; more exactly, there were elements of both. For example: "... while nationalism had been firmly absorbed into Soviet ideology, it had not replaced Marxism-Leninism."³⁵

Elements of continuity still do not amount to complete continuity. Complete continuity would hardly have raised any great objections, for as Vernadsky wrote, prior to October 1917 "Russia followed the pattern of other great powers. Morally, its diplomacy was no worse—and no better—than that of the West".³⁶ And Richard Pipes noted that "the tsarist state was a traditional state ... willing to function within the established international state system", whereas the Soviet state "refused to recognise the international community of states".³⁷ The conclusion drawn by the authors of the Yale collection of articles amounts to the following: the Soviet Union inherited the worst features of the foreign policy of tsarist Russia and whatever changes there were were changes for the worse.

In the concluding article, "Contemporary Perspectives", George Kennan summed up, saying that the history of Russia, including the Soviet period, "has been marked by some rather striking elements of continuity". Thus, he continued,

"Even had there never been a Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917, and even had Russia remained under the control of governments not pitted against the West by any formidable ideological preconceptions, the persistence of these archaic traits and tendencies of Russian statesmanship, coupled with the rise in Russia's physical strength, could and probably would have made Russia a troublesome neighbour for other countries by the middle of the twentieth century." However, Kennan continued: "... it is one of the great tragedies of our age that onto this burden of inheritance there was superimposed in 1917 ... an ideological superstructure which practically precluded as long as it should predominate, anything resembling a really peaceful and constructive relationship between Russia and a great part of its international environment."³⁸

In the light of the current development of co-operation between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries, a process taking place right before our eyes, this statement of Kennan's looks like an incongruous anachronism.

The lack of correspondence between historical facts and the theory of continuity led to some obvious contradictions. It may be recalled that in its address "To All Working Moslems of Russia and the East" of December 3, 1917, the Soviet Government announced the abrogation of all the treaties which had been concluded between the tsarist government and other imperialists in regard to Persia and Turkey—a fact which, like many others, refutes the continuity theory. But here is what Firus Kazemzadeh wrote on this score in an article entitled "Russia and the Middle East": "The very repudiation of tsarist imperialism was but the first step in the construction of a Soviet policy that would be as active as that of the tsars." And further: "... one may also expect that the goal of Russian foreign policy in the Middle East will remain the same: domination at *almost* any price."³⁹

The contributors to the collection of articles could not get together on some points. For example, Richard Pipes said that "domestic political pressure ... never materially affected

Russia's foreign policy... and that "Russian foreign policy... was conducted with little consideration for the needs of the country..." and "with little regard for the realities of domestic politics..."⁴⁰ Adam Ulam, however, stressed the unquestionable fact that foreign policy is more closely tied to domestic policy in the socialist countries than in the capitalist countries. Some authors wrote about a predominant Western influence on the historical development of the USSR, while others spoke of the peculiarity of everything Russian, to say nothing here of those profound statements about the Slavic "inferiority complex", the peculiar "Russian mentality", etc.

It is not surprising that many of the authors' assertions were contradictory since their very position contradicted the facts.⁴¹ Everyone knows that the Great October Socialist Revolution, having destroyed a system pervaded with social injustice, forever broke with tsarism's aggressive foreign policy, proclaimed the principles of peace and friendship among peoples, and opened a new era in the history of international relations.

From the first days of its existence, the Soviet state resolutely rejected in its international relations everything based on robbery, coercion and conquest. It proclaimed the principle of good-neighbourly relations and equitable economic ties with all countries. In one of its first decrees—the Decree on Peace—the Soviet Government announced that it was abolishing secret diplomacy and expressed its firm decision to conduct international negotiations "quite openly in full view of the whole people". On November 8, 1917, Lenin declared at the Second Congress of Soviets: "We reject all clauses on plunder and violence, but we shall welcome all clauses containing provisions for good-neighbourly relations and all economic agreements; we cannot reject these."⁴²

The Soviet Government abrogated the secret treaties concluded by the tsarist and the bourgeois Provisional governments and exposed their predatory imperialist essence. Thus, it abrogated the treaties on the partition of Persia and

Turkey. The Council of People's Commissars immediately recognised Finland's independence. The October Revolution brought freedom to Poland also. The Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People said in January 1918 that the Land of Soviets made a total break with the "barbarous policy of bourgeois civilisation, which has built the prosperity of the exploiters belonging to a few chosen nations on the enslavement of hundreds of millions of working people in Asia, in the colonies in general, and in the small countries."⁴³ These are some of the facts that show the untenability and groundlessness of the theory of continuity. Noteworthy in this respect is the opinion of Henry Roberts, managing editor of the *Slavic Review*, expressed on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. "We are inclined," he wrote, "to regard the Russian Revolution as one of the great discontinuities in history, a real break with the past..."⁴⁴

THE "STATIC MODEL" OF SOVIET SOCIETY: THE CONCEPT OF TOTALITARIANISM

As we have seen from the example of the "East-West" formula, in comparing capitalism and socialism, bourgeois historiography replaced the real dissimilarity between the two systems with an invented one. The contrast method of analysing the two systems enabled them to obfuscate the advantages of socialism over capitalism, classifying the real distinctive features of the socio-economic formations under simplified "black and white" headings: "democracy—totalitarianism", "collectivism—individualism", "coercion—free initiative", etc. At the same time, capitalism was declared "the ideal type", the "positive model", while socialism, "by contrast", was endowed with negative characteristics. Ever since the October Revolution, the new social system, representing democracy of the highest type, was portrayed by the

ideologists of the bourgeoisie as "forced", "undemocratic", "unfree". The extreme manifestation of these tendencies were the attempts by Western sovietologists to use the so-called concept of totalitarianism in describing the socialist system and on this basis to create a "totalitarian model" of Soviet society.

It should be noted that the idea of a totalitarian state was first developed in the works of fascist jurists. The contrast between "national socialist totalitarianism" and a "communist dictatorship", which embodied the "rule of the rabble", was just about the fundamental thesis in the arsenal of Hitler's propagandists. The concept of totalitarianism began to be applied to the socialist system in the postwar period as the cold war developed. In December 1946, American journalist Herbert Matthews posed in one of his articles the question whether the USA should now place the USSR "in the same category as Hitlerite Germany?" The answer to this rhetorical question was already decided by the forces of reaction. As Harry Truman, then President of the United States, explained: "There isn't any difference in totalitarian states. I don't care what you call them, Nazi, Communist or Fascist..."⁴⁵ The anti-communists strove to instil in the public mind a conception of socialism as an allegedly undemocratic system where the entire material and spiritual life is under the arbitrary control of the state, and at the same time to frighten the peoples of the world with an imaginary danger from the "totalitarian East".

In 1948, Hans Kelsen of the University of California described "étatism or totalitarianism" in his book *The Political Theory of Bolshevism* as a "centralised" "coercive order" which is "in principle unlimited, so that the mutual behaviour of the individuals is regulated in every possible aspect of human life, especially ... economic and cultural life".⁴⁶

At a conference of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in March 1953, totalitarianism was given a tinge of exclusiveness, described as distinct not only from "Western democratic societies", but from former "traditional

autocratic regimes". Nicholas Timasheff, Alex Inkeles, Waldemar Gurian and Bertram Wolfe defined totalitarianism as a system that completely destroyed the line between society and state and represented a hypertrophy of state power which excludes any uncontrolled self-assertion of the individual.⁴⁷

In 1956, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, in their *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, developed the concept of totalitarianism as a new state form that had emerged on the soil of the modern "mass society". In developing the point of view about a completely (totally) organised and controlled society, they formulated six features of totalitarianism which underscore the monopoly of power of central organs. Although their proposed definition actually corresponds with extreme forms of the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie, and although the authors themselves conceded that a "totalitarian dictatorship is a logical extension of certain traits of our modern industrial society (oftentimes called 'capitalism')",⁴⁸ they did everything to associate totalitarianism with socialism.

The concept of totalitarianism ignores the fundamental distinction between what the essence and role of the state are in the capitalist as opposed to the socialist socio-economic formation. It is perfectly clear that the extreme forms of the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie, which monopolises power and with the help of a hypertrophied apparatus of coercion holds the popular masses in economic and political subordination, cannot be compared with the socialist system, which represents the power of the people in the interests of the people. The very notion of "state power carried to the extreme" applied to the Soviet socialist system is both a logical and factual absurdity. How can one speak of "totalitarianism" when the characteristic feature of the development of the Soviet social and state system is the all-round unfolding and improvement of democracy? Where and when have any bourgeois scholars seen a "totalitarian state" which strives to create the kind of conditions of social

life under which the state itself will become unneeded and will completely wither away? Just the posing of these questions shows how illogical it is to apply the totalitarian yardstick to Soviet society. The development of the historical process shows that ever-increasing and steady democratisation of social life is a natural and inevitable feature of socialism. Anti-democratism and totalitarianism are phenomena engendered by the antagonisms of the capitalist system, and any attempt to attribute them to socialism is unjustifiable.

Efforts to come up with a theoretical substantiation of the origins of "Soviet totalitarianism" were just as untenable. They took three directions. One looked for roots of "Soviet totalitarianism" in specific features of Russian history and psychology and, drawing on the concept of continuity, ascribed the "totalitarian tendencies" thus found to the present-day socio-political system in the USSR. According to this view, totalitarianism (more or less strongly manifested) is a natural condition that is "organically" characteristic of Russians—their historical fate, so to say. The second direction derived "Soviet totalitarianism" from the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. And the third strove to base it on the objective needs of the country's economic development.

Central to the first group of arguments was the thesis about the notorious extremes of the "Russian soul", which allegedly combined extreme passiveness and extreme anarchism in irreconcilable contradiction. Here again we have an example of confusing concepts: the anarchistic lack of discipline of petty-bourgeois elements (which is not a national, but an international phenomenon) is passed off as a characteristic trait of the entire people. Talk about a "maximalist" Russian temperament is not convincing, for there is not and cannot be any scientific evidence that Russians and Slavs in general are inherently undisciplined and anarchistic (it was precisely Russia that gave the world an example of conscious discipline and purposefulness—the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union). And this is to say nothing of it being unscientific to ascribe to the national psyche the significance of a factor that determines the socio-political structure of a society.

Despite the untenability of their basic premise, the theoreticians of totalitarianism as a national Russian trait drew the far-reaching conclusion that an inaptitude for political freedom is characteristic of human nature and of Slavs in particular. Stuart Tompkins, for example, opposed the self-discipline of the Western nations to the discipline "from without" (that is, sustained by external coercion) of the nations of the East, and, in this connection, portrayed the leading role of the Communist Party in Soviet society as the embodiment of the old Russian idea of *opeka* (tutelage) over the society.⁴⁹ Curiously combined with these fantasies about the "totalitarian peculiarities" of the Slavic psyche were the more universal features of the concept of totalitarianism—the "natural totalitarianism of the masses", etc.

Without going into a polemic on the question of the origins of "Russian autocracy" (the basic methodological fault of the bourgeois scholars lies in their ignoring the role of classes and class struggle in the creation of one or another socio-political structure, in their treatment of the state as a supraclass force), we shall note that the excursions into history were used primarily to represent the Soviet socialist system as the logical successor to the tsarist regime and one that developed the totalitarian tendencies of the latter.⁵⁰

Citing an alleged mystical inclination of the Russian people towards totalitarianism and autocracy, many sovietologists contended that the undemocratic nature of Russia's socio-political institutions was historically predetermined. In so doing, they played up the theme that Russia's backwardness was the reason for her inability to adopt democratic forms of government. Bourgeois authors wrote profusely to the effect that the Russians were unfamiliar with parliamentary democracy and that they had no traditions of self-

government or a free press, drawing the conclusion that it was doubtful whether democracy could be established in such a country.⁵¹ But according to this strange logic one would have to conclude that democracy is impossible anywhere.

The unscientific nature of the "Soviet totalitarian model" was particularly apparent in the attempts to connect totalitarianism with undemocratic tendencies allegedly existing in Marxist-Leninist ideology. With this aim, Leninism was arbitrarily separated from Marxism and distorted. A widely used device was the identification of Leninism with "totalitarian" manifestations of the "Russian spirit". Robert MacMaster, Professor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and author of the book *Danilevsky, A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher*, declared for example, that the spiritual, cultural and emotional basis of the Russian totalitarian type that is embodied in Bolshevism, as he put it, is hardly more than "the main Russian intellectual tradition given a demonic turn". He called the "Russian totalitarian philosopher" and reactionary epigone of the Slavophiles, Danilevsky, a precursor of Bolshevism.⁵²

The main target for the attacks of bourgeois ideologists was the Marxist teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat. From this teaching, Sidney Hook, for example, derived the "totalitarian tendencies of the USSR", which he called a break with the democratic traditions of Marxism.⁵³ Not grasping the essence of the teaching of the Marxist classics on the dictatorship of the proletariat as a new and higher form of democracy, as the democracy of the majority of the people, Merle Fainsod held that establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat meant imposing "the rule of the few on the many; the dictatorship of the Russian proletariat was by definition a minority dictatorship".⁵⁴ Creating a caricature representing the dictatorship of the proletariat as little more than coercion and terror, bourgeois theoreticians at the same time sought to prove that in the countries of socialism, as in the countries of capitalism, there exists a "chosen" upper stratum of people, an "elite", which enjoys special privileges

and concentrates all power in its hands. This was one of the countless attempts to show the essence and character of socialist democracy in the wrong light.

Any dictatorship presupposes force. In the capitalist countries—even the most democratic—state power represents forcing the will of the minority upon the majority. A dictatorship of the proletariat, however, uses force against an insignificant minority on behalf of the rights and freedom of the vast majority. Moreover, as Lenin stressed, the dictatorship of the proletariat "is not only the use of force against the exploiters, and not even mainly the use of force".⁵⁵ The tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat amount to a radical restructuring of the whole system of social relations, the creation of a new social system, the establishment of the foundations of genuine people's power. As concerns force, its character and forms depend on the intensity and methods of resistance put up by the hostile classes.

A state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat means a dictatorship with respect to the overthrown exploiter classes and at the same time broad democracy for the working people. This is an entirely new type of democracy—democracy for the bulk of the population, for all the working people. From its very birth, the dictatorship of the proletariat had genuinely democratic features. A dictatorship of the proletariat is distinguished from the dictatorship of any exploiter class precisely by the fact that it draws millions of people into the administration of the state and society, awakening the self-awareness of the people. With the victory of socialism, a state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes the political organisation of the whole people, with the working class playing the leading role, that is, it becomes a state of the whole people.

According to the "totalitarian model" based on the idea of the "immutability of psychological make-up" or the "dogmatism of ideology", the socio-political structure is stable and immutable (with changes, if any at all, only

towards increasing the state's power, i.e., towards greater "totality"). A certain modification of this theory is a concept which regards a "coercive totalitarian" regime as a temporary phase, necessary in backward countries in order to "modernise" them according to the Western model.

Those who tried to explain totalitarianism in economic terms tended to absolutise the role of the force, treating it as an historically inevitable and the only practical method of solving problems under "Russian conditions". According to their logic, socialist transformations, industrialisation in particular, required the introduction of harsh measures and coercive institutions.⁵⁶ Harvard Professor Abram Bergson associated authoritarian political institutions with public ownership of the means of production, that is, with socialism.⁵⁷

Developing this concept, Theodore von Laue devoted primary attention to the theses of "Russia's backwardness" and the Russians' "spontaneity", "lack of discipline" and "inclination to anarchy".⁵⁸ Russia's backwardness, low level of development and preindustrial traditions and institutions, asserted von Laue, made it practically impossible to industrialise using Western methods. He called totalitarianism an inevitable consequence of the struggle with the spontaneous anarchism of the masses in the period after the revolution.⁵⁹

Pursuing the "communism-totalitarianism-backwardness" formula, Allan Gruchy asserted that "the authoritarian communist regimes have had most of their success in countries with low standards of living and primitive economic and political systems".⁶⁰ In books by adherents of this point of view, political democracy was connected with the period after the accomplishment of "modernisation", while this process itself was said to require a consolidation of authority and enhancement of the role of the individual, with the role of the popular masses reduced to a minimum.⁶¹

Such was the ultimate conclusion of these constructions: from mediocre economism to a primitive "cult of the hero".

Even such an *ultima ratio* of bourgeois sovietology as the "anarchism of the masses" ultimately boiled down to the tyranny of a single person. All this shows the concept of "Soviet totalitarianism" to be groundless and illogical. The falsity of sovietological constructions is seen even more clearly when they are compared with the facts.

Democratism is embodied in the very nature of socialism and is conditioned by its economic system—the abolition of private ownership of the means of production. Socialist ownership and the emancipation of labour are the basic conditions of genuine individual liberty. "Proletarian democracy," wrote Lenin, "is a *million times* more democratic than any bourgeois democracy. Soviet power is a million times more democratic than the most democratic bourgeois republic."⁶² For the first time in history, the door was open, in deed and not in word only, for the broad masses of the people to take part in the administration of the state.

Unlike bourgeois democracy, under which civil rights and freedoms are to a large extent formal in character, socialist democracy guarantees the working people all political rights and personal freedoms, and draws representatives of all social strata and groups into active participation in affairs of state. All adult citizens of the USSR have the right freely to express their will, and this freedom is assured by many material, political and organisational guarantees, particularly by the fact that the electors themselves are in charge of organising and conducting elections. Participation in elections gives Soviet people the opportunity to actively influence the work of state bodies and to control them.

In a socialist state, supreme power is exercised by representatives of the working people who are elected and can be recalled by the working people. The fact that there are more than two million deputies to the Soviets testifies to the broad participation of the people in governing the country. Elected representatives of the people manage the affairs of state from the bottom to the top. Working with them is a

whole army of volunteer helpers—25 million activists working in conjunction with the Soviets.

What have the sovietologists opposed to these facts? The author of a special study, published by Stanford University, on elections to local Soviets of the USSR argued as follows. It is true, he admitted, that careful selection of candidates at pre-election meetings makes for the fact that "the ideal candidate emerges" and the best people are elected as deputies to the Soviets. But, in his view, "...the Soviet deputy is not supposed to legislate. He is supposed to help secure acceptance of whatever programme the regime may be pushing..." The Soviet deputy, he asserted further, "has no legal power to formulate policy..."⁶³ The bourgeois author gave an entirely wrong interpretation to the real state of affairs. For example, he completely ignored the work of the deputies in committees, through which they actively participate in the formulation of plans and policy.

The meaning and content of socialist democracy lie in the participation of increasingly broad sections of the public in running the country, in managing public affairs. The constantly growing initiative of the working people in the Soviet Union serves the building of communism. This kind of democracy is a vital need of the Soviet people, an indispensable condition for the development and strengthening of socialist social relations.

A number of authors extend the above-mentioned interpretation of socialist democracy to the CPSU, the leading and guiding force of Soviet society. Wrongly interpreting the role of the Marxist-Leninist vanguard, they try to discredit the CPSU with the help of absurd accusations of "elitism". According to the doctrine of "totalitarianism", the "elite" and the masses are two diametrically opposite organisms with different aims and interests. The sovietologists have no serious arguments for creating such a "model" of relations between the Soviet people and the Leninist Party. Therefore, they often resort to almost purely anecdotal devices. For example, an American writer who wrote

a book on the system of political education in the USSR used some critical remarks published in the Soviet press about the work of propagandists who abused foreign words and therefore failed to make contact with their audience in order to make the groundless conclusion that a "gulf" exists between the Party and the people.⁶⁴ Soviet people, their friends abroad and bourgeois observers who are the least bit objective know that this is not true. The CPSU's leading and guiding role in Soviet society is secured not by "privileges", but by the fact that the Party expresses the interests and aspirations of all working people. The Party relies on its moral prestige and on its ability, tested by life, to foresee the future and adopt scientifically grounded decisions by creatively applying Marxist-Leninist theory. The CPSU cherishes the confidence of the people. It unwaveringly carries out Lenin's precept not to lose touch with the masses. This enables the Party to lead the working people, to be their teacher and their collective political leader.

The CPSU is extremely representative in its make-up; into its ranks go workers, peasants, members of the intelligentsia—people who have shown their worth in the building of communism. The CPSU membership is 40.1 per cent industrial workers, 15.1 per cent collective farmers and 44.8 per cent office employees. More than two-thirds of the Communists in the office employees category are engineers, agronomists, teachers, doctors, scientific workers, writers and artists. Obviously it is senseless to apply the term "ruling elite" to the organisation that is constantly growing as the result of its being joined by representatives of all strata of the population, people for whom entrance into the Party gives no privileges except one—always to be in the forefront in solving the tasks standing before the country.

Bourgeois sovietologists are wont to ignore the fact that the Party leadership is made up of the most competent Communists, selected by means of democratic elections. For example Richard Allen, Chairman of the Study Programme on Communism at the Centre for Strategic Studies at

Georgetown University, in acquainting the American reader with the concept of democratic centralism, which is the basic principle of the CPSU's structure, wrongly interprets this principle, passing over in silence the fact that all Party organs from bottom to top are elective and that the higher organisations are accountable to the lower.⁶⁵

The "totalitarian model" of socialist society was so contrary to the actual state of affairs in the USSR that even its adherents were forced to make reservations. In the above-mentioned book by Friedrich and Brzezinski, it was stipulated that such spheres as the family and religion were not under the totalitarian power of the state.⁶⁶ But these partial exceptions do not make the concept of "Soviet totalitarianism" any more convincing.

Attempts to solve the theoretical difficulties flowing from the contradiction between the "totalitarian model" and reality led some authors to an expanded interpretation of the concept of totalitarianism as a system encompassing different kinds of totalitarian regimes—from terroristic to voluntary. Another modification amounted to constructing various hybrid definitions, such as a "democratic-totalitarian" system, for example, which included elements of democracy and totalitarianism.⁶⁷ Some authors suggested replacing the term "totalitarian" with the term "partialitarian", meaning not completely totalitarian, but only "semi-totalitarian".⁶⁸ George Kennan and Karl Deutsch advanced the idea of a "relaxed totalitarianism".⁶⁹ Proposed were such terms as "the administered society".⁷⁰

In the debate that took place in US academic circles in the early 1960s, the Friedrich-Brzezinski concept was subjected to criticism. Professor Robert Tucker, calling in question the legitimacy of the very term "totalitarianism",⁷¹ urged that existing realities be taken into account in assessing the Soviet system. Brzezinski himself steered a course towards partial revision of his theory. In a book written jointly with Samuel Huntington, the term "totalitarianism" was virtually not used.⁷²

His previous coauthor Carl Friedrich, however, did not make any revisions in his concept. In a new edition of *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, he wrote: "...there is no reason to conclude that the existing totalitarian systems will disappear as a result of internal evolution, though there can be no doubt that they are undergoing continuous changes."⁷³

The contradictions and confusion in the concept of "communist totalitarianism", as well as the strained interpretations the author had to resort to in trying to defend his theory, stand out especially clearly in this edition. In an effort, for example, to find in Soviet society the crucial element of all theories of totalitarianism, namely terror, Friedrich "expanded" the concept of terror to have it include administrative measures against individuals who commit anti-social acts. But he also wrote about terror not being necessary because of the considerable degree of unanimity achieved in the Soviet Union and most of the other socialist countries. Clearly, he could not make things jibe.

Along with the shattering of the theory of totalitarianism came a re-examination of the interpretation of the concept of "elite". In his *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia*,⁷⁴ Sidney Ploss argued against viewing the "elite" as a monolithic organism, asserting that its main feature was the existence of internal conflicts. However, even before that, the term "elite" had begun to be interpreted in an expanded sense—as a "pluralistic", heterogeneous elite—and was gradually replaced by the "group" theory, which stressed the existence within the elite of various groups, each with its specific interests.

One of the devices used in American bourgeois science was to develop a comparative theory of modern authoritarian regimes, or "mobilisation systems", according to which a new kind of authoritarian system in the twentieth century is the regime based on a mass movement under the leadership of a single party. Such "movement regimes", the theory says, exist in different varieties, and although they have certain

basic features in common, they may differ one from the other considerably.⁷⁵

All these palliatives, however, could not save the "totalitarian model" from total devaluation. At the turn of the 1960s, Inkeles and Bauer were already writing about the erosion of the theory of totalitarianism.⁷⁶ In 1963, Ulam echoed this thesis.⁷⁷ And in December 1967, Cattell noted: "...Soviet Russia has moved even further away from the totalitarian model."⁷⁸ Polemicising with his American colleagues, British sovietologist Seton-Watson attempted to call a halt to the re-examination of the "Soviet totalitarianism" dogma.⁷⁹

But some representatives of American Soviet studies considered the totalitarian model to lack ideological and political prospect. Alfred Meyer of the University of Michigan, although he did not exclude partial use of the totalitarian model, called it "an abstract construct to which no system had ever conformed totally", and expressed doubt concerning the usefulness of the term totalitarianism.⁸⁰ Jeremy Azrael objected to putting the Soviet system into the category of "totalitarian" systems, stressing that, in general, the utility of such models of society was highly doubtful.⁸¹

Confirmation of the untenability of the totalitarianism doctrine came from such an unexpected source as a report to the US Senate on a trip to the USSR by a US Senator. The document, presented by Senator A. J. Ellender of the State of Louisiana, was interesting in that, being the Senator's travel diary, it reflected the dynamics of notions about the Soviet Union held by a bourgeois politician who was not blinded by anti-communism. In the beginning of the diary, Ellender repeated the old ideas about "control" over the working people in the USSR, but after becoming familiar with the actual state of affairs admitted that the Soviet form of government was the direct opposite of the American and that he was amazed at the tremendous job the Soviet people were doing. He found it hard to understand, as he wrote, how it was possible to direct so many people along the same

course and persuade them to carry out the many tasks in building the biggest country in the world. This progress was achieved by the people, and, he noted, without any particular fanfare; everything could be seen without it: the silhouettes of the most varied kinds of construction rise into the sky everywhere. What puzzled him particularly was how the Soviet people managed to get the proper accounting and distribution for such an enormous amount of material values in such a huge country. Judging by everything, he got the impression that everyone knows his job and values it. He heard very few complaints from anywhere. Since enormous amount of money is spent every day, for example, on construction equipment alone, he was simply surprised that this could be done so skillfully.... It really never ceased to amaze him how this clock mechanism worked—and it was obvious for him that it did work—and how it was possible to build all this in such a short time. People looked satisfied, and this was understandable. For example, the new apartments were much better than what the people were used to. In any case, it was evident to him that they were satisfied enough to give their time and their labour to the country.⁸² As we can see, the concept of totalitarianism gave way to utter bewilderment and amazement.

Speaking of the doubtful utility of the term totalitarianism, Paul Hollander of the Russian Research Centre at Harvard stressed that American sovietology "was at a stage when the old model has lost some of its validity".⁸³

A "DYNAMIC MODEL" OF SOVIET SOCIETY: THE THEORY OF CONVERGENCE

The devaluation of the static totalitarian model compelled sovietologists to look hard for a new theory, one that could give a more satisfactory explanation of the development of the USSR at present. Such a theory was the "dynamic" theory of convergence—the theory of a growing similarity

and ultimate merger of the socialist and capitalist systems. Ideologically, the emergence of the theory of convergence was predetermined by the steady decline of the above-mentioned postulates concerning the exclusive, unique and specific character of the Russian experience and Russian communism. Methodologically, the ground was prepared for it by the crisis of the "contrast method" of opposing the USSR and the USA and the transition to a comparative method of studying the two systems.

In the course of a relatively short span of time, the theory of convergence became widespread in US academic circles and occupied a leading place in the anti-communist propaganda campaign. According to American authors, the theory serves many needs; it "is not only an abstract intellectual position, but also a source of optimism for many and of justification for all".⁸⁴ What was it in the theory of convergence that inspired optimism in bourgeois ideologists? First of all, its anti-Marxist orientation. Revealing the essence of the theory, Dominique Urbany, Chairman of the Communist Party of Luxembourg stressed in his address at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow: "Attempts are made to prevail on the working class that if a bit of water is added to the wine of Marxism-Leninism and a bit of socialist flavouring to the vinegar of capitalism, they will get a beverage suitable and acceptable for all. In scientific terms this concoction is called 'convergence', politically it is named 'humane socialism' and in practice it connotes collaboration with capitalism for the purpose of saving it".

What role has the theory of convergence played in the interpretation of Soviet history by bourgeois historiography? If the theories we reviewed above proceeded partly or wholly from the proposition of "Russian exclusiveness" and "Russian tradition", the theory of convergence strove to give a general picture of the historical process in motion and change, and thereby laid claim to being universal and dynamic. But before examining the impact of the theory of convergence

on American sovietology, we should look at least briefly into the history of its emergence.

One of the first to propagandise the idea of convergence was the White émigré philosopher Pitirim Sorokin. Declaring in his book, *Russia and the United States*, published in 1944, that in all spheres of life there were more similarities than differences between the two countries, Sorokin drew the conclusion that the Soviet socialist society and the American bourgeois society "have been steadily converging towards a similar type of social organisation and economy."⁸⁵ In the late forties and early fifties, the idea of similarity was all but forgotten; the "contrast method" became firmly established, and the "totalitarian model" acquired the stability of dogma.

The idea of convergence came to the surface again in the late fifties and early sixties in connection with criticism in US academic circles of the excessive polarisation of political and scholarly thought (in analysing the interrelationships of the two systems). Criticism of the dogmatism of the totalitarian model developed almost parallel with criticism of the inflexibility, inertia and stagnation of US foreign policy connected with the name of Dulles. Appearing in the United States in that period were ideas of "pluralism", "polycentrism" and "diffusion of power", which underscored evolution and change in a rapidly developing world, while in historical science there emerged a tendency to re-examine and reappraise the traditional interpretations of history. In 1959, Reinhold Niebuhr spoke of similarities between the Soviet and Western societies.⁸⁶ In 1959, W. W. Rostow delivered a series of lectures at Cambridge and the following year published a book *The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto*,⁸⁷ which became very popular among the convergence theorists. Bourgeois ideologists at times assessed the emergence (or more exactly, revival) of the concept of convergence as a turn to greater realism, as a sign that "black and white" formulas were out.

Rostow's concept of stages of economic growth and the

idea of a single industrial society that flowed from it served as a philosophical and theoretical substantiation of the convergence theory. According to Rostow, every society goes through five consecutive stages of economic growth in its advancing development: 1) the traditional society, 2) the preconditions for take-off, 3) the take-off, 4) the drive to maturity, and 5) the age of high mass-consumption.⁸⁸ The structure of these stages, according to Rostow, does not depend on the character of social relations or forms of property. The basic distinction between the stages is in technical and economic level. The "traditional society", once it "takes off", moves to the stage of "maturity", finally becomes a mature "industrial society" and enters the stage of "high mass-consumption". Rostow's theory amounted to identifying present-day capitalism with advanced techniques and technology and modern forms and means of management and thereby pushing through the thesis that social relations under capitalism are evolving into a rationally organised society of "mass consumption". In other words, bourgeois scholars were saying, scientific and technological progress will make it possible to remove social antagonisms and ensure the prosperity of all social strata without class struggle.

The anti-Marxist direction of Rostow's theory is obvious, and its supporters never tried to conceal this fact. Their writings were aimed at bolstering the decrepit bourgeois myth that Marxism was obsolete. According to Rostow, Marxism was an ideology engendered by the peculiarities of the initial period of industrial development, and only in that period, as a rule, can it be accepted by the working class movement.⁸⁹

Representatives of different schools of bourgeois scholarship united around this thesis. Ulam, for example, echoed Rostow by saying that Marxism was the "natural ideology" of societies at an early stage of industrialisation, be it England in the mid-nineteenth century or certain Asian and African countries in the twentieth.⁹⁰ Marxism belongs to the

nineteenth century, continued von Laue.⁹¹ And George Jackson made a significant "amendment" to Marxism, saying that in the twentieth century the Marxist theory is applicable only to "underdeveloped peasant nations" and not to industrial countries.⁹² The bourgeois author was clearly repeating the Maoists' idea of the "world village".

Many books were written on the theme that modern capitalism does not fit Marxist concepts, that Marxism is inapplicable to "Western civilisation". However, as Lenin wrote, every time it is "annihilated" in this way, Marxism penetrates all the more broadly and deeply into the thick of the popular masses and "becomes stronger, more hardened and more vigorous. . .".⁹³ In speaking of Marxism's obsolescence, Rostow was attempting to substitute his theory for the Marxist teaching on socio-economic formations and their law-governed change. According to his basic postulates, the essence of the modern era is not the transition from capitalism to socialism, but the process of modernisation, the desire of less developed countries to reach the level of the advanced capitalist countries of the West. Rostow advertised "stages of growth" as a general theory about modern history which constitutes "an alternative to Karl Marx's theory of modern history".⁹⁴ In his view, since the movement of a society from the lowest stage to the highest is connected exclusively with technical and economic factors and depends little on the socio-historical forms of social life, what is important is not whether a given system is capitalism or socialism, but the level of industrialisation. In other words, socialism and capitalism are variants of a developed industrial society: from different starting points and by different paths they are moving towards the same goal.

The stages of growth theory, together with the concept of a "single industrial society", gave the appearance of providing scientific validity to the notions of growing similarity between socialism and capitalism, the inevitable elimination of socio-political differences between them, and their prospective convergence within the framework of a "single

industrial society". As the differences between socialist and capitalist states in their levels of industrial development narrow, said the proponents of the theory, so will the socio-political differences between them inevitably disappear.

The main arguments used by proponents of the theory of convergence amounted to the following: a) industrialisation and urbanisation lead to the creation of a "common (industrial) culture" seen in all modern societies, which would ultimately lead to similar political institutions; b) in order to function successfully, an industrial society must reckon with the laws of science and the scientific organisation of society, which are the same for all and, therefore, inevitably limit the influence of ideology and politics; the emergence of numerous social groups, unknown in the pre-industrial society, and their gravitation towards autonomy also undermine the dominating role of the state; c) industrialisation brings prosperity, which undermines the political discipline and ideological orthodoxy characteristic of the early phase of industrialisation. The adherents of this theory believe that the age of ideology has already ended in Western Europe, the United States and Japan, and that it will soon end in the Soviet Union as well.⁹⁵ The premises and conclusions of the theory of convergence are in no way confirmed by actual historical material. Practice has shown that a "common industrial culture" or the same level of industrial development does not at all mean uniformity of social and political institutions. A high level of industrial development, the possession of modern technology and use of advanced technological methods will not and cannot bring the two socio-economic formations, the capitalist and the socialist, closer together, for the substance of the social processes taking place within them is entirely different.

Historical experience clearly shows that social life can develop in entirely different ways, depending on the socio-economic structure of society and above all on the property system prevailing in it. How can there be a growing similarity between socialism and capitalism if in the socialist coun-

tries there is public, and in the capitalist countries, private ownership of the implements and means of production; if in the socialist countries power belongs to the people, headed by the working class, while in the capitalist countries it belongs to the monopoly bourgeoisie; if in the capitalist countries socio-economic inequality is growing, while under socialism there is a general rise in the material and cultural level of all working people.

It is a known fact, for example, that by the mid-1960s, 1.6 per cent of the adult population in the United States owned a minimum of 32 per cent of all the property. Some 200,000 families out of a total of about 58 million owned 22 per cent of all the private capital.⁹⁶ At the same time, in the socialist countries the entire national wealth and the entire national income belong to the working people and are used in their interests. As socialism grows and improves and as the contradictions of capitalism increase, the fundamental differences between the two systems will increase rather than decrease.

Characteristically, those who adhered to the theory of "growing similarity", although they did write about a process of changes in both the socialist and capitalist systems, put the accent on changes in the socialist system and, in the final analysis, on the degeneration, the bourgeoisification of socialist society. The many supporters of the convergence theory, as it follows logically from their arguments, were actually counting not on a merger of the two systems and the emergence of a hybrid society, but on socialism being swallowed by capitalism. "Thus on closer examination," wrote Brzezinski and Huntington, "it is striking to discover that most theories of the so-called convergence in reality posit not convergence but submergence of the opposite system."⁹⁷ Ultimately, asserted Rostow, in its drive towards "maturity", society "outgrows" communism, which "is likely to wither in the age of high mass-consumption".⁹⁸ As soon as a system is industrialised, declared Apter, its transformation begins.⁹⁹

Rostow's views evoked numerous debates. Brzezinski and Huntington criticised the convergence theory. Noting that both the political systems and the character of economic development are entirely different in the United States and the Soviet Union, they expressed doubt that the idea of ultimate convergence would ever be realised.¹⁰⁰ Others, (Inkeles, for example) took a half-way position; on the one hand, they criticised the idea of convergence, and on the other, stressed "similarities" between the USSR and the USA.¹⁰¹ Certain researchers (Grossman) remarked that "convergence is less likely on the political than on the economic plane..."¹⁰²

In *The Dynamics of Modernization. A Study in Comparative History*, Professor Cyril Black of Princeton University came up with a concept somewhat different from Rostow's.¹⁰³

Like Rostow's book, Black's, also claiming to open up new horizons in the philosophy of history, is directed against the Marxist-Leninist theory of historical development. Many of the assertions of the convergence school are encountered here. At the same time, the author objects to the narrowness of Rostow's theory, saying that Rostow "does not seriously take into account the differences represented by traditional institutions".¹⁰⁴

What amendments to Rostow's theory did Black offer? The term "modernisation", which he used in the title of his book and as a basis for classifying societies, was by no means of his own invention. This term, understood as the transformation of a society from a "traditional" to a "modern" society, had been used also by Rostow and others writing on related subjects. Black merely emphasised that in his view the concept "modernisation" is much broader than simply the political and social changes accompanying industrialisation, and that it expressed the process of adapting traditional institutions to the rapid and continuous changes brought on by the scientific and technological revolution.¹⁰⁵

Instead of Rostow's stages, Black advanced the following periodisation of the modernisation process: 1) "The challenge

of modernity", in other words, the confrontation of a "traditional society" with modern ideas and institutions and the emergence in it of "advocates of modernity"; 2) "the consolidation of modernising leadership", that is, the transfer of power, in the course of a normally bitter revolutionary struggle, from traditional to modernising leaders; 3) "economic and social transformation"—the transformation of a predominantly rural and agrarian society into an urban and industrial one; 4) "the integration of society"—a fundamental reorganisation of the social structure of the society as a result of economic and social transformation.¹⁰⁶

To the same extent as Rostow's stages of economic growth, Black's categories of modernisation were designed to replace the Marxist proposition of the law-governed change of socioeconomic formations. The scheme he presented virtually ignored the fundamental differences between different formations, and the capitalist countries of the West were declared the leaders of modernisation. Characteristically, he compared the process of England's industrial development in the first half of the nineteenth century with the process of socialist transformations in the USSR after the October Revolution (under the common heading "Economic and Social Transformation").¹⁰⁷

According to Black's classification, in England (the first pattern in his scheme), the consolidation of modernising leadership began in 1649, and the "integration of society" took place in 1945. In the United States (the second pattern), these processes took place in 1776 and 1933, respectively, and in Germany (the third pattern), in 1803 and 1933. As for the USSR, Black included it in the fifth pattern together with such different countries in terms of their social, political, ideological and economic indicators as Japan, China, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Thailand. This group differed from the others, said Black, in that its modernisation began under the indirect influence of societies that modernised earlier (that is, the Western countries), and that the process itself was one of "limited or defensive modern-

isation". The consolidation of modernising leadership, in Black's view, began in Russia in 1861 and ended in 1917 as a result of the revolution. At that point economic and social transformation began and continues to this day.¹⁰⁸ Clearly predominating in Black's categories is the propaganda idea of the USSR's "backwardness" in comparison with the Western capitalist countries.

In bringing up the question of the importance of the role of "traditional institutions" Black was inferring a traditional inferiority of non-Western countries. This tendency could be seen, for example, in his method of classifying countries according to seven basic patterns. Indeed, what can such states as the USSR, Japan and Ethiopia have in common in the socio-economic sense? The Soviet Union is the recognised country of developed socialism, Japan belongs to the category of highly industrialised capitalist states, and Ethiopia is a developing country, overcoming the survivals of feudalism and colonialism. What, then, is the criterion for his classification? Technical and economic level? No, that was obviously ignored here: Ethiopia and Thailand were put into the same pattern as the USSR, while Albania went into the same group as Belgium, Denmark, Holland and Germany (third pattern). The look of irreality in Black's methodology takes on a more practical appearance when we notice that the dividing lines in his scheme are determined sooner by geography (with a strong political flavour) than by economic factors. In essence, his whole classification boils down to the same two regions: West and non-West. The former sets the tone and points out (on the broadest plane) the general direction of the world historical process, and the latter (in its different variations) repeats or imitates the former.

The preconceived ideological rationale for Black's categories becomes even clearer when we examine what events in the different countries he considered crucial to their economic and social transformation. An amazing detail comes to the surface here. It turns out that the bourgeois reforms

in England of the 1830s, the Civil War in the United States, the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, and the defeat of Japan in the Second World War were events of equal significance for each country in that they gave impetus to their economic and social transformation. In this context, the October Revolution and the building of socialism in the USSR were regarded not as a transition to a higher formation, but as a form of modernisation that merely duplicated what was already begun by others.

Black's theory is an example of how a most abstract economic-sociological scheme can be used tendentiously. But in examining the influence of the theory of convergence on the way the past is described, we should first clarify the relationship between the model of Soviet society as constructed in that theory and the "totalitarian model".

The basic difference between these two arbitrary creations of bourgeois social science lay not in their assessment of the Soviet socio-political system, but in their prognosis of the prospects of its development. The "totalitarian model" was stable (an exception was the viewpoint, mentioned earlier, of those who would give an "economic" explanation of "Soviet totalitarianism"). The model proposed by proponents of the convergence theory on the contrary, was "dynamic". Assessing the Soviet socio-political system as "undemocratic", they at the same time regarded it as a disease of growth on the way to achieving Western standards. The former spoke of the monolithic nature of "Soviet totalitarianism", while the latter spoke of its erosion. With certain reservations it can be said that these two models embodied the two concepts of the historical development of Russia and the USSR which we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter: the "totalitarian model" rested mainly on the theory of "Russian exclusiveness", while the idea of the convergence of socialism and capitalism was connected with the theory of the "non-independence" of Russian history.

Indeed, taking the Western capitalist model of modern-

isation as the standard, the supporters of Rostow's theory doomed all the rest of mankind to inevitable imitation of the West. David Apter, Director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, declared that the drive towards modernisation expresses not only the basic content of the present era but that "embodied within it are all the past revolutions of history and all the supreme human desires". He stressed that this movement began in the West, and that beginning with the latter half of the nineteenth century, Western society became a universal model or at least a standard.¹⁰⁹ Associating modernisation with the capitalist system, he forgot to add, however, that one-third of the world's population had chosen the socialist rather than the capitalist way of development.

It was precisely in order to discredit socialism—to counteract its growing popularity—that some bourgeois theoreticians sought to assure peoples that Soviet socialist society is nothing but an imitation, a variant of Western capitalist society. It follows directly from Rostow's theory that the main difference between the West and the USSR is merely a difference in timing: that which in Soviet life seems different from Western life is in essence also Western, but relates to an earlier period. In comparing from a purely technical and economic standpoint the development of the USSR with that of the USA over the period 1850-1950, Rostow declared that in the course of that century Russia's development was "remarkably similar to that of the United States, with a lag of about thirty-five years in the level of industrial output and a lag of about a half-century in *per capita* output in industry". There is nothing in the Russian stages of economic growth, said Rostow, that "does not fall within the general pattern; although like all other national stories it has unique features..." The prerevolutionary and the Soviet periods, according to his theory, are nothing other than the last two stages in the drive to maturity.¹¹⁰ Rostow mixed socialist Russia with capitalist Russia, although it is

well known that after the Great October Socialist Revolution, the development of the USSR and the USA went in opposite directions: the United States entered the phase of the general crisis of capitalism, while the Soviet Union, having built a socialist society, embarked on the building of communism.

We might note that some bourgeois authors' conception of socialism is still on the "barracks" level and associated with poverty. In fact, however, socialism by no means excludes the possibility of raising the material well-being of the masses. In the Soviet Union, for example, the standard of living is growing steadily. Only over the eighth five-year plan period, the real per capita income there grew 33 per cent. Public consumption funds are constantly growing. At state expense, working people and their children receive free education in secondary schools, specialised secondary schools and higher educational establishments, and enjoy free medical services, stipends and other benefits. The housing problem is being solved at a rapid rate and on a large scale; 55 million Soviet people improved their housing situation over the eighth five-year plan period. The maximum satisfaction of the society's growing material and cultural needs is a goal that is fundamentally inherent in socialism and in no way contradicts it.

Theodore von Laue, whose writings clearly do not fit into the framework of sovietological conceptual structures (as noted earlier, he is one of the authors of an "economic" substantiation of "Soviet totalitarianism"), developed the "imitation" theme further. After stating that the West's progress went according to its internal laws and that "the English (or the Americans) do not imitate..."¹¹¹, he made the following conclusion: the Soviet Union "...like all developing [!—B.M.] countries, must pursue the same basic pattern of development which the Western countries have pioneered..."¹¹² "The Soviet experiment... represents no more than a controlled effort to put the Western pattern of an urban industrial society to work under Russian conditions."¹¹³

Von Laue tried to substantiate this conclusion by invoking the proposition of the primacy of foreign over domestic policy. Russia, he wrote, "could meet the common challenge of the global power competition only by a special effort of imitation. . . , Russia's defeats from the Crimean war to Brest-Litovsk compelled imitation, and imitation in turn predetermined the course of Russia's development".¹¹⁴ Gerschenkron resorted to the same device, saying that the external political factor was the basic stimulus to internal modernisation.¹¹⁵

This last point of view actually leads to the absurd. It would mean that Russia's development was determined not by internal factors (the objective requirements for developing the country's productive forces, the class struggle, etc.), but by external factors—the desire of the ruling circles to catch up with the advanced European powers. But the imitation thesis suffers from more than methodological defects. The contention that the "Soviet model" is not independent stands in glaring contradiction to the generally acknowledged fact that twentieth century world development as a whole proceeds under the direct influence of the ideas of October, that the October Revolution determined the high-road of history. Soviet society does not refuse to study and use the economic experience and scientific and technological achievements of capitalist production. Lenin urged the Soviet people to do this. But in the very foundations of economic organisation, in the foundations which make possible the fullest use of progress in science and technology for the good of the whole society, it is precisely socialism that is the most advanced system in the modern epoch and worthy of imitation.

Insisting that the Soviet system was imitative some authors tried to prove that the "imitation" was bad and of second-grade quality. This propaganda aim, however, contradicts the basic premises of Rostow's theory. The levels of technical and economic development with which he operates determine only the "stage" which a society has reached and

not at all the quality or "grade" of one or another variant (the idea of "imitation" furthermore does not exclude the possibility of the "copy" being superior to the "original"—an example of which could be seen in Japan's industrial practice). Therefore, in his efforts to associate socialism with economic and cultural backwardness, Rostow turned to the proposition of "specific Russian conditions". Communism, he declared, is by no means the only form of effective state organisation in which the transition can be made from a "traditional society" to "technological maturity". It is only one of the models capable of starting and continuing the process of economic growth in a society lacking the conditions characteristic of the West. Moreover, Rostow continued, "it is a kind of disease which can befall a transitional society if it fails to organise effectively those elements within it which are prepared to get on with the job of modernisation."¹¹⁶ Roger Benjamin (University of Minnesota) and John Kautsky (Washington University, St. Louis) developed the same thought. "In underdeveloped countries. . ." they wrote, "Communist parties may be regarded as merely one variety of the modernising movements that evolved in these countries in response to the impact of Western industrialism."¹¹⁷

Cyril Black, as we mentioned earlier, referred to the role of "traditional institutions" as the reason for the "backwardness" of the Soviet pattern. Von Laue tried to show the same thing by referring to "anarchistic" tendencies in the Slav psychology. Although the Western pattern of development, wrote von Laue, has become the "global prototype", it "does not organically mesh with indigenous traditions". The fate of Western institutions "outside the original matrix is uncertain. . . ."¹¹⁸

After uttering this thought, differing somewhat from the viewpoint of the orthodox convergence theorists who dream of reorganising the world exactly according to the American pattern, von Laue let it be known clearly that the Western pattern of development could not have manifested it-

self in Russia in its pure, "classical" forms because of a deep cleavage in Russia between the native mentality and the objective need to "modernise", or as he put it, "between the turbulent spontaneity of the native temperament" and the "Western-oriented necessities, between heart and head, ... between the native value structure and imported ideals and goals".¹¹⁹ He stubbornly called the socialist transformations in the USSR "Westernisation". Nor is it clear exactly how the "cleavage" between the native temperament and the necessities of economic and cultural development showed itself. As we know, socialist transformations were carried out in the USSR in an historically short span of time, and the rate of development was much higher than that of Western countries. However, Soviet borrowings from the West, declared von Laue, inevitably got distorted and assumed the character of a parody, a "caricature echo of Western state and society, the best copy feasible under Russian conditions".¹²⁰ In other words, some sovietologists portrayed Soviet socialist society as an inferior brand of bourgeois society.

The thesis that the socialist society is a "retarded", "lagging" variety of capitalist society is the credo of convergence. However, the proponents of this view cannot explain why a "second-grade model" or "lagging form" of modernisation should be able to solve problems (the absence of economic crises, the absence of unemployment, a high rate of industrial development, etc.) that are clearly beyond the powers of the "higher" Western model. Why this "lowest" pattern was able to make exceptional progress in minimally short terms and surpass the "highest" pattern in many indicators in the fields of culture, science and economics? Why an ever greater number of countries are taking as a model not the "highest" but the "lowest" pattern of development?

Peter Filene points to the West's desire to borrow elements of economic planning from the USSR.¹²¹ D. Conklin notes the importance of "the Russian experiment", not only

for Russia but also for the West.¹²² Michael Ellman says in plain terms: "Much of the 'new' Western economics of the post World War II period ... was simply the repetition and development of the fruitful Soviet work of the 1920s."¹²³

Lacking concrete facts, the convergence theorists engaged in prognostic speculation. The absence in present-day Soviet society of shortcomings typical of capitalism is, they said, only the consequence of the "immaturity" of Soviet society. For example, if the USSR has no unemployment now, it will when Soviet society reaches maturity. Many bourgeois scholars regard such prognoses with skepticism, however. Thus, French colleagues of one such prognosticator—S. Schwartz, who had appeared on the pages of the American journal *Current History*—after analysing his arguments, criticised him for coming to hasty conclusions.¹²⁴

An increasing number of Western researchers note the value of the Soviet economic and scientific experience. "The Soviet experience has had profound repercussions on the economic policies of other countries..." writes Stanley Cohn from the State University of New York. "Much of the development consciousness prevailing since World War II was stimulated by the results of the Soviet experiment." In his view, the main innovation of the socialist economic system of the USSR was economic planning. "Prior to the Soviet demonstration," he stresses, "comprehensive economic planning existed only in a rudimentary form in the theories of unconventional economists.... Soviet performance demonstrated for the first time that a socialist economic structure could function and that explicit planning of an economy was feasible." Further, he points to another unique element of the Soviet experience that is used by the West—planned economic growth. He notes that the major market economies of Western Europe follow "concerted policies of stimulating growth" and that since 1961 such policy has been pursued by the United States as well.¹²⁵ A number of bourgeois authors, not wishing to make any uncertain specific "forecasts", advanced approximately the

following thesis: the Soviet Union will score successes, but only because and to the extent that it assimilates capitalist methods of production and distribution. However, such views did not become widespread because no signs of any approximation to the capitalist economy could be found in the Soviet economy. The discussion concerning "the adoption of profit as the best sign of good management of enterprises", wrote the French economist Michel de Enden, "...prompted certain people (in the West) to see in it a symptom of rapprochement between the collectivist economic system and capitalism. Others felt justified in predicting on the basis of this fact the possibility of a gradual 'bourgeoisification' of the population of the USSR. The truth seems often to be quite different".¹²⁶

The convergence myths inevitably fall apart, and the myth makers are forced to resort to arguments that lack even the semblance of being scientific. For example, some bourgeois scholars cite as evidence of convergence the fact that both the USSR and the capitalist countries face the problem of protecting the natural environment. This thesis was advanced by Wellesley College Professor Marshall Goldman formerly with the Harvard Russian Research Centre, first at an international conference in Tokyo in 1970 and then in a book called *The Spoils of Progress* (1972). Contrary to the facts of the matter, Goldman tried to show that the socialist system did not have any noticeable advantages in solving the problem of environmental disruption.¹²⁷

Analysing the postulates of the convergence theory, Allan Gruchy came to the conclusion that the proponents of this theory "overlook the basic ideological differences" between the two systems, "differences which show no sign of disappearing". Noting that the socialist economy will always preserve the principle of public ownership in contrast to the private property character of the capitalist economy, Gruchy sums up: "There is now no prospect of any ultimate convergence between economic systems with these basically contradictory ideologies."¹²⁸

Supporting the proposition that Soviet society is being transformed under the influence of an industrial way of life, Alfred Meyer suggested that the Soviet system could be "understood adequately by comparing it with complex modern bureaucratic organisations anywhere", and, among others, with the bureaucratic structure of modern American corporations. The totalitarian model of communism, he held, applied to the communist system only in the initial period of system building, while the bureaucratic model applies to the period of its maturity.¹²⁹ By his logic, Soviet society has outgrown socialism and has "grown up" to monopolistic bureaucracy! However, the "bureaucratic model" is just as inapplicable to the actual state of Soviet society and the prospects of its development as were the models that preceded it.

Such, in general outline, are the theoretical foundations of American sovietology. Let us now see how this conceptual baggage is used in interpreting specific aspects of the history of the USSR.

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³ James H. Billington, "Six Views of the Russian Revolution", *World Politics*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, April 1966, p. 458.

⁴ *The Russian Review*, January 1967, p. 3.

⁵ Theodore von Laue, "Westernization, Revolution and the Search for a Basis of Authority—Russia in 1917", *Soviet Studies*, October 1967, p. 155.

⁶ The fact that American historiography borrowed ideas from émigré sources was confirmed by James Billington in "Six Views of the Russian Revolution", *World Politics*, Princeton, April 1966, p. 457.

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- ²¹ Melvin C. Wren, *The Course of Russian History*, New York, 1958, p. VIII.
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- ²³ Robert V. Daniels, *Russia*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964, pp. 53-55.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 55.
- ²⁵ Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Modern Russia, Historical and Political Thought of Russia's Great Age*, New Brunswick, 1955, p. 235; Dinko Tomasič, *The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism*, Glencoe (Illinois), 1953, p. 217.
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- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 169.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 595-96.
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- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 148, 149, 150.
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CHAPTER 3

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION:
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL MYTHS
AND HISTORICAL REALITY

In 1967, representatives of bourgeois sovietology gathered in the United States for a conference to discuss a question that had for decades disturbed bourgeois thought: why did the socialist revolution take place in Russia.¹

The time is long past when bourgeois historical science tried to deny the world significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Now its representatives speak and write about the global significance of October. British historian Paul Dukes notes, for example: "Just as the eighteenth-century democratic revolution might be said ... to have exerted a profound influence from the Atlantic to the Urals, a proletarian revolution of the twentieth century can be considered to have made an impact on a wider, even worldwide scale."²

Such statements are not accidental. Over the past years achievements of the October Revolution went through a thorough historical test. The ideas of October live and triumph in the victory of socialism and the achievements of communist construction in the USSR, in the development of the world system of socialism, in the broad upsurge of the working-class movement, and in the successes of the national liberation struggle. Marxism-Leninism has won the minds of hundreds of millions of people, and the commu-

nist movement has become the most influential political force of our time.

It is interesting to note that bourgeois writers speak about this more and more frequently themselves. "Leninism," notes American sovietologist Stanley Page, "...is more than a body of thought. It is the principal shaping influence of the global and domestic policies of the USSR and a directive to action for hundreds of millions the world over."³ The British sovietologist Leonard Schapiro, in 1967, had to acknowledge the tremendous role played by Lenin "...whose personal impact on events both in his own country and in the world outside may well have been greater than that of any other individual in this century."⁴

The great historical significance of the revolution that opened a new era in the history of mankind compelled bourgeois historiography to make an intensive search for an "answer" to the basic ideological challenge of the era and set before bourgeois historians the task of making an appropriate appraisal of the main historical event of the twentieth century.

THE ALLEGEDLY "ACCIDENTAL" CHARACTER
OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

A sense of bewilderment and helpless outrage was expressed in the first evaluations in the United States of the October Revolution. In an article entitled "Six Views of the Russian Revolution", James Billington of Princeton University noted this characteristic reaction of bourgeois historians, their inclination to view the Revolution as one would "the interjection of a senseless natural calamity into human affairs", their inability to see in the Revolution any deep meaning, their bewilderment which "resolved into a feeling of pathetic regret and intellectual inquiry focussed on random detail and occasionally animated by the belief or suggestion that what happened might somehow have been avoided..."⁵

This "pathetic-emotional" view was typical above all of the émigré literature, in which the October Revolution was portrayed as spontaneous development sparked by a fatal concurrence of circumstances. In entitling his memoirs *The Catastrophe*, the former Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, Alexander Kerensky, set the guidelines, as it were, for a whole trend.⁶ Once it had advanced the "theory of catastrophe", the émigré literature simply froze at that level. Thus, for example, many years after October 1917, Michael Karpovich wrote of the "suddenness" of the fall of the Romanov dynasty, after whose demise "chaos" ensued, for the Russian people had neither "enough experience in self-government", nor "enough political education".⁷ George Vernadsky attributed the victory of the Bolsheviks to the fact that the members of the Provisional Government were too weak; none of them, he said, "had a strong will nor determination to suppress the enemies of order".⁸

The practice begun by the White émigré literature of ignoring the historical background of the Great October Revolution was adopted by bourgeois historiography in the United States with slight modifications. In a review of books on the October Revolution which came out in the United States on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Revolution, Arthur Adams aptly described them as "old wine in new bottles".⁹ However, of the main theories in American historiography, the theory that October was accidental and unnatural had very definite sources—it was embodied in the writings of out-and-out enemies of the socialist revolution, persons whom the Revolution left outside the bounds of the country's historical development.

The accident theory swept away as immaterial any question of there having been objective preconditions for the socialist revolution. The theory's supporters proceeded from the assumption that the victory of October was not historically inevitable or unavoidable. Robert Daniels of the University of Vermont wrote in 1967 that the Bolshevik revolution was "neither inevitable" nor likely,¹⁰ and that "it

succeeded against incredible odds in defiance of any rational calculation...". In his words, the October Revolution "was a desperate gamble, unlikely to succeed and still less likely to hold out".¹¹

Why then did this "desperate gamble", as Daniels put it, lead to success? Answering this question, the American sovietologist wrote: "It was... a victory partly by default, partly by a series of lucky developments that no one could have counted on." The October Revolution, Daniels said, would not have taken place at all but for a "stroke of historical accident"—the dispatching of troops by the Kerensky government to destroy the printshop of the Bolshevik newspaper *Rabochi Put* on the morning of the 24th of October.¹² "Kerensky's ill-conceived countermove was the decisive accident."¹³ Its failure showed the impotence of the government. As a result and "to the surprise of both sides... Petrograd fell by default into the hands of the Bolsheviks". According to Daniels' reasoning, chance put the Bolsheviks in power and kept them there "during the dizzying days that followed... The accession and survival of the Soviet regime in its early days were little short of a historical miracle".¹⁴

Daniels denied not only the objective but also the subjective preconditions of the October Revolution. He ignored the role of the proletariat and its vanguard, the Bolshevik Party. In his writings, the role of individual psychological factors in human behaviour was inordinately exaggerated at the expense of socio-historical factors, and the individual psychological factor itself was presented as the distorted "mentality of the revolutionary", in which the psychoanalysts saw a reflection of Freudian motives of rebellion and self-assertion.

Trying somehow to holster the accident theory of the October Revolution, Daniels used the following line of reasoning: "Yet there are critical points in the history of nations where two or more divergent alternatives lie open and where the accidents of politics, the words of a negotia-

tor, the path of a few shots, can decide the fate of generations." In Daniels' view: "It was a series of such unpredictable events that diverted Russia from the customary course of modern revolutions and paved the way for the unique phenomenon of twentieth-century communism."¹⁵ This is obviously the typical methodology of idealism, which ignores the fundamental objective conditions and causes of the historical process, remains on the surface of things and thereby distorts their inner essence.

Daniels was not alone in his views and conclusions. Sidney Harcave, in his book, *Years of the Golden Cockerel. The Last Romanov Tsars*, tried to explain what happened by invoking the incompetency of the Romanovs, and particularly of Nicholas II.¹⁶ George Kennan excluded the work of revolutionary organisations from among the causes of the demise of tsarism. In his words, the existence of a revolutionary party only indirectly affected the situation of the regime.¹⁷ And Adam Ulam said that power was simply lying in the street and that any group of decisive people could have picked it up.¹⁸

John Lukacs developed this same idea. "...The October Revolution," he wrote in an article entitled "A Dissenting View of 'The Day That Shook the World'", "was not a revolution, and perhaps not even a coup d'état. The Bolsheviks overthrew little or nothing. The Government of Russia had for all intents and purposes ceased to function before the Revolution took place..." "The Bolsheviks," he claimed, "were climbing atop the wreckage".¹⁹ Merle Fainsod echoed this view, stating that the Bolsheviks won because of the lack of resistance, "utmost confusion", "passivity and apathy".²⁰ And Louis Fischer held that "the coup was successful because... few raised a finger to save the Kerensky government".²¹

Not all bourgeois authors shared this viewpoint, however. Some tried, albeit rather timidly, to analyse the preconditions of October. Professor John Curtiss of Duke University wrote that the February and October revolutions of

1917 "were not an isolated outburst, but were rather the culmination of a struggle of large parts of the Russian people..."²² But having taken a step towards objectivity, Curtiss reduced the causes of the revolution to errors made by the Provisional Government, to the "rebellious" character of the Russian revolutionary movement as a whole. Even Frederick Schuman, who in some cases showed himself to be a realistic historian, declared that the Russian revolution consisted of a chain of accidents and that "there was nothing 'inevitable' in the final triumph of the Russian Marxists".²³ On this issue, history itself is the indisputable arbiter. How can one speak of "chance" when Russia's whole development was marked by the mounting revolutionary movement, when the growing contradictions could be resolved only by means of a socialist revolution?

As early as September 1917, Lenin pointed out the error of denying the inevitability of a socialist revolution in Russia. "The whole course of events, all economic and political conditions," he wrote, "...are increasingly paving the way for the successful winning of power by the working class, which will bring peace, bread and freedom and will hasten the victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries."²⁴ Economic development, and the development of the revolutionary movement and international relations made Russia in the beginning of the twentieth century the focal point of economic, social and political contradictions, one of the weakest links of the imperialist chain. The centre of the international revolutionary movement shifted to Russia. The strength and revolutionary experience of the Russian proletariat, its alliance with the peasantry, and the fact that the working class had a militant Marxist party were also indications of presence of the subjective factor necessary for the socialist revolution. The victory of October and the emergence and development of world socialism confirmed one of the basic propositions of historical materialism—the law-governed character of human history.

The works of Soviet scholars convincingly refute the

theory that the October Revolution was some kind of accident or spontaneous outburst; through an analysis of a huge amount of material they show that the Revolution was the result of Russia's preceding historical development and the expression of objective laws operating in the era of imperialism.

Striving to substantiate the argument that the October Revolution was not law-governed, some bourgeois authors advanced the theory that it was a "coup d'état", a "secret plot". To bolster the long-since exposed myth that the Bolsheviks were "German agents" and thereby to "prove" that the October Revolution was "arranged for by the German Great General Staff", some anti-communist historians did not hesitate to use fake documents. This slanderous fabrication spread by the enemies of the Bolsheviks in the first years after the victory of October (incidentally, it was repeated by Kerensky in the first and second editions of his memoirs) was widely used in anti-Soviet propaganda.

A torrent of official and semi-official literature portraying the Bolsheviks as German agents and displaying no understanding of the causes and character of the revolutionary events in Russia flooded the American book market. In the words of R. Warth, "the crowning folly of this blend of outraged patriotism and political naïveté was the publication... of the spurious 'Sisson Documents' under the garish title 'The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy'".²⁵ These documents were published in 1918 with the aim of demonstrating an allegedly existing secret link between the Bolsheviks and the German General Staff.²⁶

In a book published in New York in 1920, Raymond Robins, an American Red Cross representative in Russia, ridiculed the allegation that there was any connection between the Bolsheviks and German imperialism.²⁷ Edward Ross, in his *The Russian Bolshevik Revolution*, published in New York in 1921, objected to the assertion that the Bolshevik revolution "was the work of a handful of extremists".²⁸ Some representatives of bourgeois historiography,

including George Kennan, also noted the spuriousness of the Sisson Documents.²⁹ After the Second World War, Z. A. B. Zeman of St. Anthony's College (Oxford) made a special study of German diplomatic archives seized by the Anglo-American forces in 1945. However, for all his efforts he could find no evidence of any ties between the Bolsheviks and the German Government.³⁰ Alan Moorehead's attempts to show that such a connection existed were just as futile.³¹ As an American reviewer noted, Moorehead failed to support this "absurd contention".³²

Nonetheless, this forgery was widely used in the literature on the subject. In the Preface to Browder's and Kerensky's three-volume *The Russian Provisional Government, 1917, Documents*, the October Revolution was referred to as a "conspiracy" carried out by a "small minority".³³ Many publications drew ungrounded historical parallels between the October Revolution and various anti-popular coups. Variations on the conspiracy theme were also used in the notorious textbooks on communism. A number of authors stubbornly expounded the propaganda idea that the popular masses "did not participate" in the October Revolution and the idea of its "upper echelon" character.

Although US scholars, in the words of R. Warth, "refrained from lending credence to the more unsophisticated variations", the conspiracy thesis prevailed for a long time in the American historiography on the October Revolution,³⁴ and not only in American historiography. One example was George Katkov's contention that it was the Germans, the Masons and the liberals who paved the way for revolution in Russia.³⁵ Katkov's extreme position drew objections from his colleagues. R. Warth said of his book that "it is highly tendentious and presents a rather fanciful interpretation of the February Revolution as a product of German intrigue and anti-tsarist agitation by the Duma 'liberals'...".³⁶ And Paul Avrich noted sarcastically that "Katkov has convinced himself that the lack of documentary evidence... merely strengthens his case...".³⁷

The conspiracy thesis followed directly from the old Menshevik insinuations regarding the "Blanquism" of the Bolsheviks. S. Schwarz, a former Menshevik and author of one of a series of books on the history of Menshevism published under the aegis of the Hoover Institute, repeated in 1967 the long-since debunked contention that the Bolsheviks were inclined towards conspiracies.³⁸

Some American sovietologists picked up the Menshevik accusations, putting particular emphasis on an alleged "voluntaristic" orientation of Leninism. In this connection, attempts were made to oppose Leninism to Marxism, to give Leninism a tinge of voluntarism. In the words of professional anti-communists, extremist, Blanquist theories were supposedly revived in Leninism.³⁹ Such "interpretations" of Leninism are totally false.

Marxists-Leninists have always rejected any kind of adventurism and conspiracies. In 1897, Lenin stressed the contrast between Blanquism and Marxism, the difference between narrow conspiracy and general popular uprising, the fundamental differences between a top level coup and a revolution of the popular masses. "Blanquist, conspiratorial traditions," he wrote, "are fearfully strong among the former [Narodovoltsi.—B.M.], so much so that they cannot conceive of political struggle except in the form of political conspiracy. The Social-Democrats, however, are not guilty of such a narrow outlook; they do not believe in conspiracies; they think that the period of conspiracies has long passed away, that to reduce political struggle to conspiracy means, on the one hand, immensely restricting its scope, and, on the other hand, choosing the most unsuitable methods of struggle."⁴⁰ As Lenin pointed out, "revolutions develop from objectively [i.e., independently of the will of parties and classes] mature crises and turns in history..."⁴¹

Marxism-Leninism rejects voluntarism. Lenin wrote that "the only effective force that compels change is popular revolutionary energy..."⁴² By its nature and aims the socialist revolution cannot be other than a profoundly popular

revolution, drawing the majority of the exploited masses into struggle. The activity of the masses was the decisive force of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Blanquism is profoundly alien to the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution. Lenin wrote that "revolution is impossible without a nationwide crisis [affecting both the exploited and the exploiters]. It follows that, for a revolution to take place, it is essential, first, that a majority of the workers [or at least a majority of the class-conscious, thinking, and politically active workers] should fully realise that revolution is necessary, and that they should be prepared to die for it".⁴³

"Revolutions," he said, "cannot be made to order, or by agreement; they break out when tens of millions of people come to the conclusion that it is impossible to live in the old way any longer."⁴⁴ He criticised voluntaristic ideological theories in which the subjective factor is given predominant, self-sufficient significance. What bourgeois historians do, therefore, is to attribute to Leninism their own voluntaristic and Maoist views of the historical process.

The groundlessness of the conspiracy thesis can be seen in the contradictory arguments of its exponents. James Billington, for example, after talking about the top level character of revolution, was compelled to mention the broad social base of the Bolshevik movement. He spoke of the Bolsheviks in terms of their "speaking for hitherto forgotten social classes" and of the Revolution as the seizure of state power "by substantial elements of the unpropertied classes under the leadership of a disciplined, new political organisation consecrated to a new philosophy of history and social organisation".⁴⁵ Thus, the fabrication about a Bolshevik "conspiracy from above" is left hanging in mid-air.

The people are the creators of history. This general sociological proposition, confirmed by the worldwide course of historical development, manifested itself with particular force during the Revolution. "Revolutions," noted Lenin, "are festivals of the oppressed and the exploited. At no

other time are the mass of the people in a position to come forward so actively as creators of a new social order, as at a time of revolution. At such times the people are capable of performing miracles."⁴⁶

Studies by Soviet historians and published documents and materials show that the decisive role in the victory and consolidation of Soviet power was played by the revolutionary movement of the broad popular masses under the leadership of the Bolsheviks. Thus, 23 million workers, peasants and soldiers were united in the revolutionary organisations of working people—the Soviets. Within them, the alliance of the proletariat and other strata of working people was politically and organisationally formed. The Soviets expressed the interests of nine-tenths of the population of the country.

Works by Soviet researchers cogently show the popular character of the socialist revolution in Russia, the close bond between the Bolsheviks and the broad popular masses, and the struggle of the proletariat, under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, to rally the overwhelming majority of the people to the cause of the revolution. On the eve of the October Revolution, in Petrograd alone there were no less than 300 thousand armed workers, soldiers and sailors on the side of the Bolsheviks, while only a little over 30 thousand men were on the side of the bourgeoisie.⁴⁷ The October Revolution relied not on conspiracy, as the bourgeois interpreters claim, but on a mass political army of the revolution created through the heroic efforts of the Leninist Party. The triumph of the cause of October and its ideas compels some bourgeois scholars to acknowledge the fact that the October Revolution "was a good deal more than an armed rising by an isolated band of conspirators".⁴⁸

THE VERSION OF THE "NON-MARXIST NATURE" OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Developing the idea of the accidental nature of the October Revolution, Daniels said it was a puzzle that the Russian revolutionaries embraced Marxism, which, he implied, suited neither their country nor them.⁴⁹ This remark, made in passing, indicated more than just an inadequate knowledge of Marxism and the conditions in Russia. It testified also to the lack of logic and consistency in the overall conceptual position of American Soviet studies. On the one hand, incredible efforts were spent to denounce, brand and discredit the October Revolution precisely as a socialist, Marxist revolution. On the other hand, the same revolution was denied its Marxism. A reflection of this kind of disparity was the version about the "non-Marxist nature" of the October Revolution.

The ideological and political reasons for this historiographical contradiction are quite clear. "The dialectics of history were such," wrote Lenin, "that the theoretical victory of Marxism compelled its enemies to *disguise themselves* as Marxists."⁵⁰ The successes of Marxism also compel its enemies to reorganise and in some cases to play the role of its "defenders". It was no accident that standing at the sources of the contention that October was "non-Marxist" were Menshevik leaders who in their time had "excommunicated" the Bolsheviks from Marxism. In a book published in 1962 in New York (true, even one bourgeois historian called the book "a mediocre performance of dubious value to specialists and of little interest to the general reader"⁵¹), Raphael Ahramovitch said that "Bolshevism was an anomaly—a utopian terrorist aberration, incidental to the world Socialist Movement".⁵² In connection with this, Abramovitch spoke of "the exclusively military character of the rising, which was to enter history under the name of 'the great proletarian-socialist October Revolution...'"⁵³

Embracing the version of the non-Marxist character of the October Revolution, bourgeois scholars tried to give battle to Marxist historiography along two basic themes: the objective preconditions of October and its motive forces.

In the first case, examining Russia in isolation, outside the general process of the development of world imperialism, bourgeois scholars focussed their attention on her economic and cultural backwardness, drawing from this the dogmatic conclusion that a Marxist revolution was impossible under such conditions. With virtually no changes (and without proofs!) this theoretical stereotype was repeated by many authors. Thus, William Chamberlin in his history of October asserted that "Russia did not seem to fulfill Marx's specifications for successful socialist revolution. For capitalism had taken root there later than in Western Europe".⁵⁴ Thomas Hammond held that "Lenin... acted directly contrary to Marx's formula" when "in 1917 he insisted upon carrying out a 'proletarian' revolution, despite the fact that Russia was a backward, agricultural country with very few proletarians".⁵⁵ Daniels wrote that the Revolution was not the result of the kind of conditions envisaged by Marx; that it was not the outcome of industrial maturity; that it was a movement standing for socialism which came to power "in a country that was not supposed to have the material preconditions for such a change".⁵⁶

To substantiate these statements, bourgeois scholars were compelled to resort not only to an erroneous interpretation of the facts of the prehistory and history of the Revolution, but to a distortion of Marxism-Leninism. They often substituted Trotskyism for Leninism and ascribed to Lenin a Trotskyist viewpoint on many questions, saying, for example, that Lenin denied the revolutionary role of the peasantry as the ally of the proletariat and rejected the possibility of the victory of socialism initially in one country, particularly in Russia. Anti-communist historiography adopted such terms as "Thermidor", "bourgeois degeneration" and "bureaucratization", terms which in the 1920s were used by

the Trotskyists in their struggle against Soviet power and are now being used by the "Left" revisionists. For example, in an article entitled "Reflections on the Revolution", Adam Ulam tried to divorce Marxism, as the theoretical legacy of Marx and Engels, from its further development by Lenin and the revolutionary practice embodied in the October Revolution. Ulam accused the Bolsheviks of tearing "Marxism away not only from its historico-deterministic moorings, but also from much of its materialistic setting", and said that "Marxism in Russia had thus suffered complete attrition". Proceeding from this fantastic notion, Ulam stressed the "non-Marxist" nature of the October Revolution, which, in his words, "prevailed largely because its opponents were still living in the nineteenth century, when ideologies were held to be binding representations of social and historical reality and not merely conglomerations of slogans or quasi-religious visions."⁵⁷

But not all of his colleagues embraced such extreme views. George Hamsch of the John Carroll University (Ohio) wrote in his *The Theory of Communism. An Introduction*: "Leninism and the ideology invoked in the Soviet Union and throughout the communist world is basically Marxian." And further: "... the movement initiated by Marx, developed by Engels, and in another way by Lenin, and finally actualised in contemporary communist countries is the only interpretation of Marx viable at present." Replying to those who maintained that the Communists deviated from Marx, Hamsch stressed: "... The Bolsheviks have held true to this idea which they have termed the 'creative advancement' of Marxist theory." Lenin's theory of imperialism, he wrote, was the logical advancement of Marx's ideas.⁵⁸

The endeavours of the above-mentioned authors to oppose the October Revolution and Leninism to Marxism are untenable. The October Revolution was a vivid concrete demonstration of the vitality of revolutionary ideas; it was the triumph of the only scientific theory of social development—the Marxist-Leninist teaching.

Utterly unjustifiable were the assertions that conditions in Russia did not correspond to the Marxist conceptions of the preconditions of a socialist revolution. It may be pointed out that the founders of Marxism emphasised the great revolutionary potential of Russia. "...Marx and Engels," wrote Lenin, "naturally possessed the most fervent faith in a Russian revolution and its great world significance."⁵⁹

Marx maintained a steady interest in the struggle of the Russian revolutionaries against the tsarist autocracy and was personally connected with many of them. He was deeply convinced "that a fearful social revolution is approaching".⁶⁰ Russia, he pointed out in 1877, "has long been standing on the threshold of an upheaval, all the elements of it are prepared.... This time the revolution will begin in the East, hitherto the unbroken bulwark and reserve army of counter-revolution".⁶¹ Engels also noted in 1878 that in Russia "there existed all the elements of a Russian 1789 which will inevitably be followed by a 1793... and once matters reach the point of revolution in Russia the entire face of Europe will change".⁶² A Russian revolution, Engels said, "augurs the kind of change in the entire situation in Europe that workers of all countries should joyously hail as gigantic step towards their common goal—the universal emancipation of labour".⁶³

The contention that the October Revolution was non-Marxist in nature and allegations that the Bolsheviks deviated from the Marxist understanding of the historical process were related to the kind of thinking that identified historical materialism with vulgar economic materialism. Reducing the preconditions of a socialist revolution primarily to the condition of industry and the size of the working class, the critics of Leninism ignored the balance of class forces in Russia and in the international arena, and divorced the question of the maturity of the material preconditions of revolution in Russia from the problem of the development of the whole capitalist system in the era of imperialism.

Soviet scholars have done a tremendous amount of research into the economic preconditions of the October Revolution. Although Russia was, indeed a relatively backward country, capitalism was nonetheless extensively developed in her. Powerful capitalist monopolies existed in the country, and some industries were highly advanced. The Prodamet, Med, Prodarud, Prodvagon and other syndicates controlled 75-95 per cent of the major industrial output. Before the war no less than 150 to 200 regional and nationwide cartels and syndicates were operating in Russia.

As industry developed, its fixed capital grew, almost doubling between 1900 and 1913. In the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia surpassed the United States in rate of growth of fixed capital.⁶⁴ At the same time, there was a greater concentration of banking capital than there was in the West. On the eve of the October Revolution, the banks controlled or influenced enterprises whose share capital accounted for 44 per cent of the capital of all joint-stock enterprises. Proceeding at a rapid pace was the merger of banking capital and industrial capital and the formation of finance capital. By 1913, the key branches of heavy industry were connected with the banking monopolies.

The development of state-monopoly capitalism in Russia multiplied the objective preconditions for the revolutionary transition to socialism. During the imperialist First World War these preconditions were created with tremendous speed. Lenin wrote that "socialism is now gazing at us from all the windows of modern capitalism; socialism is outlined directly, *practically*, by every important measure that constitutes a forward step on the basis of this modern capitalism".⁶⁵

In analysing the objective conditions in which a socialist revolution ripens, more than the economic conditions alone have to be taken into account. The political situation must also be considered. The mature economic conditions do not automatically bring about revolution. A revolution requires also certain objective political conditions;

it requires such an arrangement of class forces as would create the possibility of a victorious onslaught against the old system. A dialectical understanding of the whole aggregate of socio-class contradictions, and not simply an assessment of the level of development of the productive forces, enabled Lenin and the Bolshevik Party with complete confidence to steer a course towards the turning of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. This is what those who criticise Leninism from the positions of vulgar economism do not understand.

The class character of bourgeois historiography and its inherent hostility to Marxism-Leninism manifested themselves with particular force in its approach to the question of the motive forces of the Great October Socialist Revolution. What social forces carried out the October Revolution, and to attain what goal?—is far from an academic question for bourgeois scholars. To acknowledge the proletarian character of the Revolution, to admit that the proletariat was its chief motive force and, finally, to admit that as a result of October, power went over from the hands of exploiters into the hands of the exploited, would mean, in the eyes of bourgeois historians, to acknowledge the historical doom of capitalism. It is no wonder, therefore, that the history of the proletarian struggle in Russia and the history of the participation of the working class in the Great October Socialist Revolution are erroneously interpreted and deliberately distorted.

Developing the version of the non-Marxist nature of the October Revolution, bourgeois historiography strove to belittle the role of the working class in preparing for and successfully consummating the Revolution. But in so doing, the logic of the ideological struggle and the necessity for a polemic with Marxist historiography forced bourgeois science to pay attention to things it had formerly simply ignored. American sovietologists, for example, began to show increasing interest in the Russian working-class movement (Leopold Haimson, Richard Pipes, and others). Pipes for

example, noted that "the emergence of Russian labour in the closing decades of the nineteenth century..." was "a fact of great significance for the history of modern Russia..."⁶⁶

However, even in these works the degree to which the proletariat took part in the revolutionary reorganisation of Russian society was not given full consideration. In accord with the view that Russia was "not ready" for a socialist revolution, bourgeois historians advanced different variations of the idea that the Russian working class was "immature", "backward", that it sooner consisted of downtrodden, illiterate "semi-peasants" than a "type of industrial worker". Thus, William Chamberlin wrote of the "masses of the unskilled and slightly skilled labourers" who were "ignorant and backward" and "never thought about political or social ideas at all".⁶⁷ On the eve of the Revolution, noted another American author, the Russian workers "remained a primitive and essentially anarchic group".⁶⁸ With rare exceptions, American sovietologists ignored the fact that on the eve of the Revolution cadres of industrial workers already existed in Russia.

Bourgeois historians gave a one-sided description of the working class, stressed elements of spontaneity in it, kept silent about the growth of its class-consciousness, and put its revolutionary traditions to question. Exaggerating the backwardness of the Russian workers, they vulgarised the forms and features of the working-class movement in Russia, portraying it as a spontaneous, semi-conscious mutiny. In one of his works, Alexander Gerschenkron said that "such labour as was available was uneducated, restless and fitful in its habits, often trying to submerge the sense of frustration and loneliness in alcoholic excesses..."⁶⁹ And W. Chamberlin had this to say: "... The bleakness and poverty of Russian working-class life promoted among those workers... an extremism that was bound to come to the surface as soon as the restraints of tsarism were removed."⁷⁰

Leopold Haimson mentioned the growth of the revolutionary character of the Russian proletariat, but gave as the reason for it the workers' "primitive spirit of *buntarstvo*".⁷¹ He considered the working-class movement itself—which in his view was sooner the consequence of the discontent of the peasant masses than that of class-conscious workers—to be immature.⁷² Such assertions are completely erroneous. Documented materials on the working-class movement refute the theses that the Russian proletariat was politically passive and immature.⁷³

Some bourgeois authors, seeking to draw a line between the proletariat and the revolutionary Social-Democrats and to oppose the one to the other, tendentiously interpreted the history of the spread of socialist ideals and Marxist-Leninist ideology among the Russian proletariat. In his book, *Social-Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement*, R. Pipes asserted: "The History of the Social-Democratic and labour movements in St. Petersburg during the period from 1885 to 1897 is the history not of one but of two separate and distinct movements. Though they co-operated on many occasions, the two never merged." Pipes strove to prove that the Russian workers were hostile to socialism and politically indifferent. "The workers," he wrote, "never yielded to the socialists' efforts to politicise their movement."⁷⁴ His conclusions clearly echoed the writings of Abramovitch, who maintained that the workers of Russia were not politically minded and "steered clear of the existing parties and party leaders".⁷⁵

The facts, however, show that on the eve of the Revolution the Russian proletariat was a numerically large class, and one that was sufficiently mature, organised and class-conscious to unite for the purpose of tackling its class tasks, which were interlocked with the tasks of revolution that had matured in Russia, and to play an independent and decisive role in the liberation movement. It had over 10.6 million men in its ranks in 1917, of which 3,545,000 worked in factories, mines or in the mining industry. But the working

class was much stronger than could be inferred from the proportion of the total population it constituted. As Lenin explained it, that was "because the proletariat economically dominates the centre and nerve of the entire economic system of capitalism, and also because the proletariat expresses economically and politically the real interests of the overwhelming majority of the working people under capitalism".⁷⁶

A characteristic feature of the Russian working class was its high concentration at large enterprises and in industrial centres. In 1910, 53.4 per cent of the country's workers were employed at enterprises with 500 or more workers. By comparison, on the eve of the First World War, only 32.1 per cent of the work force in the United States were employed in comparable enterprises, and in Germany in 1909—10 per cent.⁷⁷ This high concentration in Russia favoured the formation of the highly revolutionary proletariat that was able, under the leadership of the party of a new type, to sunder the chain of imperialism and head the working masses in the building of a socialist society.

Some sovietologists did not agree with those of their colleagues who pictured the Russian workers of 1917 as a "motley, unstable agglomeration of various elements weak in class-consciousness". Thus, Paul Avrich considered this description inapplicable to the workers at the large metallurgical, chemical and electrical plants in the larger industrial towns. Among those workers, Avrich noted, the new elections to the factory committees "in late May and early June showed substantial Bolshevik gains". At the First Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees on May 30, 1917, the Bolsheviks won a symptomatic victory. After the collapse of the July offensive, wrote Avrich, "Russian workmen in large numbers abandoned the relatively moderate SRs and Mensheviks to join the Bolshevik ranks".⁷⁸

While Lenin attached primary importance to the proletariat as the basic force of the socialist revolution, he pointed out that the proletariat does not have to be numerically in

the majority to carry out a revolution. Under the conditions of imperialism, the influence of the proletariat on the working masses is determined not so much by its size in numbers as by its organisation, unity, political maturity and earned prestige. Another motive force in a socialist revolution are the poor peasants, the urban semi-proletariat, and all the brutally exploited working people who enter into alliance with the working class and accept its leadership. The Russian proletariat had all the objective possibilities of becoming the leader of the revolution, of heading all the working people in the struggle for the socialist transformation of society.

In reviewing the history of the working-class movement in Russia, some foreign scholars tried to reduce to a minimum the world historical mission of the Russian proletariat, to belittle the revolutionary role it played in the struggle to destroy the old and create a new world. According to Herbert Marcuse, for example, the position of the working class in the October events was "passive".⁷⁹ Abramovitch pursued this line with particular zeal, putting to question the proletarian character of the Revolution and stating that it was carried out "while the working masses of the capital stood by passively".⁸⁰ Arvid Brodersen took a similar position and even held that the forces of the Revolution of 1917 included "some agents of the German General Staff". He asserted further that the Bolsheviks were not the party of the proletariat, but merely an organisation acting on behalf of the proletariat.⁸¹ That these assertions are wrong can be seen from the fact that the social nucleus of the Bolshevik Party (60 per cent) was made up of workers.

One sovietological work alleged that the leaders of the October Revolution "were only abstractly interested in the working class" and, consequently, in realising its ideals; in practice "... they desired a social upheaval, but the only real goal of this transformation was to place them in positions of power".⁸² Stefan Possony asked this rhetorical question: "But was there really an uprising? The workers

had remained in their jobs and there were no mass strikes—not even workers in the streets. The Red Guards, few in number, played an insignificant role. . .".⁸³

All this simply does not correspond to the facts. The uprising in October was the logical continuation of actions already begun by the proletariat. Spontaneous strikes and demonstrations were on the verge of turning into an armed uprising much earlier, and only the Party restrained the masses from premature action. The factors accounting for the success of October were the energetic and decisive actions of the Military Revolutionary Committee; the vigorous onslaught of the Red Guards, the revolutionary military units in Petrograd and the naval detachments of Kronstadt; all the Party's extensive preparatory work in the army and the correct timing of the uprising.

The armed Red Guard detachments of workers played a big role in the Revolution and in establishing Soviet power. By October 20, 1917, there were over 20,000 men in the Petrograd Red Guards alone. By November 1, the number had increased to 32,000 and by mid-November, to 40,000. Most were metalworkers (74.5 per cent), but some other trades were well represented. These included chemical workers (7 per cent), woodworkers (5.3 per cent), boot and shoe factory workers and tanners (3 per cent). As of January 1, 1918, about half of the Red Guards were members of the RSDLP(B). Of the Petrograd Red Guards only about 3 per cent were members of other parties, and these were mostly Left SRs and Menshevik internationalists. These brief data on the composition of the Petrograd Red Guards testify that they included the best forces of the workers in the capital. By the autumn of 1917, the armed vanguard of the Russian proletariat, the Red Guards, numbered over 200,000. The proletariat was the advanced contingent of the Revolution, its motive force.

Some bourgeois historians divorced the October Revolution from Marxism, portraying it as a specific, purely Russian phenomenon, conditioned by the peculiarities of Rus-

sian geography, history and national character. In line with the theory of Russian exclusiveness, they stressed the importance of Russian psychological traits, traits which supposedly found expression in a special inclination towards anarchy and rebellion. Thus, Alan Moorehead held that manifesting themselves in the revolutionary events of October 1917 were the spontaneous forces of the incomprehensible Slavic soul, the peculiarities of the Russian character, which had been shaped under the influence of "a climate and a topography that call for extremes and idealism, not for liberalism or compromise". According to his description, the Russian people comprise an unstable, amorphous mass of people whose moods are unpredictable; they can be passively calm and then suddenly and unexpectedly tempestuous.⁸⁴

With the help of discourse about Russian "anarchism" and "extremism", attempts were made to depict the new and highest stage in mankind's development as a manifestation of typically Russian extremes and of the impossibility of a "normal", "democratic" solution of fundamental problems under Russian conditions.

Apart from the fact that these ideas are class biased, we shall note that they stem from the practice of not treating the world historical process as a unity, and examining the social and economic condition of prerevolutionary Russia in isolation from that process. However, Soviet and progressive foreign writers reveal both the specific and the general laws that governed the Great October Revolution. In their works they show the world historical significance of the October Revolution, its impact on the international communist and working-class movement, and on the national liberation movement.

In the light of historical facts, the October Revolution can hardly be interpreted as an "exclusive", purely Russian phenomenon. Nor was it an accident. It was the first example of a logical and successful resolution of the antagonistic contradictions of the capitalist system. On the

whole, it was the historical consequence of objective processes engendered by capitalism and in particular a consequence of specific developments in the world situation at that time.

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE MODERNISATION THEORY

In this era of the world's revolutionary renewal, the reactionary forces were increasingly compelled to change forms of their ideological struggle against socialism. Typical was their speculation with the very concept of "revolution". Realising the futility of trying to discredit revolution, the reactionaries tried to substitute some other term for the concept of "revolution", to emasculate its content, and in the final count to declare capitalism as the "vanguard" of social progress.

A new form of struggle used by the reactionaries against the world revolutionary process was to bring the slogan of "radicalism" into play, to depict various pseudo-revolutionary, Maoist, anarchist and petty-bourgeois groups as truly revolutionary, as the vanguard of the world revolutionary process, and to label true Communists as conservatives. These ideological somersaults were borrowed directly from the arsenal of "Left" revisionism.

The concepts employed by "Left" opportunists and extremists do not issue from the fundamental interests of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and all working people, but rather reflect the anarchistic sentiments of the petty bourgeois. This kind of radicalism is incapable of advancing and consistently implementing a constructive programme. But this is just what makes it so attractive to the reactionaries who insist that modern capitalism does not fit the "Marxist-Leninist framework", and that socialism has assumed "conservative forms". One concept that was advanced to countervail the Marxist-Leninist theory of world development was Brzezinski's so-called technetronic theory.

Brzezinski's thesis was that under the influence of advanced technology and electronics developed capitalism in the United States would be transformed into a technetronic society, "a transformation more dramatic in its historic and human consequences than that wrought either by the French or the Bolshevik revolutions".⁸⁵ In his theory, Brzezinski substitutes the "technetronic transformation" of capitalism for the process of the revolutionary change of socio-economic formations.

Brzezinski's technetronic theory was one of the latest attempts to belittle the role and significance of the Great October Revolution, to depict that world historical phenomenon as an event of limited significance, affecting the "periphery" of world civilisation, but not its "vital centres". It was from this premise that the writers who interpreted the October Revolution from the standpoint of the modernisation theory proceeded. In their view, Marxism spread in Russia and was adopted as the theory and practice of building socialism not because the necessary economic and social preconditions had matured, but simply because of the economic backwardness of the country.⁸⁶ Interpreting Marxism as the ideology of the early period of industrialisation, bourgeois historians regarded the October Revolution as one of the radical methods of solving the problems of Russia's backwardness.⁸⁷ The Revolution in October 1917, they maintained, was the first of a series of revolutions in backward countries facing the task of modernisation.

Exponents of this view did not mind stressing that the October Revolution and "revolutions of its type" did follow definite laws, but that these were laws of a special kind. There was not a word here of the laws governing a revolutionary change of socio-economic formations taking place in connection with ripe objective preconditions. The revolution was necessary, declared these latter-day "determinists", insofar as it was necessary to modernise Russia, in other words, it was natural for Russia as an underdevel-

oped country, just as similar revolutions are natural for other underdeveloped countries. For the advanced industrialised West, of course, none of this has any meaning. Bourgeois historiography thus advanced the doctrine that backwardness is the condition for carrying out a proletarian revolution, or in accord with the new term—a revolution in underdeveloped countries.

In the words of von Laue, the causes of the Russian Revolution of 1917, unlike the causes of the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century, were not connected with the internal development of the country. "The Russian revolution belongs to a new category of modern revolutions, to revolutions in backward countries, and ... therefore it can be understood as a revolution whose causes lay outside the country." In his view, "Europe had worked as the primary revolutionary force in Russia" and the Western example was for the Russian Revolution the main goal.⁸⁸

Von Laue brought out two unresolved problems that Russia faced at the beginning of the twentieth century: a) the urgent need to eliminate the gulf between the government and the people and between the privileged and unprivileged strata of society and, b) the need for the rapid modernisation of the country.⁸⁹ In his view, the first task (political) made the Russian Revolution close to the Western European prototype: it was completing, as it were (with great tardiness) the process begun by the Great French bourgeois revolution. The second task, dictated by the "logic of survival" in the struggle for influence in the world arena, was something new—a phenomenon of the twentieth century. Its solution not only imparted special, specific features to the Russian Revolution, but created a fundamentally new "Russian prototype" of revolutions in underdeveloped countries.

The double task standing before Russia, according to von Laue, made the Revolution of 1917 a double revolution: "Up to the summer of 1917, it resembled ... the European prototype, for it aimed at the overthrow of all inequalities

and restrictions on popular participation in politics. It was a revolution of liberation and a revolution from below." "From the summer of 1917," von Laue continued, "a new pattern came to prevail, that of the revolt against backwardness, already foreshadowed in the character of Leninism." This second revolution (the October Revolution) was "a peculiarly Russian phenomenon, in the tradition of Peter the Great, relevant only to countries on the fringes of European civilisation." It was the external expression of the imperative internal need to introduce the Russian state and society to modern industrialism.⁹⁰ In other words, according to von Laue, the Revolution did not stem from the class struggle or the struggle for democracy, but from the non-class need to put an end to the country's backwardness.

It was precisely in its movement towards modernisation, von Laue held, that Russia initiated a new process. Fighting the backwardness of their own country, "the Bolsheviks proclaimed themselves leaders in the mounting anti-Western revolt..."⁹¹ This factor was also underscored by George Kennan, who, noting the impact of the October Revolution on the developing countries and its role in the disintegration of the European colonial empires, said in addition that the Revolution was "...the first great example of successful revolt by non-Europe against Europe".⁹²

To explain the revolution as stemming from Russia's backwardness as a capitalist state is utterly groundless. Russia's backwardness, the existence of semi-feudal survivals alongside developed forms of finance and industrial capitalism naturally affected the development of the revolution. But the fact that economically Russia lagged behind the highly developed capitalist countries was by no means a factor promoting a socialist revolution. On the contrary, as Lenin stressed, a lag of this kind creates great difficulties in building socialism. It was easier for the Russian proletariat to begin the revolution, he said, than to continue and complete it.

The explanation for the spread of Marxism in Russia and the victory of the socialist revolution lay not in the country's backwardness, but in the ripening of the necessary socio-economic preconditions. We touched on this question earlier. Despite the fact that Russia embarked on the road of capitalism later than many West European countries, she moved along this road rapidly, and her transition to imperialism was accomplished simultaneously with that of the principal capitalist countries at the turn of the twentieth century.

Contemporary historical experience clearly shows that the objective laws of world development at the present time is mankind's transition from the capitalist to the communist formation, and not at all the non-class process of "modernisation".

Although von Laue incorrectly appraised the meaning and nature of the Great October Socialist Revolution—the first revolution to put an end to social oppression and the exploitation of man by man—he did acknowledge its significance for the rapid economic development of the country. He also said that the Bolsheviks "solved the first of the underlying necessities of modern Russian development, identifying the people with their government and in turn identifying themselves with the people". The Bolshevik revolution, he said, "was a democratic revolution. It established a government that could hope to speak—at least at this fleeting moment [which? we might ask.—B.M.]—for a majority of Russians".

But upon making these partial concessions, von Laue immediately voiced a series of reservations which, under the cover of discourse about Russian backwardness and anarchism and the spontaneity of the masses, served to cast doubt on the just acknowledged democratic nature of the October Revolution. He used his "imperative of modernisation" to support the proposition that the October Revolution and the socio-political system it gave birth to were totalitarian. Modernisation, he declared, required self-discipline, and

since self-discipline was absent, compulsion became inevitable.⁹³

Von Laue's theory is the most refined of those that try to set up a contradiction between its "positive" and "negative" features—"positive" from the standpoint of the nation's destiny and the condition of the economy, and allegedly "negative" from the socio-political standpoint. The refinement here consists not only in the fact that the author found eloquent words with which to acknowledge the positive features of the Soviet experiment, but also in that he tried essentially to obfuscate the great humanistic experience of the October Revolution.

Incidentally, we might note that von Laue's theory was unique in the bourgeois historiography on the October Revolution. In the form of charges of totalitarianism, anti-democratism, etc., most of his colleagues took only the negative side from the "contradictions" he manufactured. "Revolution or Reaction?"—was the rhetorical question posed by Stuart Tompkins in his *The Triumph of Bolshevism*. In his view, the October Revolution—which was the greatest emancipating revolution in the history of mankind—was not revolution at all, but reaction.⁹⁴ Daniels implied the same thing when he said that the "manner of the revolution ... destroyed its spirit".⁹⁵ Distorting the essence of the revolutionary transformation of Russian society which was inaugurated by the October Revolution, bourgeois historiography depicted this emancipation process as one of "enslaving" the masses, of creating an anti-democratic regime of a new type—totalitarianism.

This was particularly manifest in the practice of opposing the October Revolution to the February Revolution. Many bourgeois scholars maintained that while the February Revolution was really a popular, democratic revolution "from below", the October Revolution was a "planned" coup "from above", leading to the destruction of democracy (Billington, Mazour, McNcal, and others). Common to most bourgeois works was the assertion that the October Revolution

gave nothing in the way of developing democracy; moreover, the argument went, compared with the February Revolution it was a "regression", a step backward. Abramovitch was particularly zealous in this regard, voicing regret over the "destruction" of the democratic regime that had been established in February 1917. This "socialist" claimed that "neither the first provisional government headed by Prince Lvov, nor the coalitions that followed it, were 'bourgeois'..."⁹⁶

This kind of "defence" of the Provisional Government has been thoroughly refuted in published documents and monographic studies by Soviet historians and economists, where it is shown that the bourgeois regime, with the support of the Mensheviks and the SRs, pursued an essentially undemocratic, anti-popular and anti-worker policy. Both the home and foreign policy of that government were subordinated to the interests of the big bourgeoisie. The peasants did not receive land and the workers were mercilessly exploited. The Provisional Government and its Menshevik Ministry of Labour did not act in such matters as social insurance or child labour protection. Even the tsarist insurance law was not observed.

Bourgeois scholars who opposed the October Revolution to the February Revolution apparently failed to understand that the February Revolution was essentially only a prologue to the Great October Revolution, a stage on the way to the revolutionary transformation of Russia that was accomplished under the leadership of the Communist Party. The February Revolution was the beginning of the process in which the bourgeois-democratic revolution grew into a socialist revolution. Of tremendous importance was the conclusion drawn by Lenin that the bourgeoisie could not solve the gigantic tasks set by the Revolution.⁹⁷ In the era of imperialism, general democratic tasks assumed an anti-capitalist direction—this was the guarantee that the bourgeois-democratic revolution would develop into a socialist revolution. The contradictions of February objectively demanded

that the country switch to the road of socialist development. Lenin noted this inexorable necessity and saw the February victory as the first stage of the already begun Russian revolution. "It is *impossible* in twentieth-century Russia, which has won a republic and democracy in a revolutionary way, to go forward without *advancing* towards socialism."⁹⁸

It is also erroneous to associate the transition to the new society with sheer violence. At the end of the nineteenth century, Lenin had already noted "the working class would, of course, prefer to take power *peacefully*..."⁹⁹ And he also spoke of this later, for example, when he pointed to the possibility, in the first months after the February Revolution, of power passing "to the Soviets, immediately, peacefully, without an uprising".¹⁰⁰

The revolutionary violence of the dictatorship of the proletariat was a forced response to the violence of the counter-revolution. Examining the question of the use of force against the resisting bourgeoisie, Soviet scholar Sofinov, the author of a work on the history of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission, showed that on the eve of and in the first weeks after October, it was contemplated that the resistance of the deposed classes would be smashed with the help of the usual organs of power, without taking extraordinary measures. The need for special measures revealed itself as the resistance of the bourgeoisie increased. The suppression of the individual and sheer violence have nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist theory or the experience of the October Revolution. They are characteristic only of the petty-bourgeois slanderous representation of socialism, which Marx characterised as barracks communism.

It is interesting to note that the more objective bourgeois historians dispute the validity of assertions to the effect that Soviet power was violent and undemocratic. Thus, Frederick Schuman wrote that "contrary to the impression that soon became current in the West, the Soviet Government between November and June, 1917-18, established itself and pursued its programme with less violence and with far fewer

victims than any other social revolutionary regime in human annals".¹⁰¹ William Mandel appraised the Bolshevik Party as an organisation of unselfish men and women who had a clear understanding of their tasks and how to gain the support of the masses to achieve their set goal.¹⁰²

Proletarian in its content, the October Revolution was at the same time a truly popular revolution. It solved, along with the basic socialist tasks, urgent tasks of democratic development. It created real conditions for democracy in all spheres of the life of society. The Soviets, which had emerged in the course of the Revolution, were by their very nature highly democratic organs of power, elected and controlled by the people. The profound democratic essence of the new, socialist state was clearly seen in the very first decrees and measures of Soviet power.

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² Paul Dukes, *The Emergence of the Super-Powers. A Short Comparative History of the USA and the USSR*, London, 1970, p. 102.

³ Stanley W. Page, *Lenin and World Revolution*, New York, 1959, p. XVII.

⁴ *Lenin. The Man, the Theorist, the Leader. A Reappraisal*. Editors: Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway, London, 1967, p. 19.

⁵ James H. Billington, "Six Views of the Russian Revolution", *World Politics*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, April 1966, pp. 456-57.

⁶ Alexander Kerensky, *The Catastrophe*, New York, 1927.

⁷ Michael Karpovich, *A Lecture on Russian History*, s'Gravenhage (The Netherlands), 1958, pp. 42-44.

⁸ George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, Philadelphia, 1944, p. 237.

⁹ Arthur E. Adams, "New Books on the Revolution—Old Wine in New Bottles", *The Russian Review*, October 1967, p. 391.

¹⁰ Robert V. Daniels, "The Bolshevik Gamble", *Russian Review*, October 1967, p. 335.

¹¹ Robert V. Daniels, *Red October. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917*, New York, 1967, pp. 215-16; "The Bolshevik Gamble", p. 337.

¹² Robert V. Daniels, op. cit., pp. 338-39.

¹³ Robert V. Daniels, *Red October*, p. 216.

¹⁴ Robert V. Daniels, "The Bolshevik Gamble" pp. 339-40.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

- ¹⁶ Sidney Harcave, *Years of the Golden Cockerel. The Last Romanov Tsars, 1814-1917*, New York, London, 1968.
- ¹⁷ *Revolutionary Russia*. Ed. by Richard Pipes, p. 13.
- ¹⁸ Adam Ulam, *Lenin and the Bolsheviks*, London, 1969, p. 409.
- ¹⁹ John Lukacs, "A Dissenting View of 'The Day That Shook the World'", *The New York Times Magazine*, October 22, 1967, p. 33.
- ²⁰ Merle Fainsod, *Revolutionary Russia*, p. 219.
- ²¹ Louis Fischer, *Russia's Road From Peace to War. Soviet Foreign Relations 1917-1941*, New York, 1969, p. 9.
- ²² John S. Curtiss, *The Russian Revolutions of 1917*, New York, Toronto, London, 1957, p. 7.
- ²³ Frederick L. Schuman, *Russia Since 1917. Four Decades of Soviet Politics*, New York, 1957, p. 13.
- ²⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 317.
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- ²⁹ George F. Kennan, "The Sisson Documents", *The Journal of Modern History*, June 1956, pp. 130-54.
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- ³¹ Alan Moorhead, *The Russian Revolution*, New York, 1958.
- ³² R. Warth "On the Historiography...", *Slavic Review*, June 1967, p. 261.
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- ³⁴ R. Warth, "On the Historiography...", *Slavic Review*, June 1967, p. 263.
- ³⁵ George Katkov, *Russia 1917: The February Revolution*, London and New York, 1967.
- ³⁶ R. Warth, op. cit., p. 260.
- ³⁷ *The American Historical Review*, December 1967, p. 545.
- ³⁸ S. Schwarz, *The Russian Revolution of 1905*.
- ³⁹ Leopold H. Haimson, *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1955; *Fifty Years of Communism in Russia*. Ed. by Milorad M. Drachkovitch, University Park, 1968; Robert Payne, *The Life and Death of Lenin*, New York, 1964.
- ⁴⁰ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 340.

- ⁴¹ Ibid., Vol. 21, p. 240.
- ⁴² Ibid., Vol. 23, p. 213.
- ⁴³ Ibid., Vol. 31, p. 85.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 480.
- ⁴⁵ James H. Billington, "Six Views of the Russian Revolution", *World Politics*, No. 3, April 1966, pp. 452-53.
- ⁴⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 113.
- ⁴⁷ E. F. Yerykalov, *The October Armed Uprising in Petrograd*, Leningrad, 1966, pp. 303-04 (in Russian).
- ⁴⁸ R. Warth, op. cit., p. 263.
- ⁴⁹ Robert V. Daniels, *Red October*, p. 22.
- ⁵⁰ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 584.
- ⁵¹ R. Warth, op. cit., p. 254.
- ⁵² Raphael R. Abramovitch, *The Soviet Revolution 1917-1939*, New York, 1962, p. XIV.
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- ⁶⁴ S. G. Strumilin, *Industrial Capital in the USSR*, Moscow, 1925, p. 210 (in Russian).
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- ⁷² *Ibid.*
- ⁷³ See for example: *The Working-Class Movement in Petrograd, 1912-1917*, Leningrad, 1958 and others (in Russian).
- ⁷⁴ Richard Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
- ⁷⁵ Raphael R. Abramovitch, *The Soviet Revolution...*, p. 16.
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- ⁷⁹ Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism. A Critical Analysis*, New York, 1958.
- ⁸⁰ Raphael R. Abramovitch, *The Soviet Revolution...*, p. 89.
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- ⁸⁴ Alan Moorehead, *The Russian Revolution*, New York, 1958, p. 29.
- ⁸⁵ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "America in the Technetronic Age. New Questions of Our Time", *Encounter*, London, January 1968, pp. 16-26.
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- ⁸⁷ Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness...*, pp. 22-29.
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- ⁸⁹ Theodore von Laue, *Why Lenin? Why Stalin?*, p. 16.
- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 223-24.
- ⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- ⁹² George F. Kennan, "The Russian Revolution—Fifty Years After. Its Nature and Consequences", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967, pp. 13-15.
- ⁹³ Theodore von Laue, *Why Lenin? Why Stalin?*, pp. 127, 134, 137-38.
- ⁹⁴ Stuart R. Tompkins, *The Triumph of Bolshevism: Revolution or Reaction?* Norman, 1967, pp. 295, 298. Curiously enough, in review-

- ing Tompkins' book, von Laue noted the contradictoriness of the author's theory, which interpreted Bolshevism as a specifically Russian phenomenon on the one hand, and on the other, clothed the Bolsheviks in abstract-mystical and supranational vestments (*The American Historical Review*, December 1967, p. 544).
- ⁹⁵ Robert V. Daniels, *Red October*, p. 226.
- ⁹⁶ Raphael R. Abramovitch, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 19, 455.
- ⁹⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 324; Vol. 24, p. 308.
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, p. 358.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 276.
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- ¹⁰¹ Frederick L. Schuman, *Russia Since 1917. Four Decades of Soviet Politics*, New York, 1957, pp. 98-99.
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CHAPTER 4

REFRACTION OF THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF BUILDING SOCIALISM IN THE USSR THROUGH THE PRISM OF SOVIETOLOGICAL THEORIES

Having built a socialist society, the Soviet people showed in practice the ways in which the cardinal contradictions of the present era can be solved. Over the decades, much experience has been accumulated in building socialism and applying on a mass scale socialist principles and standards of life of human society, experience which other peoples are using creatively. The transforming and creative example of the Soviet socialist state under the leadership of the Communist Party has become a powerful revolutionising factor which has an enormous effect on the course of world history.

The ideological and political significance of the building of socialism in the USSR prompts Western students of the Soviet Union to devote keen attention to this topic. A certain devaluation of primitive anti-communism has taken place in their writings. While still incorrectly interpreting the meaning and character of the socialist transformations, bourgeois scholars now speak of the Soviet system as one that has stood the test of time. Von Laue, for example, speaks of the dynamism, stability and prestige of the socialist system.¹ "The impact of the Soviet Union on the world scene," stresses Cohn, "is one of the great developments in mid-twentieth century life. What transformed the sleeping giant of 40 years ago into the economic superpower of today? The Soviet economic system and the development

strategy it followed were the secret ingredient in the evolution and performance of the Soviet Union in the modern world."

Noting the great achievements of building socialism in the USSR, Cohn also speaks of their international significance. "As an innovator in economic organisation and development strategy, the USSR has set precedents which have been followed with local variations by other communist economies.... In our era the Soviet system and development model provide the only serious alternatives to those evolved by the Western market economies over the past two centuries."² Professor Charles Wilber expresses similar thoughts in his book, *The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries*, published in 1969. He writes: "...the USSR seems to have opened a new chapter in world economic history.... The USSR produced the world's first example of rapid economic development centrally planned and directed; and this example... exercises today a deep influence on the underdeveloped countries." "...the Soviet model," the American Professor states, "can provide some useful lessons for underdeveloped countries."³ Allan Gruchy, another American specialist in the field of economics holds a similar view: "...to the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America," he concludes, "the Soviet Union presents an example of how a nation can mature economically in a rapid manner."⁴

The scope of research in the USA on the Soviet experience is rather great, but the results in the scientific respect are very meagre. Concerning the "level of understanding" of the USSR in American historiography, Anatole Mazour notes: "The haunting query remains: how does such a system [reference is to the Soviet system.—B.M.] manage to be dynamic enough to attain a commanding position in world affairs?"⁵

THE BOURGEOIS HISTORIOGRAPHY ON INDUSTRIALISATION. THE THEORY OF "COSTS"

Sovietological studies current in the West devote considerable attention to socialist industrialisation. This is quite understandable, for socialist industrialisation was the pivotal task in building socialism in the USSR. Guided by Lenin's teaching on the possibility of building socialism in one country and relying on the active support of the working people, the Communist Party chose the road of industrialisation as the only possible one to bring the country out of its age-old backwardness, to raise the living standard of the population, and to build the material and technical basis of socialism.

Over the years of the Soviet five-year plan periods, the USSR made colossal industrial progress, accomplishing in a short period of time what it took the capitalist countries many decades to do. The successful solution of this task strengthened the Soviet Union's economic independence and defence capacity and provided the material basis for the technical reconstruction of the national economy and for the socialist transformation of agriculture. The industrial might of the country in many ways predetermined the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Now the Soviet Union is a powerful world industrial power. The successes of socialist industrialisation are acknowledged by many bourgeois researchers.

In the beginning of this chapter we quoted Stanley Cohn. But here is what Naum Jasny, one of the leading (until his death in 1967) specialists on the Soviet economy in the West, wrote: the industrialisation of the USSR was "a full-scale revolution. It was a great event that a backward agricultural country was converted into an industrial nation in so short a time and in spite of immense handicaps".⁶ We could cite many similar acknowledgements. Alexander Erlich, for example, noted that Soviet economic progress was unprecedented. "The Soviet economic advance since 1928,"

he wrote, "has been one of the dominant facts of our time."⁷ And Barry Richman stated that "it is clear that in the past forty years the Soviets have built a vast industrial complex and that they are continuing to do so".⁸ "Even the most unrelenting critic of the Soviet Union," wrote Marshall Goldman, "would have to agree that the USSR managed to transform an underdeveloped country into a highly industrialised society."⁹ Such statements are characteristic not only of American sovietology, but of Western Soviet studies as a whole.

For example, a British student of the Soviet economy wrote: "The Soviet Union has been the scene of an industrial and social, as well as of a political, revolution. Great changes have been compressed into a short space of time. They have been carried through under the leadership of the Communist Party ... and they have transformed a backward, peasant country into a giant industrial power."¹⁰

Another symptomatic development in American Soviet studies, one which is also explained by the successes scored by the socialist economy, is the appearance in the economic literature of works whose authors, for practical purposes, try to determine the reasons for the Soviet Union's rapid industrial progress. We might, for example, point to the materials of the University of Indiana Conference on the direction and impact of Soviet economic growth,¹¹ as well as to general works on the Soviet economy. Such books were designed to fill in the gaps in knowledge about the economic development of the USSR which manifested themselves dramatically in the late 1950s in connection with the Soviet scientific and technological achievements in space exploration (books by Robert Campbell, Nicholas Spulber, and others).¹²

We might also note the extensive and detailed studies of the USSR's economic growth (Abram Bergson, Simon Kuznets and others)¹³, and the work devoted to an analysis of the development of Soviet industry over a 40-year period, published by Princeton University Press at the request

of the National Bureau of Economic Research.¹⁴ An eight-volume series devoted to economic competitive coexistence was published in the USA.¹⁵ Much attention in these works is devoted to the Soviet "economic strategy" and its impact on the developing countries.

There are, finally, special analyses of individual sectors of the Soviet economy. Here we might note Nicholas de Witt's work on education and professional employment in the USSR, Marshall Goldman's book on marketing and distribution in the USSR, Robert Campbell's book on Soviet accounting, Jordan Hodgkins' book on Soviet energy resources, David Granick's book on Soviet metallurgy, and a book on planning and the market in the USSR.¹⁶ Various anthologies and collections of articles by experts on the Soviet economy have also been published.¹⁷

All this bears witness to the fact that the economically most advanced capitalist power not only attentively follows the industrial growth of the USSR, but also carefully studies the Soviet experience. Certain bourgeois economists in the United States acknowledge the achievements of the Soviet economic system. Thus, for example, S. David has noted that the strength of the communist economy lies in planning with its system of stimulating production and productivity and its system of priorities and price control.¹⁸ This same thought, as we mentioned above, is also stressed by Stanley Cohn, who writes that "the Soviet leadership showed particular foresight in recognising how vital education was to its industrialisation programme.... Closely related to the educational emphasis has been the strenuous Soviet effort in scientific research and development."¹⁹

But while acknowledging the successes of industrialisation, some bourgeois authors try to divorce these successes and the practice of building socialism as a whole from the theory of scientific communism; they try to show that the grandiose socio-economic changes in the USSR not only have nothing in common with Marxism, but actually contradict it. We noted earlier that a number of bourgeois writers

have declared that the Great October Revolution "contradicted Marxism". Proceeding from this same premise, Sidney Hook asserted that the revolution preceded a far-reaching abandonment of Marxist theory. Soviet Communists, Hook wrote, set out to do what Marxist theory considered impossible, that is, to build a socialist economy even though the necessary economic preconditions were absent. The very success of socialist construction in the USSR, in Hook's opinion, refuted Marxist theory.²⁰ Hook repeated this assertion in the Introduction to a book by Raphael Abramovitch, where he said that the Bolsheviks "refuted the theory of historical materialism by creating an economic system... by *political* means in the absence of the preparatory, material foundations."²¹

The convergence theory contributed to an even bigger emphasis on the "non-Marxist" features of the Soviet economy and to the discovery of "similarities" between socialist and capitalist industrialisation. Wrote Barry Richman: "If and as the Soviet economy approaches the American economy in terms of volume and diversity of industrial output, technical complexity, and scope and complexity of market relationships, the structure of the two economies may well turn out to be much more similar than initially contemplated."²² According to Rostow's scheme, Soviet economic development between 1929 and Stalin's death corresponded to the development of Western Europe and the United States in the decades preceding 1914.²³ In other words, in Rostow's view, with certain specific distinctions, socialist industrialisation is nothing other than a poorer and late-blooming variety of capitalist industrialisation. Soviet economic development is an imitation of Western economic development, wrote Joseph Berliner in a collection of essays entitled *Industrialization in Two Systems*. He even maintained that the five-year plans were drawn up largely with the Western model in view.²⁴

The best refutation of these theses are the actual facts of the history of transforming the once backward country

into an advanced industrial power. Collections of statistical and documentary data published in the USSR provide rich material on industrialisation, and many books have been written on this important subject. Facts at the disposal of every researcher testify to the complete groundlessness of opposing the socialist industrialisation of the USSR to the theory of scientific communism.

The crucial precondition of socialist industrialisation was the creation, as the result of the October Revolution, of the public sector of the national economy. The country had all the necessary material and production conditions to carry out industrialisation on its own. It had extremely rich natural resources, and a definite industrial potential inherited from old Russia.

The character and method of carrying out socialist industrialisation in the USSR provide no material whatever for analogies with capitalist industrialisation. Capitalist industrialisation takes place spontaneously and unevenly, while socialist industrialisation is distinguished by the planned and comprehensive development of the various industries and regions of the country. As a result, socialist industrialisation is accomplished at a faster rate than capitalist industrialisation. We might recall that when the United States was industrialising (1860-1913), its economic development rate was about 5 per cent, while the Soviet Union's economic development rate in the First Five-Year Plan reached 19.2, in the Second, 17.1, and in three years of the Third Five-Year Plan, 13.2 per cent. The Soviet economy's "rate of development has been unusually rapid by international historical standards", noted Stanley Cohn.²⁵

Socialist industrialisation also differs substantially from capitalist industrialisation in the sources of the means necessary for its accomplishment. In the capitalist countries the means are derived from the exploitation of working people, the plunder of colonies and defeated countries, shackling loans, etc.; in the socialist countries the material sources of industrialisation are the corresponding part of

the national income and the fraternal support of other socialist countries. Finally, from the standpoint of social consequences, capitalist industrialisation leads to the intensified exploitation of the working people and their economic bondage. In contrast to this, the social consequences of socialist industrialisation are a higher material and cultural level of the masses, and better working conditions.

Substituting the term "modernisation" for "socialist industrialisation", some writers endeavour to show that the October Revolution and the socialist system as a whole had nothing to do with the epochal industrial revolution accomplished in the USSR. Their approach is to say that the industrialisation of Russia began long before the Revolution, and that the Bolsheviks only continued something begun by the tsars.

There are variations on this theme, but they all amount to the same thing. For example, applying the stages of growth theory to the economic history of Russia, Rostow wrote that the "take off" (the third stage preceding "maturity") began in Russia around 1890. Thus, Rostow asserted, the Communists inherited an economy that had already "taken off". He regarded the socialist reorganisation of industry simply as "a drive to maturity". Soviet industrialisation, in his view, was nothing more than the completion of a process begun prior to the October Revolution.²⁶ Gerschenkron, too, did his bit in the search for parallels between the economy of tsarist Russia and the Soviet socialist economy. Bertram Wolfe called socialist industrialisation and the building of the material basis of socialism and communism the continuation of a policy of modernisation begun by Peter the Great.²⁷ Daniels categorically stated that the Soviet achievements in the sphere of industrialisation and in becoming a great power had "little to do with the programme of the October Revolution", but were inherent in the resources, human and material, at Russia's disposal.²⁸

Some bourgeois writers tried to buttress their arguments with statistical data. They tried to create the impression that

the rate of the Russian Empire's industrial growth in the last decades before the First World War was comparable to the rate of the USSR's development during socialist industrialisation.²⁹ Since true figures contradicted the point of view they were presenting, bourgeois economists attacked Soviet statistics, saying they were "scanty" and "unreliable". At the same time one could encounter, especially in American publications not intended for a wide reading audience, statements that contradicted this contention.

Abram Bergson, for example, a well-known specialist on the Soviet economy, reported in a journal called *American Statistician* that "contrary to common supposition, the Russians seem generally not to resort to falsification in the sense of free invention and double bookkeeping".³⁰ His colleague, Nicholas de Witt, stated that "in regard to Soviet educational and professional manpower statistics, it may be stated that in the course of many years of research, evidence of out-and-out fraud was not found".³¹

Turning to the substance of the question raised by bourgeois sovietology, it must be said that despite the relatively rapid development of Russian industry in the prerevolutionary years, the conditions of the bourgeois-landowner system impeded economic progress. Thus, in the period 1860-1913, the gap between Russia and the advanced capitalist countries not only did not narrow, but actually grew wider in a number of key industries. Pig iron production in Russia in 1860 equalled 40 per cent of US production and 61 per cent of Germany's. In 1913, it was 13 and 27.8 per cent respectively. According to British economist Colin Clark, Russia's industrial output between 1895 and 1899 was 8.5 per cent of that of the US, while between 1910 and 1913, it was 8.3 per cent. As we can see, the distance separating Russia from the United States did not shrink; it grew. We find an entirely different picture in Soviet times. The assertions of bourgeois economists that even without the October Revolution Russia's industry would have developed at the same rate as at present do not look very convincing

in the light of historical facts. Almost annually during the socialist industrialisation of the country, industrial output in the USSR grew at a rate four times as high as in prerevolutionary Russia. Alexander Gerschenkron, characteristically, acknowledged this fact, saying that "a rate of growth of industrial output was achieved [in the Soviet economy.—B.M.] which ... was a good deal higher than the rate attained in the 1890s".³²

Arguing against the thesis, widespread in bourgeois sovietology, that Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a "rapidly developing and strong" power (so that, as the thesis would have it, it was not much different from the "Soviet model"), Alex Inkeles, a specialist on the USSR well known in the United States wrote: "Although Russia under the Tsars... was in all respects a country of great resources and potential, it was definitely not a modern nation in the sense that Germany or England were. Its power and influence were largely limited to Europe, especially after the disaster at Port Arthur, and it was exclusively the brute power of sheer size in territory and men. By comparison, the Soviet Union is today one of the world's most modern nations. It shares with the United States alone any serious competition ... and it does so on the basis of an industrial strength, administrative organisation and effectiveness, breadth of international activity, scientific eminence, and ideological appeal which were either totally lacking or infinitely less developed in tsarist Russia.

"Tsarist backwardness in industry could be met by massive investment drawing heavily on imported material, technology, and even management. But the new industrial machine could not be properly harnessed... unless the general backwardness of Russian society could be overcome. In contrast to the situation in industry, social development could not be accomplished by importation. It required change from within.

"Of course, we may not like the system that was established. Here I mean to insist that, whatever our judgment

of the system as a whole, we cannot deny the magnitude of the social construction which it represents.

"...conceiving the Soviet system," wrote Inkeles, "then creating it, and finally making it work, ranks as one of the great feats of socio-political engineering of all time."³³

In conclusion, let us examine a thesis that is widespread in bourgeois historiography and one that unites representatives of the most diverse schools and trends—the thesis regarding the "costs" of Soviet industrialisation. To a certain extent, this thesis reflects an effort to raise the question of the "price" of the socio-economic transformations in the USSR as a whole. Yes, say some bourgeois ideologists, Soviet industrial achievements are impressive and were accomplished in a short historical span of time, but the price paid for them in terms of human effort and suffering was too high. Formulating this thesis, Cyril Black expressed it in the following categorical form: "The Soviet leaders have increased industrial production in Russia substantially, and they have modernised it in other respects as well, but they have achieved this at the highest relative human cost previously experienced by a modernising society."³⁴ Sidney Hook developed the same theme at an international conference in West Berlin in September 1967 dealing with the 50th anniversary of Soviet power. He maintained that the costs of capitalist industrialisation were lower and that it produced greater results than socialist industrialisation.³⁵

It is a well-known fact that in this era of transition from capitalism to socialism the Soviet people were and are trailblazers. Their unexplored path was complex and difficult. The epoch of building socialism was a great and heroic and at the same time very tense period in the life of the Soviet state. Socialism was built in conditions of hostile capitalist encirclement, with unceasing attempts by reactionary imperialist circles to destroy the new system. The development level of the productive forces in Russia was comparatively low; the country was in a state of ruin as a result of the imperialist First World War and the Civil War; and there

was no experience in the socialist transformation of society. However, the power of the ideas of socialism, the advantages of socialist production relations, the cohesion and organisation of the Communist Party and the creative enthusiasm of the people were so great that even in those unfavourable circumstances the socialist state succeeded in the shortest historical span of time to create all the conditions necessary for the forces of socialism to outweigh the forces of capitalism on a world scale. The Soviet people overcame all hardships to create the powerful economic, military, political and spiritual potential, which now serves as a reliable bulwark of socialism in the world.

Playing up the objective hardships of industrialisation and keeping silent about the fact that it was the military threat on the part of imperialism that forced the Soviet people consciously to keep their standard of living down, some bourgeois writers advanced the notion that industrialisation was accomplished contrary to the interests of the people and at the cost of "pauperising" them. Naum Jasny was particularly zealous in promoting this notion, alleging that the key to the growth of Soviet economy during the quarter-century of "Stalin's dictatorship" was an incredibly low standard of living, that industrialisation gave nothing to the people and ultimately had become an aim in itself.³⁶ Charles Wilber took a somewhat different position, stressing that the major share of the "human costs" stems from the particular historical circumstances rather than from the development process itself, and that the cost of development appears less than the cost of continued underdevelopment. "Still, some social cost seems inevitable if economic development is to take place," he concluded.³⁷

The political reasons for raising the question of the "costs of socialism" were obvious. But their propaganda range was much broader than was apparent at first glance. To a certain extent, the sovietologists' formula, cited above, reflected the fear experienced by the ruling circles of the economically developed capitalist countries that "backward" countries were

likely to make rapid economic progress along the lines of socialist industrialisation. Bourgeois social science strove to substantiate the conclusion drawn by reactionary propaganda that efforts by working people to alter the "natural", that is, the capitalist, way of development were "dangerous" and "unproductive". On the basis of allegedly objective historical studies of the industrial development of the USSR, a number of bourgeois ideologists tried to formulate a kind of general law applying to the operation of the Soviet model of industrialisation which they could address directly to the public opinion of the developing countries. Bergson asked this rhetorical question: "Students of growth wish to know whether industrialisation at Soviet tempos can be consistent with progressively rising consumption standards. If the Soviet experience is any indication, the answer must be in the negative."³⁸ With arguments such as these, conservative writers tried to prove that the Soviet model, although effective, was an "inhuman" method of solving the problem of industrial development.

While acknowledging to a certain extent that the industrialisation of Russia was historically necessary and that the Communist Party furnished efficient leadership for its accomplishment, Theodore von Laue gave a distorted picture of how socialist industrialisation was carried out. He called the measures that put an end to the country's backwardness and raised the standard of living of the people an "inhuman" and costly experiment, while "Russia has gained in industrial strength and efficient leadership, in the two respects crucial for meeting the competition of power politics".³⁹

What was the theory of costs based on? As noted above, exponents of the modernisation school declared the need for modernisation to be a categorical imperative ("the law of survival") in Russian and Soviet history. The less developed a country, they declared, the greater its desire to break away from its backwardness. The character and intensity of the ideological devotion to industrialisation, wrote Gerschen-

kron, depends on the relative backwardness of a country at the beginning of the corresponding phase. Moreover, in Gerschenkron's view, there operates here a kind of law of interconnection between extreme economic backwardness and "extreme ideology". Russia's backwardness predetermined her turning to "extreme means" to rapidly close the gap between her and the industrially developed countries. Gerschenkron stressed the "great tension" created in Russia by industrialisation before and after the Revolution, as compared with the West European countries which had industrialised earlier.

On the other hand, he declared, the main stimulus to the development of the economy in Russia was determined not by internal (as in the Western countries), but by external causes. Unlike the situation in the Western countries, the state was the "primary agent propelling the economic progress in the country", and military power was its primary goal.⁴⁰ The accomplishment of industrialisation "from above" led to a fusion of "statism" with industrialism, which distinguishes the Russian from the German and English models, wrote Bertram Wolfe of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace.⁴¹

At least two conclusions were drawn from this theory. Bourgeois scholars remarked that since military necessity was the main reason for developing the Russian economy, the latter acquired a militaristic character.⁴² Another important feature, in their opinion, was an allegedly inherent "anti-democratism" and "bureaucratism". Since in Russia the state was the initiator and controller of economic growth, wrote Professor Herbert Levine of the University of Pennsylvania, non-economic methods of coercion (in carrying out the industrial development of the country) were applied pervasively.⁴³ Here again we see Russian bourgeois historiography's characteristic theme about the "costs" of all the transformations in Russia showing through (in this case, when the state allegedly tried to force the speed of the "natural" course of development).

But even leaving aside the sovietologists' ideas about the causes and character of industrial development in pre-revolutionary Russia, the question arises: what has all this to do with socialist industrialisation, which represents a qualitatively new phenomenon in completely different circumstances? And can the role in the country's economic development of a bourgeois-landowner state be compared with the role of a socialist state which expresses the interests of the working people? However, as we have more than once observed, logic is not a strong point in American Soviet studies.

Contrary to the facts of the history of industrialisation, some sovietologists say that non-economic coercion was the primary (and inevitable) method in the socialist reorganisation of the national economy. Whereas the West used the "market mechanism" in carrying out industrialisation, wrote Professor Gregory Grossman of the University of California at Berkeley, the USSR relied above all on administrative-coercive measures.⁴⁴ As a result, he said, a "command economy" was created.⁴⁵

The idealist theory of coercion is actually of a piece with the voluntaristic views held by the present leaders in Peking, who have abandoned the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the objective preconditions of the world revolutionary process and the economic laws of socialism. In fact, the Leninist programme for the building of socialism proceeded from a thorough analysis of the Soviet Republic's position and of world economic progress and its objective trends. It excluded subjectivism and subordination to temporary aims. The great achievements of industrialisation in the USSR and the accomplishments in the building of socialism as a whole clearly demonstrate that the Communist Party is leading the Soviet people along the path which is completely in keeping with the laws of economic and social development. And, on the contrary, any voluntaristic course which ignores reality and relies on sheer coercion and command only puts socialist gains in jeopardy.

Developing the theme that socialist industrialisation in the USSR was coercive, von Laue invoked the thesis that the Russian working class lacked discipline and was inclined towards anarchy. He evidently could not understand the labour enthusiasm of the masses who, for the first time in history, became the masters of their destiny. He simply could not believe that people could work for themselves without compulsion and selfish motives.

However, von Laue contradicted his own statements about the coercive nature of industrialisation in the USSR when he said that during the five-year plan periods, both formerly and in fact, "the government and the people were now in alignment, the people integrated into the state, and both government and people set to work with breath-taking singlemindedness on the tasks of economic modernisation...". On this basis, he concluded, Russia has established herself as a super power.⁴⁶

The contention that industrialisation was coercive is also refuted by the great upsurge in the Soviet people's labour heroism, inconceivable under capitalism. Testifying to the high consciousness of the Soviet working class was the significant rise in the production activity of workers when the country was going through the greatest difficulties of industrialisation. Thus, during the First Five-Year Plan, the number of participants in production conferences went up significantly. And it was during the First Five-Year Plan that the mass socialist emulation movement began, as well as the shock-work movement in which three-fourths of the country's workers took part in 1933. The number of production innovators, or Stakhanovites, reached over two million in 1939.

In the face of the successes of socialist industrialisation in the USSR, the question of its "costs" is placed in the proper perspective. Everyone knows that socialist industrialisation was carried out in circumstances of capitalist encirclement, with the country under constant danger of being attacked by the aggressive forces of imperialism. This is

what made an extremely rapid rate of industrialisation and an allout effort by the people imperative. The Soviet people faced the choice of either tightening their belts or being destroyed by the united forces of imperialism. The Soviet people did not spare themselves and willingly opted for privations, displaying courage and self-sacrifice, all for the sake of pulling the country out of its economic backwardness and turning it into a great socialist power. And their efforts were not in vain.

The growth of socialist production created a firm basis for raising the material welfare and culture of the Soviet people. As a result of the prewar five-year plan periods, the living standard of the working people was markedly improved, unemployment in the cities and overpopulation of the countryside disappeared.

The progress made in industrialisation in the early 1930s contributed to the fact that the bulk of the peasantry went over to collective farming. At the same time, the collectivisation of agriculture removed the contradiction between large-scale socialist industry and small-scale peasant farming and thus helped the further rapid development of industry. Account should be taken of the important role of industrialisation in the successful accomplishment of collectivisation. Over the years of the first five-year plan period the production of agricultural machines tripled, increasing eightfold in comparison with prerevolutionary times. The USSR rapidly created its own material and technical basis, making it possible to put agriculture on the road of advanced machine technology.

The living standard of the working people has gone up considerably over the years of Soviet power. As L. I. Brezhnev noted in the Report of the CC CPSU to the 24th Party Congress, "the Party proceeds primarily from the postulate that under socialism the fullest possible satisfaction of the people's material and cultural requirements is the supreme aim of social production".⁴⁷

In the Eighth Five-Year Plan alone, real per capita income

has risen an average of 33 per cent. A considerable further rise in the living standard of the working people is envisaged in the Ninth Five-Year Plan.

But what were the "costs" of industrialisation in the capitalist countries? Everyone knows at what a monstrous price capitalism achieved the development of its economy: the ruin of millions of peasants, the merciless exploitation of workers and of women's and child labour, and the plunder of colonies. And what were the social results? It is enough to recall that at the present time in the capitalist world there are millions of the unemployed, and unemployment is only one of the elements of the "costs of progress" under capitalism.

Of interest is the following admission made by Frederick Schuman, who does not close his eyes to the facts as stubbornly as some of his colleagues. "Industrialisation is not unique," he writes, "... what is unique in the USSR is that a single decade saw developments that required half a century or more elsewhere. Industrialisation was achieved, moreover, without private capital, without foreign investments ... without private ownership of any of the means of production, and with no unearned increment or private fortunes accruing to entrepreneurs or lucky investors.... A staggering human reality is mirrored but faintly in the obvious generalisations: the adventure led from illiteracy to literacy, from NEP to socialism, from archaic agriculture to collective cultivation, from a rural society to a predominantly urban community, from general ignorance of the machine to social mastery of modern technology."⁴⁸

THE TRIUMPH OF LENIN'S NATIONALITIES POLICY AND SOVIETOLOGY

The formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922 was an important milestone not only in the history

of the Soviet land, but also in world historical development. At the 3rd All-Russia Congress of Soviets, Lenin said: "We do not rule by dividing, as ancient Rome's harsh maxim required, but by uniting all the working people with the unbreakable bonds of living interests and a sense of class. This our union, our new state is sounder than power based on violence which keeps artificial state entities hammered together with lies and bayonets in the way the imperialists want them."⁴⁰

Marxism-Leninism pointed out the only correct way to solve the national question: not isolating nations on the basis of bourgeois nationalism, but drawing them together on the basis of proletarian and socialist internationalism. Overcoming economic and cultural backwardness and national differences, the Party and Soviet power patiently and consistently worked for the all-round co-operation of the peoples, who in December 1922 voluntarily united into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The solution of the national question in the USSR has shown in practice that active, independent historical creativity is not an attribute of only "chosen" nations, as the ideologists of racism assert, but is accessible to all peoples. The Soviet multinational socialist state daily demonstrates the triumph of the ideas of proletarian internationalism.

The world historical significance of advancement of nationalities in the USSR not only evokes great interest among progressive circles abroad, but also attracts the keen attention of bourgeois ideologists. The flood of works on the topic of the Soviet nationalities⁵⁰ and the creation of corresponding research centres are an eloquent acknowledgement by the political-academic complex of the United States of the importance of the problem. Symptomatically, in March and April 1972, as the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR approached, a number of conferences and symposiums were held in the United States where various aspects of the solution of the national question in the USSR were examined.

American sovietology's growing attention to the history of advancement of nationalities in the USSR was accompanied by an evolution of its theories and assessments. The triumph of Lenin's nationalities policy forced the ideologists of imperialism to retreat and manoeuvre. Hence such a paradoxical (at first glance) phenomenon as repeated acknowledgement by bourgeois researchers themselves of the successful development of Soviet nations and nationalities.

As early as 1957, in his book *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927*, Alexander Park, notorious for his anti-communist views, asked rhetorically: "Has the Soviet system been able to create a new and mutually satisfying order of relationships between dominant and minor nationalities in the territories of the former Russian Empire? Or has the Soviet regime, despite its development of novel forms of political and social organisation, succeeded only in establishing a colonial system of its own?"⁵¹ However, in 1961, Maurice Hindus, a sovietologist with no less a reputation for anti-communism, gave the following appraisal of the results of Soviet advancement of nationalities, using Uzbekistan as an example. "...Uzbekistan is an example of an underdeveloped Asian country which within a brief space of time—as time is reckoned in history—Moscow has lifted to an advanced stage of industrial development, of science and technology. . . . The Asian, the African, the visitor from any underdeveloped country, who comes to Tashkent can only compare the miseries of his homeland with the achievements of Uzbekistan: the health of the people, the rise in living standards, the upsurge of education, technology, industry, and science. . . .

"...At the beginning of the Soviet revolution it was one of the most backward in Asia. This is what lends the Kremlin formula of its development global significance."⁵² In a book published in 1967, Samuel Hensdel developed the same theme: "... the USSR must be credited with great achievements in the educational, cultural, and economic development of its far-flung areas of mixed populations and national minorities."⁵³ Finally, a number of books published in

recent years in the United States have also noted the great progress of the Soviet national republics⁵⁴ and, consequently, the effectiveness of Lenin's nationalities policy which was embodied in the creation and development of the first multinational socialist state in the history of mankind.

Bourgeois ideologists, undoubtedly, take into account the impact all this has on public opinion in other countries. Professor Wilber, for example, notes that "the development of Central Asia by the Soviet regime is an excellent example of substantial economic development produced quickly and under governmental auspices. . . . Central Asia has been transformed from a stagnant, illiterate, disease-ridden, semifeudal society into a modern, dynamic, progress-oriented society. . . ." ⁵⁵

Striving to weaken the drawing power of the Soviet example, some conservative sovietologists do not stop short of falsifying the history of the formation and development of the Soviet multinational state. One work by a Canadian writer contains a frank statement of the research task: the purpose of the study was to ascertain whether the Great October Revolution prevented the "nationalist potential from developing" in the USSR.⁵⁶ This orientation is not accidental. Tendentiously interpreting the history of how the nationalities question was solved in the USSR, some authors try to substitute bourgeois nationalism for proletarian internationalism, represent it as an acceptable alternative, and prove that the communist ideology, both in theory and in practice, has turned into a "rationalisation for nationalism".

This ideological position derives from the general political strategy of the reactionary forces with respect to Asia, Africa and Latin America. Imperialism seeks to "protect" these important areas from socialism, and does everything it can to drive a wedge between the young developing countries and the socialist states, to set them against each other, to isolate the developing countries from the socialist camp and from the international working class, and to

demolish the anti-imperialist front from within. An important role in the efforts to realise these plans is played by imperialism's broad ideological offensive aimed at public opinion in Asian, African and Latin American countries.

Noting that an irreconcilable struggle between two opposite ways of life is under way, John Gibson has emphasised that the main question is whether the West will establish its ideology in the developing countries.⁵⁷ George Lodge of the Harvard Business School did not conceal the difficulties of this task,⁵⁸ and lamented that the ideological foundation of the USA does not correspond to reality: "... it has left us vulnerable and perplexed in a world where ideologies are paramount." He advised US propagandists in Latin American countries not to use the word "capitalism". "To the vast majority of Latin Americans," he explained, "capitalism means exploitation, imperialism and abuse. . . ." Lodge quoted one Latin American leader ("a non-Communist leader," he stressed) as saying: "After 150 years of private initiative, free enterprise, and free competition, there are in Latin America more than 130 million undernourished, more than 70 million illiterates and the lowest economic growth rate in the Western World."⁵⁹

Reactionary propaganda strove to frighten the young developing countries with stories about "communist expansionism" and to discredit the Soviet model of development. The authors of a work on Soviet foreign policy, Jan Triska and David Finley, for example, declared that the main task of the USSR's foreign policy was "integration-by-force in the world communist system".⁶⁰ A certain Michael Rywkin pursued the same aim with his book *Russia in Central Asia* (with the subtitle, *How Soviet Colonial Policy Operates and What It Portends*), in which he equated the USSR's policy of equal national rights and the imperialist powers' colonial policy. "Remove the shield of Communist ideology," he wrote, "and there is little difference between Russia's relationship with her Central Asian possessions and that of England and France with their dependencies in the past."⁶¹

A number of works gave a tendentious picture of the relationships among the peoples of the Soviet Union. Lowell Tillett, Professor of History at the University of North Carolina, for example, called the friendship of the peoples of the USSR an elaborate historical myth.⁶² Rakowska-Harmstone made the same false charge.⁶³ These unfounded statements are typical of the attempts made by the ideologists of the bourgeoisie to cast suspicion on objective information about the florescence of formerly backward nations in the USSR and thereby to hamper the growth of the prestige of the Soviet Union as the champion of equal rights and friendship among peoples. At one international conference of sovietologists, regret was expressed that anti-Soviet propaganda was little effective because in the eyes of the peoples of the world the USSR was the enemy of colonialism, while the West was "disappointing" with its procolonialist tendencies.⁶⁴

Not content with making incursions into the sphere of factual history, some sovietologists also invaded the sphere of theory. Their efforts were aimed at refuting the Leninist theory of the self-determination of nations and showing that this theory supposedly contradicts the Marxist propositions on the dictatorship of the proletariat and the class solidarity of the working people of different nations. Thus, Richard Pipes described Lenin's idea of the self-determination of peoples as a deviation from Marxism.⁶⁵ However, the idea not only does not contradict Marxism, but is an important principle of the Marxist position on the nationalities question. In his work *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, written in 1914, Lenin, after recalling Marx's struggle for the recognition of the independence of Poland and Ireland, wrote: "If the Irish and English proletariat had not accepted Marx's policy and had not made the secession of Ireland their slogan, this would have been the worst sort of opportunism, a neglect of their duties as democrats and socialists, and a concession to *English* reaction and the *English* bourgeoisie."⁶⁶

The founders of scientific communism, Marx and Engels, worked out the basic principles of the policy on the national question, namely, the policy of proletarian internationalism. The proletariat, pursuing socialist rather than nationalistic goals, does not isolate peoples one from the other, but, winning freedom and equality for them, creates the basis for their voluntary co-operation and drawing closer together. Engels said that "national independence ... is the basis for any international co-operation".⁶⁷

Hence one of the tasks of the policy of proletarian internationalism is to fight against national oppression and to defend the freedom and equality of nations, for "no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations",⁶⁸ "any nation that oppresses another forges its own chains".⁶⁹

Developing the views of Marx and Engels, Lenin worked out the Bolshevik Party's theory, policy and programme on the nationalities question. He set the task of eliminating not only the legal, but also the de facto inequality of peoples. In the resolution of the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which was worked out under Lenin's supervision, eliminating de facto inequality of nations was regarded as a task of drawing peoples that were at the precapitalist stages of development most actively into socialist construction.

There are no grounds whatever for the assertions made by Richard Pipes and his followers to the effect that the idea of self-determination of nations was only a tactical device designed to win the sympathy of non-Russian nationalities.⁷⁰ Indeed, the goal of the dictatorship of the proletariat is precisely to do away with national oppression and create fraternal relationships among nations on the basis of their complete equality. The slogan upholding the right of nations to self-determination was always one of the key propositions of the Communist Party. This right was proclaimed in the famous Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, adopted by the Soviet Government on November 2, 1917, which stressed that "the Council of People's Com-

missars has resolved to establish as a basis for its activity in the question of nationalities the following principles:

1. The equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.
2. The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to the point of separation and the formation of an independent state. . .".⁷¹

At the same time, the Marxists-Leninists proceeded from the fundamental advantage that the existence of a large unified state had for the defence of the revolution and the building of socialism. Defending the right of nations to self-determination is not the same as considering secession the most advisable goal. "*Other conditions being equal*," wrote Lenin, "the class-conscious proletariat will always stand for the larger state."⁷² As Lenin stressed, the goal of Communists was not separation of the peoples of Russia, but their unification on principles of equality and voluntariness.⁷³ Totally erroneous are assertions made by some sovietologists that there is a conflict between the idea of national self-determination and the idea of the class solidarity of the proletariat of different nations, i.e., the idea of proletarian internationalism. Marxists have always openly worked for the class solidarity of the working people of all nations; their banner has always been the banner of proletarian internationalism.

The very first acts of Soviet power were a manifestation of the desire to create maximum favourable conditions for the all-round development and fraternal co-operation of all nations and peoples of the USSR. The Address by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR To All the Governments and Peoples of the World, which proclaimed the formation of the USSR, read, in part: "The union state thus created on the basis of the fraternal co-operation of the peoples of the Soviet Republics sets as its aim the preservation of peace with all peoples. In close interaction and joint work, the equal nationalities will work hand-in-hand to develop their culture and well-being and to carry out the tasks of the power of the working

people."⁷⁴ The USSR historical experience testifies that the Communist Party and the Soviet Government consistently implemented Lenin's idea on the self-determination of nations and it was precisely on this basis that national oppression, inequality and inter-national hostility were eliminated in the USSR and the friendship of the socialist nations emerged and grew strong.

Dealing with the question of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, some bourgeois writers doggedly stuck to the thesis that "forcible sovietisation" had taken place. They depicted the formation of the Soviet state, which actually was the result of the voluntary expression of the will of the people, as integration of territories "conquered" in the course of the Civil War.

The "theory of conquest" was most consistently followed in the work by Richard Pipes mentioned above. In the second chapter of his book he said that in the initial period of "communist rule", no one knew how the new regime would behave with respect to the minority nationalities. "But before long it became apparent that the Soviet Government had no intention of respecting the principle of national self-determination and that in spreading its authority it was inclined to utilise social forces hostile to minority interests."⁷⁵ Here, too, the American author's statements do not accord with the facts. The Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, of November 1917, proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia and the free development of the national minorities and ethnic groups. At the same time, it abolished any and all national and national-religious privileges. These principles were embodied in the legislative acts of the Soviet Government and underlay the first Soviet Constitution, adopted by the 5th Congress of the Soviets of the RSFSR in 1918, the Constitutions of the USSR of 1924 and 1936, and the Constitutions of all the Union republics.

The entire experience of the Soviet land after the Great October Socialist Revolution has confirmed Lenin's words

that "the freer Russia is, and the more resolutely our republic recognises the right of non-Great-Russian nations to secede, the more strongly will other nations be *attracted* towards an alliance with us, the less friction will there be, the more rarely will actual secession occur, the shorter the period of secession will last, and the closer and more enduring—in the long run—will the fraternal alliance be between the Russian proletarian and peasant republic and the republics of all other nations."⁷⁶

As brought out at the 10th Congress of the Communist Party, the Soviet Government's first acts in the sphere of the nationalities policy "overturned the relations among the working masses of the nationalities of Russia, undermined the old national enmity, deprived national oppression of soil, and won for the Russian workers the trust of their brothers of other nationalities not only in Russia, but also in Europe and in Asia, and raised this trust to enthusiasm and a readiness to struggle for the common cause."⁷⁷ When they were liberated by the Revolution, the peoples of the former Russian Empire did not want to separate from each other, but to unite within the framework of a single socialist state. Expressing the interests of the Ukrainian people, for example, the 1st Congress of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine stressed in a resolution that the task of the Party in the Ukraine was "to work for the revolutionary unification of the Ukraine with Russia on principles of proletarian centralism within the bounds of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, on the way to the creation of a world proletarian commune."⁷⁸ An Address of the Soviets of Latvia to the Government and People of the RSFSR said: "We turn our eyes to Soviet Russia, with whom in the long struggle for socialism we have grown together into a single whole, and it is from her, above all, that we expect moral and material support in our struggle. We authorise our Soviet Government to petition her that, by common efforts with the Russian proletariat, a place be made for Latvia in the family of the world socialist

state..."⁷⁹ Testifying to the desire of the Soviet republics to unify was the Decree of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the Unification of the Soviet Republics of Russia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Byelorussia for the Struggle with World Imperialism.⁸⁰

How was all this treated by American sovietologists? Richard Pipes, for example, was typical in virtually ignoring the struggle of the nationalities of the former Russian Empire to establish Soviet power. The conclusions he made were contradictory. For instance, he said: "The conflict between the Bolsheviks and the nationalists which broke out in all the borderland areas after the October Revolution, as a result of the Bolshevik suppression of nationalist political institutions, would probably have led to a lasting rupture between them..." Why did this not happen? It turns out that to blame were, of all people, "the leaders of the White movement who virtually drove the nationalists into the arms of the Bolsheviks".⁸¹

But Richard Pipes said further that the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics represented a compromise between Marxism and nationalism, a compromise between doctrine and reality. To him, the creation of the Soviet union state was "an attempt to reconcile the Bolshevik strivings for absolute unity and centralisation of all power in the hands of the Party, with the recognition of the empirical fact that nationalism did survive the collapse of the old order".⁸² But earlier he was speaking not in terms of "compromise" but in terms of "conquest", in terms of the complete subordination of the non-Russian nationalities!

Pipes' book (reissued in 1964 and 1968) presents the credo of American sovietology on the national question in the USSR. The same theses in different variations figured in other works on various aspects of the subject. Thus, Rakowska-Harmstone asserted that the establishment of the Soviet system in the non-Russian areas was achieved with the help of the "Russian military action largely against the wishes of the local population", which "was still largely

hostile to the new regime", and that Soviet rule was a variety of Russian rule. At the same time, in speaking of the first actions of the Soviets in Tajikistan, she referred to the opening of schools for people, economic and social reforms, and the fact that "state assistance was made available to poor and middle peasants...". "Tajikistan," she wrote, "became part of the general dynamics of Soviet political and economic transformation", it demonstrated striking economic development, improvement in public health and progress in education.⁸³

Studies by Soviet scholars show that in reality Soviet power was established in the non-Russian regions on the basis of the alliance of the working class and the working peasantry. That these regions became part of the USSR was the result of the freely expressed will of the peoples. The progressive forces of the proletariat and poor peasantry in those regions, with the help of the Russian proletariat and under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, overcame all the difficulties in the struggle with bourgeois nationalism and resolutely chose the road of the Soviets. The facts cited by Soviet researchers leave no question as to the voluntary entrance of members of the indigenous population into the ranks of the Red Army and their active participation in suppressing counter-revolutionary mutinies.

In an effort to put the principles of fraternal friendship which underlie the relations among the peoples of the USSR in the wrong light, some writers propounded the thesis of "forced Russification". After the October Revolution, wrote von Laue, the non-Russian nationalities came under "...a more efficient version of Russian domination..."⁸⁴. Yaroslav Bilinsky repeated the insinuation that the centre pursued a policy of Russification with respect to the Ukraine, although the pressure of facts compelled him to admit that the Ukrainian Republic showed rapid industrial growth and a rising standard of living.⁸⁵

The historical facts refute the false charges. Once the antagonism of classes in the Soviet state was destroyed,

destroyed also was the antagonism among the numerous nations making up the USSR. The implementation of Lenin's nationalities policy resulted in the fraternal friendship of the peoples. The USSR is a union of sovereign states, each of which enjoys equal rights. The voluntariness of unification is guaranteed by the Constitution, which leaves to each republic the right of freely seceding from the Union.

The nationalities policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government epitomised proletarian internationalism, the strictest observance of the principles of equality among nations, intolerance of chauvinism and reactionary nationalism, and the struggle for genuine national and social liberation of the peoples and for the development of their economies and culture. How can there be any talk of "forced Russification" when it was precisely during the years of Soviet power that the national cultures of the peoples of the USSR flourished. Soviet Central Asia, for example, has surpassed a number of countries of Western Europe and America in the number of people with a higher education. In the number of students in higher educational institutions and specialised secondary schools the Uzbek SSR has surpassed the USA, Britain and France by ten thousand persons; newspapers, magazines and books in the languages of the peoples of the USSR are published in millions of copies. Whereas under tsarism many peoples of Russia did not have their own specialists with a higher education (the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tajiks, Turkmens and others), at the present time all the nationalities have such specialists. In the republics of Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan alone, the overall number of specialists with a higher or specialised secondary education was 1.8 million by the beginning of 1972. In the first years after the Great October Revolution, measures were systematically carried out to liquidate de facto inequality among the nations and peoples of the Soviet land. In 1923, for example, this manifested itself in the distribution of funds for the development of various branches of the national economy, and also in the decree of the Council

of People's Commissars On Procedures of Managing Industrial Enterprises of Union Significance, according to which many enterprises in the republics were included in the Union budget. Funds for assistance to the peoples of the Soviet East, Far North, etc., came primarily from revenue derived from the economically developed regions of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR. Republican budget deficits were usually covered out of the Union reserve fund. In 1926, by a decision of the Central Executive Committee, a special fund was set up within the USSR budget for assistance to the economically backward areas.

Fraternal selfless mutual assistance is a characteristic feature of relations among the nations living under socialism. Through centralised planning and a single all-Union budget, the socialist state is able to distribute the national income in such a way as to create favourable conditions for the development of economic sectors important for the entire Soviet people.

Over the years of Soviet power, the national republics of the USSR have scored outstanding successes in developing their economies. Between 1913 and 1940, gross production in large-scale industry increased 12-fold in the USSR as a whole, while the figure for the Armenian SSR was 22.6-fold, for Byelorussia—23-fold, Kazakhstan—19.6-fold, Kirghizia—153-fold, and Tajikistan—277-fold. By 1970, as compared with 1913, the gross industrial output of the USSR had grown 92-fold, while that of Armenia had grown 184-fold, Kirghizia—188-fold, and Kazakhstan—146-fold.⁸⁶

Where and when have the ideologists of anti-communism seen a "colonial empire" like that? Did the colonies of the imperialist powers ever approximate the parent countries in their economic development and standard of living? An inherent feature of the nationalities policy of a socialist state is economic and cultural assistance to less developed regions. An inherent feature of the colonial policy of imperialism is the exploitation of backward countries.

Finding themselves at odds with the facts, some sovietologists tried a different approach. The economic and cultural progress of the peoples of the USSR, they said, was part of a general twentieth-century phenomenon—the modernisation of backward societies which emerged as a by-product of European colonial expansion. In other words, they equated the national liberation process begun by the October Revolution with the consequences of the colonial activity of capitalist powers! Thus, using the arguments of the theory of modernisation, Rakowska-Harmstone wrote with profundity that in the process of "Westernisation" (one of the accepted synonyms of modernisation.—*B.M.*) the traditional societies were forced to enter a transitional stage of development. On the whole, in her view, the process can be explained by the influence of modern culture (usually called "Western culture" because of its European disseminators)⁸⁷ on primarily non-Western societies. For the indigenes, she continued, acculturation (with "Western culture".—*B.M.*) was the precondition of social, economic and political development and then a reassessment of social values—the destruction of the traditional social structure. These assertions were designed not only to whitewash colonialism, but to represent it as a positive factor in the life of colonial peoples. For, according to Rakowska-Harmstone, "the political conquest by a European people stimulated rapid economic growth and induced social change which disrupted the traditional pattern of a previously stagnant society".⁸⁸

The world knows only too well what were the economic and social consequences of colonial "acculturation", just as it knows what progress has been made by nations liberated by socialism. Apparently because she realised that her whole position was shaky, Rakowska-Harmstone no doubt felt she had to remark that "the experience of Soviet Central Asia differed from that of other colonial areas in several important aspects". However, true to her initial theses, she saw this difference in the absence in the first case of a "democratic component", and repeated the standard assertions

about the inequality and "Russification" of the non-Russian republics of the USSR.⁸⁹

The internal contradictions in sovietological ideas on the solution of the national question in the Soviet Union are not accidental. Bourgeois historiography is a captive not only of a subjectivist-idealist methodology, but of a biased ideological precepts. At the same time, the obvious social, economic and cultural progress made by the non-Russian republics forces bourgeois writers to make some remarkable admissions. Thus, in a book entitled *Soviet Middle East: A Model for Development?* published in New York in 1967, Alec Nove and J. A. Newth note the exceedingly rapid economic and social development of formerly backward areas, pointing out that the average per capita income is much higher in Soviet Central Asia than in such European countries as Spain and Greece and higher than in Japan. The authors stress that the Soviet Asian republics are considerably ahead of Turkey and Iran. They also admit that charges of "colonialism and colonial exploitation" against the USSR are unjustified, emphasising that the national republics receive financial and technical assistance from the centre.⁹⁰

D. Lang of London University drew some typical conclusions in his book about the Armenian Republic published in 1970. From the very beginning, Professor Lang says that for Armenia "a close association with the Soviet Union presented the only feasible way out of the economic and political difficulties facing the country". He notes a number of what in his opinion are negative features attending Armenia's development along the socialist path. At the same time, he writes that "the social and economic life of Soviet Armenia made rapid strides.... Prerevolutionary Armenia had been an agrarian country, with poorly developed industry.... At the present time, no one visiting Erevan, Leninakan and other cities of Soviet Armenia can fail to be struck by the general air of bustle, and the active pace of industrial and domestic construction works contin-

ually in progress". Further, Lang writes about the progress of science and technology in Armenia, and about her flourishing culture.⁹¹

It is perfectly clear that Lenin's nationalities policy has come through a convincing historical test and shown its great advantages. As noted in L. I. Brezhnev's Report to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party, "a new historical community of people, the Soviet people, took shape in our country during the years of socialist construction. New, harmonious relations, relations of friendship and co-operation, were formed between the classes and social groups, nations and nationalities in joint labour, in the struggle for socialism and in the battles fought in defence of socialism. Our people are welded together by a common Marxist-Leninist ideology and the lofty aims of building communism. The multinational Soviet people demonstrate this monolithic unity by their labour and by their unanimous approval of the Communist Party's policy".⁹²

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN THE USSR AND THE THEORY OF THE "EROSION OF SOCIALISM"

An inseparable part of building socialism is the cultural revolution, which includes: the spread of literacy and then of scientific knowledge among the working people; a critical assimilation of the cultural heritage accumulated by mankind and the creation of a higher culture, one that is national in form and socialist in content; changing the spiritual character of people, establishing the socialist ideology in the consciousness of the masses and creating a new intelligentsia devoted to the cause of socialism.

The new socio-economic system that emerged in Russia as a result of the October Revolution opened up for the first time in history unlimited possibilities for the spiritual growth of the entire population. Culture really came to belong to the people.

Unfortunately, this subject is inadequately and inaccurately covered in the foreign literature. At first (especially right after the Revolution) wide use was made of the myth that the Bolsheviks were "destroyers of culture". However, the measures aimed at wiping out illiteracy and promoting education and the successes of Soviet science, art and culture forced bourgeois specialists to see the question differently.

The crucial moment came when Soviet scientists ushered in the space age. American works about the USSR began raising the question of a "Soviet challenge", this time in the field of science. A book by George Counts, *The Challenge of Soviet Education*, published in 1957, told of the Soviet Union's great accomplishments in this field. Counts refuted the idea, widely voiced in the bourgeois literature, that the growth of culture in the USSR would "undermine" the socialist system.⁹³ A collection of speeches and articles on Soviet education, science and technology by William Benton, published in 1958, was entitled: *This is the Challenge*.⁹⁴

The seriousness of the problem and its importance to the United States could be gauged not only by the increased attention given to the subject, but also by the character of the research done on it. The Soviet experience was clearly being studied for practical purposes. Thus, a report on the Soviet school system was published in 1960.⁹⁵ In 1962, Nicholas de Witt published a large (over 800 pages) volume called *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR*, where he examined the Soviet educational system on every level and made a conclusion about its effectiveness.⁹⁶ Books by Alexander Korol, published in 1957 and 1965, gave the American reader some idea of the scope of scientific research conducted in the Soviet Union.⁹⁷

In a book about the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Professor Loren Graham of Columbia University stressed: "...the Soviet Union was the first nation fully to recognise science as a national resource, systematically to commit large portions of its budget to the promotion of research, and to attempt to plan the progress of scientific development."⁹⁸

Typical of the books written at the time was Sheila Fitzpatrick's monograph on the Soviet Narkompros (Commissariat of Education), published in 1970. "Narkompros," she wrote, "had a number of achievements to its credit. Universities, the Academy of Sciences, scientific research institutes and theatres were kept open with government subsidy, and without excessive interference from Narkompros in the face of considerable provocation. Public libraries, art collections and museums were preserved and opened to the public. Narkompros formulated basic principles of educational reform, and set up a large number of kindergartens and a network of experimental schools and children's colonies. . . . The leaders of Narkompros were exceptionally well-qualified for their work, democratic in their methods, appreciative of expert advice and co-operation."⁹⁹

In addition to monographic studies, collections of documents and various reference works on the Soviet educational system were published in the United States.¹⁰⁰ A collection of translations of works on education by Soviet authors was published in 1964.¹⁰¹

Not only specialised works contained acknowledgements of the cultural advance in the postrevolutionary years in the USSR. Nicholas Riasanovsky's general history of the USSR noted: "Education has played an extremely important role in the development of the Soviet Union. Educational advances were a most important part of state planning and made the striking Soviet economic and technological progress possible." Riasanovsky wrote further of the "large-scale educational programme" begun in the 1920s to eliminate illiteracy and of an educational effort that extended to libraries, museums, clubs, theatres, etc.¹⁰² Another American historian, William Mandel, remarked in his *Russia Re-Examined* that "more Shakespeare was on the boards in Moscow than in London, more Lope de Vega than in Spain".¹⁰³

However, in speaking of the changes in the spiritual life of the Soviet people, bourgeois scholars as a rule wrongly

interpreted the causes giving rise to them, as well as their social character and meaning. Some writers even suggested that no cultural revolution took place at all and that the new socialist culture was virtually the same old bourgeois culture adapted to the needs of a "totalitarian society". With respect to education, such writers held that there was direct continuity between tsarist and Soviet Russia: "The high standards, the serious academic character, and even the discipline of Soviet schools date from tsarist days,"¹⁰⁴ wrote Riasanovsky.

It would be fitting to note in this connection that in pre-revolutionary Russia two-thirds of the adult population were illiterate and four-fifths of the children and adolescents received no schooling. With a population of 150 million, the country had only 136 thousand specialists with a higher education working in the economy. In 1914, there was a total of only 11.5 thousand scientific workers in Russia. The Great October Revolution, which destroyed the system of economic and political oppression, opened the way to the spiritual renewal of the society, to the creation of a new, communist culture.

One of the first measures undertaken by Soviet power was to wipe out illiteracy. The Communist Party, heeding Lenin's behests that a "communist society cannot be built in an illiterate country",¹⁰⁵ launched a cultural and educational campaign of unprecedented scope. In a matter of only 20 years (from 1920 to 1940), over 60 million adults were taught to read and write. The USSR was transformed from a country of mass illiteracy into a highly literate country with a progressive culture.

At the present time, the various forms of free education in the Soviet Union are enjoyed by tens of millions of people. Over 550 out of every thousand workers have a higher or secondary education, and according to data reflecting the situation at the close of 1970, over half the rural residents now have a completed secondary or higher education.

Over the years of Soviet power, the number of students in higher educational institutions and specialised secondary schools increased 50-fold. The USSR ranks first in the world in number of students and in the training of engineers and technicians. During the Eighth Five-Year Plan alone, more than seven million specialists with a higher or secondary education were trained. During that same period, over 60 new higher educational institutions, including nine universities, were opened. The total number of scientific workers in the USSR, representing all branches of modern science and technology, amounts to about one million.

Also used with a view to putting the experience of cultural development in the USSR in the wrong light is the allegation that the "totalitarian" character of Soviet culture had led to the loss of individual "freedom of choice" and "freedom of creativity", and to a levelling of the culture itself. The goal of upbringing and education in the USSR, some bourgeois writers said, is not to develop and improve the individual, but to create a kind of robot. In an article entitled "Twenty Years On", published in a collection of articles called *The Future of Communist Society*, Alfred Meyer depicted communism and the collectivist way of thinking as alien to freedom of the individual, freedom of thought, humanism, the idea of human happiness, and so forth. Bourgeois sovietologists tended to slur over the fundamental contrast between the socialist, genuinely people's culture created in the course of the cultural revolution, and the so-called mass culture of capitalism.¹⁰⁶

In a number of works, the condition of science in Soviet society was also wrongly interpreted. In his book *The Soviet Academy of Sciences*, Alexander Vucinich asserted that "science has been first captured and redefined by the power holders, and then made a supreme value of Soviet society". He went on to write about "systematic and thorough Party control", as a result of which science lost its independence, etc.¹⁰⁷ Vucinich himself, however, had to admit that science is surrounded with exceptional concern in the USSR. He

wrote that the USSR Academy of Sciences deals with all the branches of systematised knowledge on a large scale, perhaps the largest in human history, and it is given huge financial support.¹⁰⁸

Loren Graham, the author of a later book on the Soviet Academy of Sciences, found himself in a similar self-contradictory position. On the one hand, he implied that the Bolsheviks suppressed science and scientists, and on the other, admitted that "no previous government in history was so openly and energetically in favour of science".¹⁰⁹ Just as conflicting were Alexander Korol's statements about Soviet state policy being both a stimulant and depressant of scientific effort.¹¹⁰

The view advanced by some writers that the Marxist-Leninist ideology, which had supposedly turned into "religious dogma", had a depressant effect on science was criticised by a number of sovietologists. Thus, in assessing a book by Albert Parry, who defended this view,¹¹¹ an English reviewer pointed out that if the "philosophical dogmaticists" had actually controlled Soviet science, "there would have been no Soviet atom bomb, Sputniks, etc."¹¹² The authors contributing to a collection of articles called *Science and Ideology in Soviet Society*, published in New York in 1967, practically rejected the myth of contradiction between Soviet science and communist ideology. As George Fischer noted in the Introduction to that book: "In contrast with many writers and observers who speak of an endemic and ubiquitous conflict between science and Soviet ideology, the contributors to this volume point to some interesting elements of harmony or even mutual reinforcement. . . . Soviet science. . . may in fact help to sustain the established system and its ideology rather than weaken or erode them."¹¹³

The differences among the bourgeois scholars are not accidental. The whole world, after all, knows of the enormous achievements of Soviet science. The most recent years alone have seen the development of first-class automatic production lines, a laser technology and new types of elec-

tronic computers and the discovery of huge mineral deposits in the USSR. Remarkable results have been achieved in space—from the first soft Moon landing to the creation of such advanced remote-controlled systems as Luna-16, which brought back Moon rocks, and Luna-17 with the *lunokhod* (a moon vehicle); from the first flights to the planet Venus to the receipt of valuable scientific data directly from its surface, etc.

Contrary to the allegations that culture is "totalitarian" under socialism, the socialist system actually releases the creative powers of the people. By abolishing the exploitation of man by man, socialism also abolishes the predominance of the exploitative ideology and transforms culture from a spiritual weapon of the bourgeoisie into the spiritual weapon of the people, into an instrument of their enlightenment. By virtue of its social nature, socialism motivates people to raise their educational and cultural level and promotes their intellectual growth. The life of socialist society is built on the basis of making maximum use of all the advances in science, technology and art; it creates tremendous possibilities for continuous cultural progress. Among the remarkable results of the development of Soviet culture as a genuinely people's culture is the rise of the cultural level of the workers and peasants, the growth of their educational level and political knowledge, and progress in eliminating an essential distinction between mental and physical labour.

No matter what the bourgeois sovietologists write about, whatever specific theme in the history of the USSR they may touch upon, their thoughts almost invariably turn to stability of the Soviet socialist system and its amazing ability to overcome all hardships and come out of the most difficult ordeals with flying colours. There is a certain historical determinant in this purposeful focus of attention. International imperialism has repeatedly tested the durability of the Soviet system, resorting to the most diverse measures—military, economic, ideological—and has invariably

failed. All the imperialist intrigues have turned out to be ineffective in the face of the advantages of the socialist system, the power of Soviet patriotism, and the moral and political unity of Soviet society.

Having suffered defeat in a frontal attack on the gains of the working people of the socialist countries, a number of anti-communist writers pinned their hopes on ideological erosion, on undermining the monolithic unity of socialist society from within. "The West feels that it cannot undo by direct political action the communist regimes in East Europe," wrote Zbigniew Brzezinski, the author of the doctrine of "building bridges". "Instead of waiting for the communist regimes to collapse," he continued, "the United States would henceforth bank on promoting evolutionary changes within them and the bloc as a whole."¹⁴ This was not the first time, however, that Western calculations were based on an anticipated degeneration or weakening of the socialist system.

In 1947, George Kennan, a prominent American diplomat with a reputation for being an "expert on Soviet affairs", made the following prognosis regarding the future of a country which had just gone through the fiercest war in its history and, at the cost of incredible losses, had saved mankind from the threat of fascist enslavement: Russia will remain economically a vulnerable, and in a certain sense an impotent, nation ... unable to display "the real evidence of material power and prosperity".¹⁵ But just a few years later, Kennan began to talk differently. In his book, *Russia, the Atom, and the West* (1958), recalling his not so ancient prophecies, the American sovietologist stated: "Today I am free to confess that Soviet economic progress in the intervening years... has surpassed anything I then thought possible. In the brief space of twelve years the Soviet people have succeeded not only in recovering from the devastations of the war but also in carrying forward a programme of industrialisation which has made Russia second only to the United States in industrial output generally, and about equal

to her, we are told, in the production of military goods. The recent launching of the earth satellite has been only a dramatisation... of this impressive economic success... the comparative rate of growth in Russia from year to year has been greater than in the United States..."¹⁶

Kennan was not alone in his role as unsuccessful prophet, although few of his colleagues were as ready to admit the fiction of their own calculations. It is interesting to trace the evolution of the assessments of another prominent representative of US sovietology, Alex Inkeles. In an article written in the early 1950s he described Soviet agriculture as "unstable" and requiring a radical transformation. It should be noted that these prophetic lamentations about the fate of socialist agriculture were popular in sovietological literature for a long period of time. In 1967, the magazine *Problems of Communism* held a kind of "discussion" in the course of which its participants spoke of the "collapse" of Soviet agriculture and, as though concretising Inkeles' thesis about a "radical transformation", predicted "decollectivisation" (!) in the USSR.¹⁷

But when that same article by Inkeles was reissued in an anthology of his works in 1968, it took on quite a different tone. The author had added a few phrases about the development of Soviet agriculture "towards greater economic rationality, to make it more responsive to the market, to facilitate intelligent decision-making at the local level". Attaching particular significance to the introduction of guaranteed wages for collective farmers, Inkeles noted that the general tendency was quite definitely in his (the peasant's) favour.¹⁸ Accordingly, it may be said that Inkeles was now operating with the concept of "radical improvement" rather than with that of "radical transformation".

Already in 1960, University of Southern California Professor Robert Campbell was calling for a far-reaching reassessment of values in Soviet studies. He testified to the failure of the propaganda clichés about the Soviet Union that had been worked out at the height of the cold war.

He wrote that American tourists visiting the Soviet Union "find that the standards of living they see... are by no means as bad as the picture of a slave camp they had expected to see and even that, contrary to the old superstition, Russians *do* laugh. This new evidence leaves us in a state of confusion". Further, he said that the "revolution in the relative power of the two systems—the American and the Russian—has come on us with surprise. We were not prepared for it and have contemplated it with startled disbelief".

Campbell should be given due credit for concluding from his study of the Soviet economy that "the most important danger which the existence of the Soviet Union poses for us [the United States.—*B.M.*] is not its approach to us in military capabilities". In his view, the trouble is that "the extension of the Soviet economic system and the sort of society that goes with it throughout the world [and Campbell considers such a prospect quite probable.—*B.M.*] would leave us [the United States.—*B.M.*] stranded, isolated, an odd survival in the midst of a hostile, alien world".¹¹⁹ In other words, by implication he was admitting that socialism was winning in the competition between the two systems.

In accordance with the dogmas of the convergence theory, some sovietologists sought to picture scientific and cultural growth in the USSR as a process involving the ideological erosion, degeneration and bourgeoisification of Soviet society. According to the exponents of that theory, human nature is unchangeable, and Soviet society is but a variant of the "industrial society"; therefore, as science and technology advance and as a result of a rising educational level, there is a growth of individualism in people's mentality and a spread of the Western way of thinking, which will ultimately supplant the principles of the socialist ideology. Bourgeois ideologists often tied their hopes for an ideological degeneration of the Soviet people to the growth of the latter's material well-being. Former Under-Secretary of State

George Ball even invented a kind of "indicator" of this process, saying that "the automobile is an ideology on four wheels."¹²⁰ This statement evidently was to be understood in the sense that the acquisition of an automobile automatically brings about a person's ideological degeneration. As Cyril Black underlined in his article "Marxism and Modernization", the new generation of Soviet people are "much more concerned with modernisation than with ideology".¹²¹

In this connection, Brzezinski pinned great hopes on the ideological subversion carried out by imperialism against the socialist countries. In his words, the ideological uniformity of Soviet society can be threatened "by its penetration by competitive ideas or by the relativisation of the ideology...".¹²² As we can see, ideological "erosion" is connected here not with some kind of natural internal processes of socialism, but with the direct or indirect "export" of bourgeois ideology to the socialist countries.

The facts conclusively refute the theory of erosion. In the years of Soviet power, the number of people attending secondary schools and institutions of higher education in the USSR has, indeed, grown dramatically. But this unprecedented growth in the educational and cultural level of Soviet citizens is indissolubly connected with their communist upbringing, with the development of their communist way of thinking. "Intellectualisation" does not and cannot under socialist conditions lead to ideological degeneration (which fact, of course, does not exclude the need to struggle against bourgeois ideology). Both during the years of harsh ordeals and today, when the material and spiritual well-being of all citizens has grown immeasurably both quantitatively and qualitatively, the workers, peasants and the intelligentsia of the Soviet Union manifested and are manifesting their unwavering loyalty to the socialist system and the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Some sovietologists were well aware that the erosion theory was untenable. J. R. Azrael, for example, wrote that "theories of political development which cast the engineers

and managers in the role of foreordained 'gravediggers of Communism' ... have found little confirmation in events." At the same time, he stressed that "potentially, the Soviet Union compares favourably with other industrialised societies and outranks most nations of the world".¹²³

One of the most contradictory parts of the erosion theory was the interpretation of the role of the CPSU in Soviet society. A logical conclusion stemming from the theory would be to speak of an "erosion" of the leading and guiding role of the Communist Party in the life of the Soviet people. However, even among the sovietologists who have become experts in inventing "ideological fermentation" in the Soviet Union, there haven't been any bold enough to suggest a weakening of the leading role of the Party in the USSR.

While critics of the myths about the erosion of ideology spoke of the futility of hopes to eliminate the leading role of the Communist Party in the USSR (as Allan Gruchy did, for example), the myth-makers themselves generally kept silent or avoided the question of the Party's role in socialist society.

A frank acknowledgement of the role of the CPSU in the development of the Soviet Union was made by George Kennan. "In creating a new order..." he wrote, "in clinging to power successfully for half a century in a great and variegated country where the exertion of political power has never been easy; in retaining its own discipline and vitality as a political instrument in the face of the corrupting influence that the exercise of power invariably exerts; in realising many of its far-reaching social objectives; in carrying to the present level the industrialisation of the country and the development of new technology; in giving firm, determined and in many ways inspired leadership in the struggle against the armies of German fascism; in providing political inspiration and guidance to many of the radical-socialist forces of the world... in these achievements, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has not only stamped

itself as the greatest political organisation of the century in vigour and in will, but has remained faithful to the quality of the Russian Revolution as the century's greatest political event."¹²⁴

What do statements of this kind indicate? Unquestionably, they testify to a crisis of the traditional sovietological doctrines. Calculations based not on realities, but on wishful thinking ultimately turn into miscalculations. Realistically thinking Western researchers cannot help but acknowledge this fact.

¹ Theodore von Laue, *Why Lenin? Why Stalin?*, p. 418.

² Stanley Cohn, *Economic Development in the Soviet Union*, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1970, p. XI.

³ Charles K. Wilber, *The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries*, Chapel Hill, 1969, pp. 3, 6.

⁴ Allan G. Gruchy, *Comparative Economic Systems*, p. 796.

⁵ *The American Historical Review*, January 1965, p. 550.

⁶ Naum Jasny, *Soviet Industrialization 1928-1952*, Chicago, 1961, p. 1.

⁷ Alexander Erlich, *The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-1928*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960, pp. XX, XXI.

⁸ Barry M. Richman, *Soviet Management, With Significant American Comparisons*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965, p. 1.

⁹ Marshall I. Goldman, "Soviet Economic Growth Since the Revolution", *Current History*, Vol. 53, No. 314, October 1967, p. 233.

¹⁰ Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economy. An Introduction*, London, 1965, p. XXI.

¹¹ *Study of the Soviet Economy*. Ed. by Nicholas Spulber, New York, 1961.

¹² Robert W. Campbell, *Soviet Economic Power. Its Organization, Growth and Challenge*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960; Nicholas Spulber, *The Soviet Economy, Structure, Principles, Problems*, New York, 1962.

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¹⁴ G. Warren Nutter, *The Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union*, Princeton, 1962.

¹⁵ *The Economics of Competitive Coexistence*, 8 Vols., Washington, 1959-61.

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- ²² Barry M. Richman, *Soviet Management. With Significant American Comparisons*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965, p. 256.
- ²³ W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge, 1960, p. 67.
- ²⁴ Joseph Berliner, "The Economics of Overtaking and Surpassing", *Industrialization in Two Systems; Essays in Honor of Alexander Gerschenkron*. Ed. by Henry Rosovsky, New York, 1966, pp. 160, 161.
- ²⁵ Stanley Cohn, *Economic Development in the Soviet Union*, p. XI.
- ²⁶ W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, pp. 66-67.
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- ³² Alexander Gerschenkron, *Europe in the Russian Mirror*, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 114-15.

- ³³ Alex Inkeles, *Social Change in Soviet Russia*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968, pp. 44-46, 48.
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- ³⁷ Charles Wilber, *The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries*, p. 131.
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CHAPTER 5

BOURGEOIS HISTORIOGRAPHY ON THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The historic victory of the Soviet Union over the fascist aggressors in the Second World War was an important landmark in world history: its consequences for subsequent historical development cannot be exaggerated; its impact—military-strategic, political and ideological—is still felt in all corners of the world.

Like any historical event of such tremendous scope, the victory of the Soviet people made a tremendous impression on the minds of contemporaries and made them look at many aspects of Soviet history and actuality with new eyes. The Soviet Union's victory brought about a veritable revolution in American public opinion. Erroneous conceptions about the Soviet people and their country that were spread by reactionary historiography began to crumble. The war effort, wrote George Kennan, was destined to stand "as one of the great historic achievements of the Russian people and as a lasting testimonial to their extraordinary capacity for heroism, endurance and sacrifice in a cause".¹

The scope of the events of the last war to a certain extent predetermined the scope of research on them. The question of the role of the USSR in the Second World War could not be kept within the bounds of Soviet studies. One or another aspect of this question is present in most American works on the history of the Second World War.

THE CONCEPT OF THE "EQUIVALENCY OF VICTORIES"

During the Second World War many bourgeois historians assessed the Soviet Union's war effort objectively. In his book, *The Road to Teheran*, Foster Dulles, for example, underlined that "...the Soviet armies were spectacularly dispelling the myth of German invincibility and giving the people of the United Nations a revived confidence in ultimate victory".² George Vernadsky also noted that thanks to the Soviet people's heroic struggle, English cities were spared "devastating bombing raids.... The average Briton could not but feel gratitude to the Russians...".³

At the same time, during and immediately after the war a different trend appeared in American historiography, a tendency to more or less ignore the significance of the armed struggle of the Soviet Army against nazi Germany. Thus, in discussing the events on the Soviet-German front, Francis Miller, Frank Monaghan, Roger Shugg, H. A. Dewceerd and others actually skipped over their influence on the overall course of the Second World War. At the same time, they devoted greater attention to the military campaigns of the American-British forces in various theatres of operation (in North Africa, Italy, France).⁴

The tendency towards an unobjective assessment of the role of the USSR in the struggle against nazi Germany grew considerably during the cold war period. At that time, it became a very widespread practice to ignore the Soviet people's struggle against the invaders and at the same time to exaggerate the achievements of the American command.

A concept was formulated in the American historical literature during the cold war which served to conceal the decisive role of the USSR in the Second World War and to cast the United States in that role. The supporters of this concept obviously closed their eyes to the fact that the struggle of the Soviet people against the nazi aggressors altered the whole course of the Second World War, that

the Soviet-German front was the main front throughout the entire war, the crucial front on which victory depended; at the same time they emphasised that the United States was, in their words, the "arsenal of democracy" and that its economic and military power determined the course of the war.

A typical assessment of the roles of the USSR and the USA in the Second World War was given in 1954 by Arthur Schlesinger, an influential bourgeois historian, in a popular book that went through several editions. Schlesinger paid almost no attention to the USSR's entry into the Second World War; for him the "turning point" came only at the end of 1941, after the United States entered the war. He ignored the significance of the Soviet Army's great victory near Moscow in December 1941, and only mentioned in passing that "the Reds" had regained some territory adjoining Leningrad and Moscow. After devoting one sentence to the Battle of Stalingrad, one of the major and decisive battles and the beginning of the fundamental shift in the course of the Second World War, Schlesinger turned his whole attention to a description of the actions of the American-British forces and of the second front in particular. In dealing with the war against Japan, he said nothing about the fact that the USSR also entered into the Pacific war. This was how the events of the past war were presented in one of the most widely distributed works of American historiography.

Works put out by the War Department consistently gave an apologetic assessment of the power of the US military machine that was created during the war, its "growing" successes on numerous fronts, its "global strategy" and the skill of the American generals.

Being published in the United States under the general editorship of K. Greenfield and S. Conn⁵ is an official multi-volumed history of the American Armed Forces in the Second World War; it is coming out in numerous series, including one on the history of the Army Air Forces.⁶ Besides this, a fifteen-volume history of United States naval

operations has been published under the editorship of S. Morison.⁷ And there is a considerable number of works on the diplomatic history of the war.⁸

Some of these works represent a certain value above all due to the factual material they contain, which, in turn, is explained by the practical purposes of military-historical research. As K. Greenfield wrote: "...in World War II the Army wanted a history of its experience in that war for its own guidance, and for this it needed full and frank history."⁹ On the whole, however, the above-mentioned line was pursued in the official military-historical publications.

Present-day official publications in the United States are frequently highly tendentious. Thus, in 1950s there was a persistent demand for works on the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences. As a result, a book on the conferences at Malta and Yalta in 1945 was published.¹⁰ Its publication, wrote Raymond Sontag, was prompted by political motives, and "...it is doubtful whether all the important papers in the Pentagon files have been included".¹¹ Collections of documents on the conferences at Teheran and Potsdam were also tendentiously compiled.¹² A number of documentary publications were of a frankly propaganda character.¹³

Many bourgeois historians in the United States held the views expressed by Kent Greenfield, Editor-in-Chief of a multivolumed history of the American army during the war, in a work of 1954 *The Historian and the Army*, who ascribed the decisive role in the defeat of Nazi Germany to the military operations of the Western allies. According to his description, the invasion force of the second front "had knifed to the heart of Germany, met the Russians on the Elbe and completed the work of utter destruction that the Soviet forces and the air bombing of Germany had begun."¹⁴

In some works by bourgeois historians, although the importance of the armed struggle of the USSR against

Germany was acknowledged, its significance was reduced to that of winning the time necessary for launching the economic and military resources of the United States.¹⁵ Moreover, as William Langer, for example, asserted, "the idea that during 1942 and 1943 they [the Russians.—*B.M.*] were carrying the major share of the burden was essentially a mistaken one".¹⁶ For his part, Julius Pratt wrote that one of Washington's basic errors during the war was to overestimate the importance of the USSR as an ally.¹⁷ War historian W. D. Puleston agreed with this opinion.¹⁸

In their nonacknowledgement of the decisive role of the Soviet Army in achieving victory in the Second World War, a definite agreement among some US and FRG sovietologists was observable in the period of international tension. Playing down the importance of the decisive battles on the Soviet-German (Eastern) front—the defeat of the German forces at Moscow, Stalingrad and the Kursk Salient—some Western historians exaggerated the role of the military operations of the allies at El Alamein, in Italy and the second front. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, for example, while on the whole acknowledging the importance of the great victories of the USSR, tried at the same time to put the successes of the allied forces in the West on the same level with them.¹⁹ American historians in every way underlined the importance of the second front.²⁰ There was a clear tendency to build up a concept of "equivalency" of victories in the East and the West.

A serious refutation of the above-mentioned assertions of bourgeois historiography can be found above all in official US government documents and materials. Thus, in a letter dated June 26, 1941 to Admiral Leahy, Roosevelt attached great significance to the USSR's entrance into the war.²¹ After Germany's attack on the USSR, former Ambassador in Moscow Joseph E. Davies stated in an interview that he felt that Hitler's "troubles would then just begin", for in his opinion, "the extent of the resistance of the Red Army

would amaze and surprise the world...".²² Secretary of State Edward Stettinius wrote in his book, *Roosevelt and Russians*...: "...the American people should remember that they were on the brink of disaster in 1942. If the Soviet Union had failed to hold on its front, the Germans would have been in a position to conquer Great Britain. They would have been able to overrun Africa, too, and in this event they could have established a foothold in Latin America."²³

Eminent American statesmen of the war period spoke in plain terms of the relationship between the USSR's struggle against nazism and United States security, and also felt that the defeat of nazi Germany depended on the outcome of that struggle. They gave an exceptionally high rating to the role of the operations of the Soviet Armed Forces. As Secretary of State Cordell Hull noted in his memoirs: "We must ever remember that by the Russians' heroic struggle against the Germans they probably saved the Allies from a negotiated peace with Germany. Such a peace would have humiliated the Allies and would have left the world open to another Thirty Years' War."²⁴ After the war, General George Marshall indicated in his reports that the successful operations of the Soviet Army were among the chief factors which "saved the United States a war on her own soil".²⁵

The most convincing refutation of the assertions of bourgeois historiography is provided by the events of the war themselves. On the eve of the opening of the Eastern Front, the military-strategic position was such that it seemed Hitler was not far from fulfilling his aggressive plans. Nazi Germany had occupied Denmark, Norway, Belgium and Holland without difficulty, defeated France in a matter of a few weeks, destroyed Poland and Czechoslovakia as national states, and occupied Albania. The nazi forces attacked Yugoslavia and Greece. With the help of blackmail and pressure, the German fascists drew Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria into their orbit.

The German forces (together with the Italian forces) marched in North Africa and were moving towards strategically important regions of the Middle East.

In the West, the only opposition to the Germans came from Britain, which had still not recovered from the defeat in Northern France and lived under the constant threat of a nazi invasion. The entrance of the Soviet Union into the struggle against the nazi aggressors marked a fundamental turn in the war, which had been developing favourably for Germany. From the outset, the Soviet-German front held the main forces of the nazi army. In June 1941, the Germany threw 152 divisions and two brigades against the USSR, that is, over 70 per cent of its ground forces. Including the ground forces of nazi Germany's satellite countries, 190 divisions were operating against the Soviet Union in the first days of the war.²⁶

Under the circumstances it is understandable why shortly after the beginning of the Soviet-German war, the then US Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote in a secret message to the President that "Germany's action seemed almost like a providential occurrence", that Soviet resistance made a German invasion of Britain or Iceland impossible and frustrated Hitler's plans in North and West Africa as well as in South America.²⁷ The entrance of the Soviet Union into the war, noted Cordell Hull, "gave us renewed hope of overcoming Hitlerism."²⁸

Beginning from the summer of 1941 the main burden of the war against Germany lay on the USSR. But Germany was the mainstay of a bloc of aggressive powers. Consequently, the outcome of the struggle on the Soviet-German front was decisive for the entire Second World War. A joint message of Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin, dated August 15, 1941, said: "We realize fully how vitally important to the defeat of Hitlerism is the brave and steadfast resistance of the Soviet Union..."²⁹

From 153 to 201 nazi divisions, or 52 to 72 per cent of their total number, operated on the Soviet-German front

between the beginning of the war and early 1944. At the same time, from 0.9 to 6.1 per cent of the German divisions opposed the British and American forces in North Africa and Italy.³⁰ In a cable to MacArthur in May 1942, Roosevelt said: "In the matter of grand strategy I find it difficult ... to get away from the simple fact that the Russian armies are killing more Axis personnel and destroying more Axis material than all the other twenty-five United Nations put together."³¹

For a long time the Soviet Union was fighting the nazi war machine virtually alone, since the ruling circles of the United States and Britain, despite their commitment to open a second front in Europe in 1942, kept delaying the landing of allied forces in France. On January 20, 1943, the British Prime Minister reported to Deputy Prime Minister and the War Cabinet: "... it must be admitted that all our military operations taken together are on a very small scale compared with the mighty resources of Britain and the United States, and still more with the gigantic effort of Russia."³² Roosevelt also admitted this fact in a letter to Stalin in February 1943.³³

Even after the opening of the second front in the West in the spring of 1944, the main part of the German forces (all in all a total of 239 German and German satellite divisions) were pitted against the Soviet Army. At that time, only 81 enemy divisions were operating against the Allies.³⁴ (Moreover, operating on the Soviet-German front were the strongest, from the standpoint of fighting capacity, and best-equipped German divisions.) Thus, by far the greatest part of nazi Germany's and its satellites' troops were on the Soviet-German front during the entire war.

In the course of the war, the Soviet Army smashed the basic forces of nazi Germany. All in all, 507 German divisions were destroyed, captured and disbanded on the Soviet-German front during the war. Besides that, no less than 100 divisions of the German satellite countries were smashed. The Soviet Union's allies destroyed and captured

176 enemy divisions in North Africa, Italy and Western Europe.³⁵

The greater part of Nazi Germany's air forces was destroyed on the Soviet-German front. The Soviet-German front accounted for 75 per cent of the total losses of the Nazi air forces, and most of the enemy's losses in artillery and tanks. The Soviet Army inflicted tremendous casualties upon the Nazis. Nazi Germany lost 10 million in killed, wounded and captured out of the total of its 13.6 million casualties on the Soviet-German front.³⁶

Decisive battles of the Second World War were also won on the Soviet-German front, such as the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, the Orël-Kursk Salient, and Berlin. Assessing the significance of the battle of Moscow, Douglas MacArthur wrote in February 1942: "The hopes of civilisation rest on the worthy banners of the courageous Russian army. During my lifetime I have participated in a number of wars and have witnessed others, as well as studying in great detail the campaigns of outstanding leaders of the past. In none have I observed such effective resistance to the heaviest blows of a hitherto undefeated enemy, followed by a smashing counter-attack which is driving the enemy back to his own land. The scale and grandeur of the effort mark it as the greatest military achievement in all history."³⁷ And in August 1944, Winston Churchill said: "It is the Russian Army which has done the main work of ripping the guts out of the German Army...", adding that "...there was no force in the world which ... would have been able to maul and break the German Army ... but the Russian Soviet armies".³⁸

Some bourgeois historians acknowledge the Soviet people's incomparable contribution to victory in the Second World War. French historian Robert Goudima, for example, wrote: "The Red Army's victory over the Wehrmacht was not a chance occurrence, it cannot be explained by German enfeeblement, nor by a simple arithmetic computation of the forces involved, nor by the influence of physical, geo-

graphic or climatic conditions."³⁹ West German researcher Michael Freund noted that "no one considered it possible to defeat Hitler without the gigantic military contribution of the Soviet Union".⁴⁰ And Alexander Werth underlined the fact that "it was indeed the Russians who bore the main brunt of the fighting against Nazi Germany, and that it was thanks to this that millions of British and American lives were saved".⁴¹

The victory over Nazi Germany was achieved by the joint efforts of many peoples. A powerful anti-Hitlerite coalition was formed during the war. The forces of the Western Allies inflicted serious blows to the enemy, and the allied forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the members of the Resistance Movement fought selflessly. However, it was the Soviet people and its heroic army that bore the main brunt of the war, it was they who played the decisive role in the victory over Hitlerite Germany.

THE MYTHS ABOUT LEND-LEASE AND THE SECOND FRONT

The Great Patriotic War was the harshest and most brutal of all the wars that Russia had ever experienced. The situation was especially difficult and dangerous in its initial period. Exploiting a temporary advantage, the huge army of Germany and its satellites penetrated deep into the USSR, reaching the Caucasus and the Volga and threatening Moscow. But this initial period already showed that Nazi Germany's aggression was doomed to failure. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet people rose to defend their country. The defeat of the Germans near Moscow was the beginning of a fundamental turn in the war. Hitler's blitzkrieg plan was buried, and the myth of Nazi Germany's invincibility was shattered.

The heroic Soviet people were able to overcome the difficulties of the initial period, and in 1942-1943 turned the course of the war. In 1944, the Nazi armies were swept from

the territory of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Army's offensive operations in the last years of the war played the decisive role in liberating the peoples of Europe from fascist oppression and in the ultimate victory over fascism.

Tendentiously interpreting historical facts, a number of Western researchers have presented the matter in such a way as to imply that it was not the heroism of Soviet people and the skillful leadership of the Communist Party, but American and British support at a critical moment that decided the outcome of events on the Eastern Front. The importance of British and American aid to the USSR is considerably exaggerated in bourgeois historiography, the importance of lend-lease in particular, while the role of the Soviet Army in the first months of the war is underestimated.

This version was launched by Winston Churchill, who wrote in his memoirs that allegedly "for more than a year after Russia was involved in the war she presented herself to our minds as a burden and not as a help", and that "the entry of Russia into the war was welcome but not immediately helpful to us".⁴²

Churchill's words were picked up by some American historians. Thus, Herbert Feis, in his book *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, declared that after Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, the British and American governments "had gone to the rescue" of the USSR.⁴³ Likewise, W. D. Puleston wrote that "in June 1941 aid was rushed to Russia on account of her weakness just to keep her in the war".⁴⁴ According to Sumner Welles, "the arms and airplanes which he [Stalin.—B.M.] received from the then limited resources of the United States ... helped greatly to make possible the victory at Moscow".⁴⁵ And Kent Greenfield even tried to establish that the victory at Stalingrad was somehow connected with American supplies.⁴⁶

What was the real state of affairs? It is a known fact that shortly after Nazi Germany attacked the USSR, the governments of the United States and Great Britain an-

nounced their countries' solidarity with the struggle of the Soviet Union. In a note to the Soviet Ambassador on August 2, 1941, the United States Government acknowledged that the Soviet Union's resistance to the attack of the aggressors was in the interests of US national defence. In the interests of its own security, the Government of the United States pledged economic aid to the USSR with the aim of strengthening its struggle against Germany.⁴⁷ Joseph E. Davies, the former US Ambassador in Moscow, said: "It was just plain common sense for us to give the Soviets all the aid we possibly could, because they were fighting the greatest danger to our security in the world..."⁴⁸ Revealing the meaning of US policy, the then Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes wrote in his diary that it was to the advantage of the United States to help Britain and the USSR, "because if these two countries between them can defeat Hitler, we will save immeasurably in men and money".⁴⁹

But what happened after aid was promised? The United States pursued essentially a so-called strategy of "indirect actions", which consisted in taking steps, without participating actively in the war, to strengthen its armed forces and to take up strategic positions.

Germany's attack on the USSR did not lead to the immediate extension of lend-lease to the USSR, although the lend-lease law stipulated that the United States would give aid to countries whose defence against aggression was vital to the defence of the United States. All the initial deliveries to the USSR were small and were made on a cash-payment basis in accordance with the American-Soviet trade agreement of 1937. As revealed in *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes*, the matter reached a point where at a cabinet meeting in late summer of 1941 "there was talk about the gold reserves that the Russians might have... It seemed to be the desire that Russia should turn over to us what gold she has, which would go to pay for goods here up to the limit of that reserve and from that point on we would

purchase goods or make advances under the new lease-lend bill which is pending".⁵⁰ In a letter dated August 2, 1941, Roosevelt pointed out to Mr. Wayne Coy, who was in charge of deliveries that "nearly six weeks have elapsed since the Russian War began and that we have done practically nothing to get any of the materials they have asked for".⁵¹

There was a tendency in American historical literature at one time to explain this policy of delays in giving the USSR material support, first, by saying that there was a shortage of the needed military materials and arms, and secondly, by suggesting that the British and American governments were unsure of the Soviet Union's ability to put up effective resistance to Nazi Germany (hence "it was thought senseless to sacrifice scarce and valuable equipment"⁵²). Both these assertions were incorrect. Under the influence of the war, American industry (especially the defence industry) developed at a rapid rate. During the year ending in June 1941, total industrial production had increased about 30 per cent, aircraft production had risen by 158 and shipbuilding by 120 per cent.⁵³

The second explanation can likewise be regarded as only an excuse. As well informed a figure as Harold Ickes made the following notes in his diary on July 12, 1941: "...the Soviet Army seems to have been holding the Germans very well indeed ... the Germans are behind their schedule"; August 29, 1941 "...they (the Russians.—*B.M.*) show no signs either of surrender or of collapse and it looks as if in Russia there were a long war ahead..."; September 20, 1941 "...if they keep on fighting, even if they have to fall back, Hitler cannot win in the end..." Meeting with his cabinet on July 11, Roosevelt indicated that "he was gratified at the good fight that Russia had been putting up".⁵⁴ Later, Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote in his memoirs: "I believed we could send Russia all weapons and supplies possible without real risk that the Germans would overrun and capture them."⁵⁵

At a cabinet meeting on August 1, 1941, reported Harold Ickes, the President said that the State Department and the War Department "had been giving Russia a 'run-around'. We have been promising to start deliveries of munitions of war to Russia; we have had a list of its wants for five weeks and nothing has even started forward". The members of the Cabinet, Ickes continued, "have taken too literally the exhortations of the President at the last Cabinet meeting to make 'token' deliveries to Russia. And yet I am afraid that this is precisely what the President meant. He evidently thought that we might be able to kid the Russians that we were giving them substantial help when, for instance, we were delivering five bombers against a request for three thousand".⁵⁶ A memo prepared for H. Hopkins dated August 6, 1941 pointed to the small dimensions of American deliveries to the USSR and drew the conclusion that "at this rate the United States would make but a slight contribution to the Soviet defense or to ultimate victory on the eastern front".⁵⁷

It was only in November 1941, that is, almost five months after the start of the Soviet-German war, that lend-lease was extended to the Soviet Union. Prior to the close of 1941, out of a total of 751 million dollars worth of American supplies delivered to other countries, 545 thousand dollars' worth had been sent to the USSR, that is, the USSR, which was alone bearing the main burden of the war, received less than 0.1 per cent of overall American aid.⁵⁸

At a most difficult time for the Soviet Union, when the Soviet Army was in especially acute need of airplanes, tanks and guns, the United States and Britain supplied this kind of equipment in small quantities. Thus, in 1941, they turned over to the USSR 750 airplanes (of which only 5 were bombers), 501 tanks and 8 antiaircraft guns. But according to the first protocol on the shipment of supplies between October and December 1941, they were supposed to have sent 1,200 airplanes, including 300 bombers, 1,500 tanks and about 50 antiaircraft guns.⁵⁹

American historians Richard Snyder and Edgar Furniss noted that American "supplies did not start to reach Russia in any quantity until March, 1942."⁶⁰ By that time, the Soviet Army had not only been able to stand up to the German troops, but had in the winter of 1941/42 gone over to the offensive. American historians Roger Shugg, H. A. Deweerd and Ivar Spector reported that the basic flow of supplies to the USSR came in 1943.⁶¹ But by that time the Soviet Armed Forces had already brought about a fundamental turn in the course of the war. "The Russians," wrote Denna Fleming, "had turned the tide at Stalingrad before our help arrived in important quantity and throughout the struggle their own factories supplied the basic sinews of war."⁶²

Although the USSR received via lend-lease important materials, equipment, machines and a large number of locomotives, on the whole these supplies did not and could not have a telling effect on the course of the war. In the matter of supplying the Soviet Armed Forces with arms and combat materiel, the Allied deliveries played only an insignificant role. Thus, whereas a total of 489,900 artillery pieces, 102,500 tanks and self-propelled guns and 136,800 aircraft had been produced in the USSR during the war (prior to December 1945), received from the United States and Britain during that time were 9,600 artillery pieces, 11,567 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 18,753 aircraft, of which 14,013 were transport planes.⁶³

US military expenditures during the Second World War, including lend-lease, amounted to \$330,000 million.⁶⁴ The military expenditures and losses from destruction and occupation of Soviet territory amounted to 2,600,000 million rubles at prices in effect at that time. The nazis destroyed 1,710 Soviet cities and settlements, over 70,000 villages, 32,000 industrial enterprises, 98,000 collective farms, and 1,876 state farms.⁶⁵ Losses in human life were uncommensurable: the USSR—20 million dead; the United States—273,900.⁶⁶ Such are the real facts regarding the relative

contribution of the USSR and the USA to the Second World War.

Nor were there adequate grounds for overstating the importance of the direct military support given by the Soviet Union's allies, in particular the significance of the second front. There were those in the US military circles who felt that, in the interests of the United States itself, the second front in the West should have been opened immediately after nazi Germany's attack on the USSR. On June 30, 1941, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox in a memo to a conference of governors said that "while his [Hitler's.—B.M.] back is turned [to the West.—B.M.], we must answer his obvious contempt with a smashing blow."⁶⁷ And in January 1942, General Eisenhower stressed: "We've got to go to Europe and fight—and we've got to quit wasting resources all over the world—and still worse—wasting time."⁶⁸ But sensible military strategy which could have shortened the war unfortunately gave way to political considerations.

The pledge to open the second front was made by the governments of the United States and Great Britain in the summer of 1942. This was done to a large extent under pressure of public opinion. As Roosevelt wrote to Churchill (April 3, 1942): "Your people and mine demand the establishment of a front to draw off pressure on the Russians. . . ."⁶⁹

On May 30, 1942, Roosevelt, in the presence of General Marshall, told the Soviet representative that the United States "expected the formation of a second front in 1942."⁷⁰ A Soviet-American communique published on June 12, 1942, said that complete agreement had been reached regarding the opening of a second front in Europe in 1942.⁷¹ However, the second front was opened neither in 1942 nor in 1943.

In his book, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. . .*, Herbert Feis, in reference to the promise to open the second front, said that "both the Americans and British. . . were determined to accomplish it during 1942" but that it was impossible

to do so.⁷² "For a long time," wrote William Langer, "a second front in Europe was militarily impossible..."⁷³

The US Armed Forces Command, however, was of a different opinion. It felt that it was possible to launch an invasion in Western Europe between July 15 and August 1, 1942.⁷⁴ However, the governments of the United States and Great Britain made this operation contingent upon either the defeat of the Soviet armies or the collapse of Germany in the war with the USSR. As we know, neither thing happened in 1942; fierce fighting continued on the Soviet-German front.

On November 6, 1942, Stalin noted that the main reason for the Germans' tactical successes on the Soviet-German front in 1942 was that the absence of a second front in Europe enabled them to throw all their free reserves to the East.⁷⁵ In a note to Roosevelt on December 14, 1942, he wrote: "I feel confident that no time is being wasted, that the promise to open a second front in Europe, which you, Mr. President, and Mr. Churchill gave for 1942 or the spring of 1943 at the latest, will be kept and that a second front in Europe will really be opened jointly by Great Britain and the USA next spring."⁷⁶

But while the USSR was strenuously fighting for the common cause of the Allies, the governments of the United States and Great Britain put off opening a second front in Western Europe. A decision was taken at an Anglo-American conference in Casablanca in early 1943 to begin an invasion of Sicily. This meant that the invasion of Europe across the English Channel would be postponed.

When the opening of the second front was again put off, this time until the spring of 1944, the head of the Soviet Government sent a note to Roosevelt on June 11, 1943, advising him that the decision of the allies "creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which, straining all its resources, has for the past two years been engaged against the main forces of Germany and her satellites, and leaves the Soviet Army, which is fighting not only for its country,

but also for its Allies, to do the job alone, almost single-handed, against an enemy that is still very strong and formidable."⁷⁷

The second front was opened when Germany's defeat at the hands of the Soviet Armed Forces was already clearly in prospect. The victories of the Soviet Army in 1943 and 1944 showed that the Soviet Union was capable of achieving victory over the fascist aggressors by itself and freeing the peoples of Europe from Nazi slavery. Moreover, as Herbert Feis has written, the ruling circles of the United States and Britain were afraid that as a consequence of the continued inaction of the Allies, the conquered peoples of Europe "might have thought us indifferent, and more of them than did might have come to regard the Soviet Union as their one great liberating friend. This is in itself... the basic political justification for our strategy".⁷⁸ Account should also be taken of the influence on Anglo-American policy of the pressure exerted by US and British public opinion, which was demanding prompt and effective aid to their ally. Roosevelt wrote to Churchill, who was insisting on the "Balkan alternative": "For purely political considerations over here, I should never survive even a slight setback in 'Overlord' (the Normandy invasion operation.—B.M.) if it were known that fairly large forces had been diverted to the Balkans."⁷⁹

THE THESIS OF THE USSR'S "SYMBOLIC PARTICIPATION" IN THE DEFEAT OF IMPERIALIST JAPAN

The tendency towards an unobjective assessment of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War is seen even more clearly in American works on the Pacific theatre of operations. Some American historians were of the opinion that the Soviet Union's participation in the war against Japan was not necessary since the war had already been won by the United States. Robert Butow noted in his book,

for example, that by the summer of 1944, thanks to American air and naval operations, Japan was cut off from her basic sources of raw materials and foodstuffs and had already lost the war economically.⁸⁰ Kent Greenfield wrote that "it was the Army Air Forces that gave the last turn of the screw which brought the Japanese Empire to its knees".⁸¹ The Japanese Government's ultimate decision to capitulate, states Karl Compton, was taken as a result of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.⁸² Some writers held that under these circumstances there was no military necessity for the USSR's participation in the war in the Far East. The Soviet Union's entry into the Pacific War came "just before Japan bowed to the demand for unconditional surrender", wrote Herbert Feis.⁸³ According to the ideas expounded in some books (John R. Deane's, for example) Soviet participation in the military operations against Japan was purely a token action.⁸⁴

Saying that the Soviet Union's participation in the struggle against the Japanese aggressors was "unnecessary" and "too late", some historians demagogically criticised Roosevelt's policy of drawing the USSR into the war against Japan. Feis asked whether the Americans were justified in making "concessions" to the USSR at Yalta "for help that in the end was unneeded".⁸⁵ William Langer wrote that Roosevelt "felt obliged to pay a price (!—B.M.) for Russian intervention, only to discover later that the Soviet contribution in the Far East was little more than a victory parade. Our own atomic bomb served our purposes a hundred times better than did the Soviet armies".⁸⁶

In an effort to explain the American Government's position in persistently seeking the participation of Soviet Armed Forces in the war against Japan, some authors spoke of errors and miscalculations made by the US Government and the American military, or about the Pentagon's and General MacArthur's inability to properly assess Japan's vulnerability.⁸⁷ Other historians, William Chamberlin, for example, went even further, declaring the policy of bringing the

USSR into the war in the Far East to be a "betrayal" of US interests.⁸⁸

The debate on this question assumed such proportions (especially in connection with the publication of the Yalta documents), that General MacArthur declared on March 23, 1955, that no one had asked for his opinion about the Soviet Union's entering into the war against Japan, but if they had he would have definitely opposed the USSR's entry into the war. Documents published by the Pentagon in late October 1955 contradicted MacArthur's statement. It turned out that in 1945 he had urged the US government to "make every effort to get Russia into the Japanese war".⁸⁹

Another fact that should be borne in mind is that Japan did not act alone in the Second World War, but in a bloc with nazi Germany. Therefore, those blows that the Soviet Army dealt to Hitler's hordes could not but affect the condition of his allies. As President Roosevelt underlined, the "defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany... Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan".⁹⁰ The presence of Soviet forces in the Far East had a direct influence on the development of military operations in the Pacific zone. The Soviet Union, while giving all its energies to the struggle with Germany, at the same time kept a huge Japanese army pinned down in Manchuria.

The role of the Soviet Union was so important that the American general staff, in its strategic plans regarding the war with Japan, invariably envisaged the participation of Soviet forces. American historian E. R. May reported that "only when the joint planning staffs learned what contributions could be made by Soviet operations and when those operations would take place could they prepare definite plans for the defeat of Japan".⁹¹

This is precisely what explains the desire of the American side to speed this participation. After examining the documents published by the Pentagon in October 1955, *The New York Times* wrote: "Indeed, the record put out by the Pentagon leaves no doubt that Soviet participation in the

Pacific war was a major United States objective from the time of Pearl Harbor.⁹² The question of the USSR's participation in the war with Japan was raised in two Roosevelt's messages to Moscow (December 16, 1941, and June 17, 1942).⁹³

At the Casablanca conference in January 1943, Roosevelt remarked to Churchill "that it would be very desirable . . . to get a definite engagement . . . from Russia that they would join in the struggle against Japan".⁹⁴ John Deane, the head of the American military mission in Moscow, testified that "our [Harriman's and Deane's.—B.M.] primary longrange objective was to obtain Soviet participation in the war against Japan".⁹⁵

Although the allies dealt heavy blows to the Japanese navy and air force, the Japanese ground forces did not suffer great losses. In the summer of 1944, US intelligence estimated the Japanese armed forces on the Asian continent (the Kwantung Army) as "*a large and dangerous force*".⁹⁶ The American military command, convinced by then by the experience with Germany of the ineffectiveness of strategic bombing, was afraid that the Japanese would transfer their troops from Manchuria and China to repulse an allied landing in Japan. "It thus became a primary concern of the American Government to see to it that the Soviet Union enter the war against Japan at the earliest possible date in order that the Japanese Army in Manchuria might not be returned to the homeland at the critical moment."⁹⁷

MacArthur told the US Secretary of the Navy that "we should secure the commitment of the Russians to active and vigorous prosecution of a campaign against the Japanese in Manchukuo".⁹⁸ A memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, dated January 23, 1945, stated: "Russia's entry at as early date as possible . . . is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations."⁹⁹

These considerations had a strong influence on the position of the American delegation at the Yalta conference.

As Averell Harriman, a member of the US delegation, noted later: "These military considerations had been the subject of careful study by Roosevelt for a long time and they were uppermost in his mind at Yalta."¹⁰⁰ At a conference of the American Historical Association in 1954, Ernest May noted that "in 1944-1945, the prospective operations against the Japanese home islands made Soviet action against the Manchurian Army seem highly desirable if not essential. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur were all of this opinion, which was reflected in the Yalta Agreements".¹⁰¹

It is obvious why the US Government wanted the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan at the earliest possible moment. Without the USSR's participation, victory over Japan remained a distant prospect. In 1945, the Japanese army numbered 5 million men. US Secretary of War Henry Stimson estimated that an invasion of Japan "might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone".¹⁰² A report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, dated February 9, 1945, confirmed strategic plans that had been worked out earlier in which the end of the war against Japan had been set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany.¹⁰³ Secretary of State Stettinius pointed out that without the Soviet Union, the United States and its allies could not achieve victory over Japan until 1947.¹⁰⁴

Was the new weapon, later to be known as the atomic bomb, taken into account in all these considerations? There is quite a definite answer to this question.

On the eve of their departure for Yalta, Roosevelt and Marshall were informed of the work being completed on a new bomb of tremendous destructive power, greater than anything known before. This information had no essential influence on the position of the American delegation at the Yalta conference. As Herbert Feis has pointed out, neither the establishment of air and naval superiority in the air and seas near Japan nor the forecast of a new weapon

"caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make any substantial changes in their plans or schedules for the further conduct of the war against Japan or waver in their opinion that Russian entry would be of great value".¹⁰⁵

On April 25, 1945, Henry Stimson wrote to the new President, Harry Truman: "Within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city."¹⁰⁶ Nonetheless, a month later Stimson, in a letter to Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew, stressed that "Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives".¹⁰⁷ President Truman admitted this in his Memoirs: "...the Russians ... had saved us many lives in the war against the Germans. ... We were eager for the Russians to get into the war with Japan. ..."¹⁰⁸

In the summer of 1945, Allied intelligence indicated that Soviet intervention in the war against Japan "would be desirable, if not necessary, for the success of the invasion strategy." Intelligence experts and the military felt that "though her industries had been seriously crippled by air bombardment and naval blockade ... Japan was still far from surrender".¹⁰⁹

It is important to note the following circumstance. The experimental explosion of the atomic bomb took place one day before the opening of the Potsdam Conference. Nonetheless, one of the principal goals of the American delegation at Potsdam, as testified to by Truman, was to gain reaffirmation of the Soviet Union's entry into the war in the Far East.¹¹⁰ Even in July 1945, when the decision to drop the bomb on Japanese cities had already been taken, American strategic plans for the defeat of Japan did not include reliance upon the atomic bomb.¹¹¹

The US Government's decision to use the atomic bomb was not based on military considerations alone. The use of the new weapon against Japan was to a considerable degree dictated by political objectives. Washington's calculations

are partially revealed in a conversation between Truman and James F. Byrnes (the President's personal representative and later US Secretary of State) which took place in April 1945. "Byrnes had already told me," Truman later recalled, "that the weapon might be so powerful as to be potentially capable of wiping out entire cities and killing people on an unprecedented scale. And he had added that in his belief the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war."¹¹²

A special committee, known as the Interim Committee, was set up by the government to look into problems connected with the new weapon. As reported by L. Morton in an article appearing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1957, "of particular concern to the committee was the question of how long it would take another country, particularly the Soviet Union, to produce an atomic bomb". Another major question was what effect the use of the weapon would have on Soviet-American relations. In the opinion of the ruling circles of the United States, the new weapon "could be used as a powerful deterrent" against the Soviet Union in Europe.¹¹³

As soon as the report on the successful atomic bomb test came in, Truman called together his chief advisers—Byrnes, Stimson, Leahy, Marshall, King and Arnold. He asked for their opinion whether the bomb should be used. The consensus was that it should.¹¹⁴ A week later, on July 24, the Commanding General of the United States Army Strategic Air Force received orders to deliver the "first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki".¹¹⁵

Was the United States government aware of what the use of the atomic weapon would mean to the population of the cities attacked? Without any doubt. Truman wrote: "I had realised, of course, that an atomic bomb explosion would inflict damage and casualties beyond imagination."¹¹⁶

But did the use of the atomic bomb shorten the war with Japan? The facts speak for themselves. Japanese capitula-

tion did not ensue immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima.

An important role in the defeat of Japan was played by the USSR's entry into the war against the Japanese aggressors in August 1945. The Soviet Union undertook this action in order to speed the onset of peace and in accordance with commitments made at the Yalta conference. The *New York Herald Tribune* said at the time: "Rarely has a great military effort been initiated for a nobler reason. . . . That it will be militarily decisive in the Far East one can hardly doubt."¹¹⁷ Soviet troops smashed the basic armed forces of Japanese militarism—the Kwantung Army of Japan.

THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. THE CONCEPT OF "ERRORS"

A decisive change in favour of socialism took place in the balance of forces between the capitalist and socialist systems as a result of the Second World War. Despite the great losses suffered, the Soviet Union came out of the war not weakened, but strong and powerful. Favourable conditions were also created for the victory of socialist revolutions in the countries of Europe and Asia, and for the formation of a world system of socialism. The national liberation struggle of the peoples was gathering momentum on a broad front. The international forces of socialism and democracy had grown strong.

Some American historians denied that the transformations that took place in the world after the war were natural and inevitable. In writing about the events preceding the capitulation of Nazi Germany, they held that the positions of socialism in postwar Europe were strengthened basically because of errors made by the United States, its having been overly punctilious in its international commitments, as well as because of those commitments themselves, in particular the ones assumed by Roosevelt at

the Yalta Conference. Hanson Baldwin, for example, said that "our World War II actions, policies, and agreements were in many cases so naively trusting, politically superficial, or limited in outlook as to make it not only possible, but easy, for Soviet Communism to turn them to its advantage."¹¹⁸ Supporters of this point of view stressed that the United States' basic mistake was that America's wartime leaders forgot about the political aims of the war. There were "mistakes of understanding and attitude on the part of our society in general with respect to a military venture in which we were engaged."¹¹⁹ "We fought to win and we forgot that wars must have political aims We substituted one enemy for another; and today's enemy, Soviet Russia, is more threatening than the old."¹²⁰

The crux of what some American writers were saying amounted to the following: by entering into the Second World War, the United States upset the balance of forces in Europe and Asia. By throwing its weight in the coalition war on the side of the Allies, it did not give Germany and Japan a chance to prostrate the USSR. Even worse, American politicians failed to notice that the USSR was growing stronger: there was no need to give it lend-lease aid, the second front should have been opened in the Balkans to prevent the Soviet Armed Forces from moving into Central Europe, and the Soviet Union's entry into the Pacific War should have been prevented. The basic errors, they felt, were made at Tcheran, Yalta and Potsdam, when the Allies supposedly made big concessions to the USSR and opened the way to its military dominance in Europe and Asia.

"My thesis. . .," wrote Baldwin, "was that the unconditional surrender doctrine, our failure to penetrate the Danubian plain and to push into the Balkans, and the halting of our armies short of Prague and Berlin and their subsequent withdrawal to the west had helped to give the Russians hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe."¹²¹

Many American bourgeois historians insisted that the

United States made a mistake in opening the second front in France instead of in the Balkans according to Churchill's notorious plan.¹²² "Invasion via the 'under-belly'", wrote Julius Pratt, "might have brought Anglo-American armies into Central Europe, where they could have contested Soviet domination of that area."¹²³ Such plans, as we know, were current in Anglo-American ruling circles.

Furthermore, the above-mentioned historians not only tried to cast doubt on the inevitability of the results of the war, but also belittled the significance of the Soviet Army's victories at the final stage, saying that the United States "let" the USSR occupy Berlin and liberate Prague and Vienna. In H. Baldwin's opinion, "indeed we might, even so, have beaten the Russians to this prize had its political and psychological significance been fully understood". But such an understanding did not exist, and the Americans stopped at the Elbe instead of crossing it and heading for the German capital. "Prague was clearly within the grasp of American troops," he wrote, "but ... we deliberately halted our armies short of the goal."¹²⁴

This point of view was supported by reactionary propaganda and used in the internal political struggle. Thus, the magazine *US News & World Report* said that America itself helped to strengthen the positions of the USSR, which was particularly true of the "unexplainable" actions at the end of the war. "Should the US and British troops have pressed on to capture Berlin ahead of the Russians? Should the Americans have gone on east to Prague in Czechoslovakia? Should they have beaten the Red Army in a race for Vienna?" the magazine asked rhetorically.¹²⁵

For its part, the American command in Europe stated that the decision to stop at the Elbe was prompted by military and not political considerations.¹²⁶ Admiral William Leahy said that Eisenhower "made a military decision in the field to rest on the Elbe..."¹²⁷

The groundlessness of attempts to depict the historic victories of the Soviet Army at the final stage of the war

as resulting from mistakes made by the ruling circles of the United States will become obvious if we refer to documents and materials of the Americans themselves. We know, for example, that at the beginning of the Second World War a committee was set up in the US State Department to study the future policy of the United States, and after Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt directed that a special Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy be established, with the Secretary of State as Chairman. In the course of the war, this committee prepared a large volume of recommendations to the government.¹²⁸ It was not, therefore, a matter of little or no attention being paid to the political aims of the war, but rather that the committee's recommendations were often built on sand: on assumptions that the USSR would be weakened by the war, and on the possibility of using the monopoly on the atomic bomb as a source of strength in the military sphere and in international negotiations, etc.

Nor did the United States completely ignore political aims in its strategic planning of the war. From the standpoint of purely military considerations, for example, the second front in Europe could have been opened much earlier. And the landing in Normandy in 1944 was conditioned by political considerations. Churchill's notorious plan for an invasion via the "soft under-belly" of Europe, in the Balkans, was also rejected for political reasons. As Charles Burton Marshall writes, "one needs only to review the experiences of the Allied invasion of Italy to dispel the specious notion of missed strategic opportunity in Southeast Europe. To have attacked there rather than where we did might well have left the Russians with the way open to the Ruhr".¹²⁹ "... Any assumption that the political consequences of an 'under-belly' attack would have been advantageous is of somewhat doubtful validity," wrote John J. McCloy. "... if the western Allies' main effort had been through the Mediterranean it is likely that even more of Northern and Western Germany would have been occupied by Soviet troops than at present. It is doubtful if the United States

and Great Britain would ever have been able to maintain substantial numbers of troops in both Germany and southeastern Europe."¹³⁰

When it became clear that the Second World War was coming to a close, Winston Churchill formulated the basic practical questions of strategy and policy. He proposed that a "new front" be created, directed against the Soviet Union, that "this front in Europe should be as far east as possible", and that Berlin, Prague and Vienna be occupied for this purpose.¹³¹

The Anglo-American military command set as its task to occupy as much of the territory held by the Nazi army as possible. As early as May 1944, the headquarters of the Allied forces taking part in the Normandy landing marked Berlin as the final objective of the Western Allies' offensive. This decision was confirmed in September 1944. But taking into account that Berlin would possibly be occupied by Soviet troops first, the Anglo-American command planned the following offensive as an alternative: in the north, to the Baltic ports; in the centre, towards Leipzig and Dresden; and in the south, in the direction of Augsburg-Munich.

A meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Great Britain took place on January 30, 1945 in Malta, prior to the arrival of the heads of governments. It was decided to speed up the advance of the Allied forces on the Western front. As Eisenhower stressed, "the factor of time ... had now become of great importance in view of the Russian advance.... In view of the present diminution of German offensive capabilities in the West, it was essential to get to the Rhine in the North as soon as possible...."¹³² But right up to the beginning of February 1945, the Anglo-American armies were still moving north from the Ardennes. In the meantime, the Soviet Army routed the Nazis in Eastern Prussia and in Poland, completed the defeat of an enemy grouping that was surrounded near Budapest, and came out to the Oder.

In March 1945, after the Allied troops crossed the Rhine, the supreme command of the Anglo-American forces again considered the question of what direction the Allied advance should take. "A natural objective beyond the Ruhr was Berlin...." wrote Eisenhower in his memoirs. "But if we should plan for a power crossing of the Elbe, with the single purpose of attempting to invest Berlin, two things would happen. The first of these was that in all probability the Russian forces would be around the city long before we could reach there. The second was that to sustain a strong force at such a distance from our major bases along the Rhine would have meant the practical immobilisation of units along the remainder of the front. This I felt to be more than unwise; it was stupid."¹³³

On March 28, 1945, the commander of the Anglo-American forces indicated the basic direction of the Allied advance: Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden until contact was made with Soviet troops on the Elbe southwest of Berlin (by an army group under the command of General Bradley). North of the main thrust, the armies under the command of Field Marshal Montgomery were to head towards the Baltic in order to "cut off Denmark". In the south, the Sixth Army group of General Devers received instructions to move into the Danubian plain until it met the Soviet troops in Austria. In order to strengthen the main thrust, American divisions included in Montgomery's army group were turned over to Bradley.¹³⁴

Eisenhower's decision caused dissatisfaction and irritation in London; on March 27, Montgomery sent a report advising London of his orders to the British 2nd and US 9th armies to head with maximum speed and energy towards the Elbe and come out on it in the Hamburg-Magdeburg sector. The British Government saw in Eisenhower's decision a rejection of Berlin as the objective. "All prospect also of the British entering Berlin with the Americans is ruled out...." wrote Churchill on March 31. In connection with this, the British Prime Minister launched into stormy

activity. He demanded by all means to break through into Central and even Eastern Europe in order to prevent the liberation of that region by the Soviet Army. "... the Russian armies of the South seem certain to enter Vienna and overrun Austria," he wrote Eisenhower on March 31. "If we deliberately leave Berlin to them, even if it should be in our grasp, the double event may strengthen their conviction, already apparent, that they have done everything..."

"If they also take Berlin," he emphasized in a message to President Roosevelt of April 1, "will not their impression that they have been the overwhelming contributor to our common victory be unduly imprinted in their minds...?" Churchill kept insisting on advancing as far eastward as possible and taking Berlin.¹³⁵ However, that Churchill's plans were unrealisable was obvious to the Allied command right at the scene of action. On April 7, 1945, Eisenhower wrote George Marshall: "I am the first to admit that a war is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations in this theatre, I would cheerfully readjust my plans..." But that was exactly the point it was "militarily unsound" at that stage "to make Berlin a major objective, particularly in view of the fact that it is only 35 miles from the Russian lines".¹³⁶

It was not that the American command, unlike the British command, was ready to "let" the Soviet Army take Berlin. Under the conditions that had taken shape it simply could not carry out Churchill's proposed task of occupying the German capital. "As regards Berlin I am quite ready to admit that it has political and psychological significance.... Naturally, if I get an opportunity to capture Berlin cheaply, I will take it,"¹³⁷ said D. Eisenhower in a message to Montgomery of April 8, 1945. The American command had by no means closed its eyes to the political consequences of how the Allied armies would be deployed in Europe by the end of the

war. But the conditions were such that it considered it possible only to establish the Allied left flank on the Baltic coast, at Lübeck, in order to prevent Soviet forces from occupying Schleswig-Holstein. The Allied forces headed in directions where enemy resistance was weaker and where, consequently, they could occupy the greatest amount of territory.

All this time, the Allied command continued to regard the German capital as a highly desirable objective. On April 14, in briefing the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the forthcoming operations, Eisenhower stressed that it would be highly desirable to strike a blow in the direction of Berlin. But although the Americans did seize a small bridgehead on the Elbe, they had only their spearheads at the river.¹³⁸ The subsequent advance of the Anglo-American armies was directed to the north—to Lübeck, and to the south.

The advance of the Soviet troops in the direction of Berlin began on April 16. On April 25, the Soviet armies completed the investment of the enemy force at Berlin, and on May 2, after fierce fighting, the German capital was taken.

As can be seen from the documentary evidence cited above, the United States and Great Britain were fully aware of the political significance of Berlin, Vienna and Prague. However, as these documents also show, they were not in a position to take those cities.

True, after January 1945, when as a result of the powerful offensive of the Soviet armies the Nazi command was forced to give up developing its original successes in the Ardennes and go over to the defensive, exceptionally favourable prospects opened up for the American and British armies to make a rapid advance in the eastern direction.*

* On April 5, 1945, Roosevelt wrote Stalin: "I have... a full appreciation of the effect your gallant army has had in making possible a crossing of the Rhine by the forces under General Eisenhower and the effect that your forces will have hereafter on the eventual collapse of the German resistance to our combined attacks" (*Correspondence...*, Vol. 2, p. 207).

Hitler's government, which in those days pinned all its hopes on a split of the anti-Hitler coalition, literally stripped the Western Front bare, concentrating in the East all the forces it still had. Therefore, while the advancing Soviet armies had to overcome stiff resistance all the way, German resistance in the West was, even according to the admission of the American and British generals themselves, sporadic and ineffective.

What, then, prevented the American command from taking advantage of these obvious advantages in its position? Of course, the reasons given by the American generals—the conditions of the locality and the danger of their troops being cut off from their bases and of overextending their supply lines in the event of too rapid an advance—played their role. However, the main reason that the advance of the American armies was slowed down was something else, and it was political in nature. Whereas the Soviet troops had saved the American and British troops from a catastrophe in the Ardennes, General Eisenhower and his bosses in Washington were most of all afraid lest any vigorous action by their armies help the operations of their Soviet ally, lest they lighten the burden that the war had placed on the USSR. The hope that the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces would be exhausted is what guided the US command even at the last stage of military operations, and that is why it did not hasten to take advantage of the fact that the nazis were taking division after division away from the Western Front and throwing them onto the Eastern Front. When Bradley's troops, and then Montgomery's, reached the Elbe, the Soviet units had already occupied Vienna and were encircling Berlin.

There is also reason to believe that despite Churchill's insistence and its own desire to take the German capital, the American command could not bring itself to undertake the Berlin operation. By the end of the war, large enemy forces were concentrated in the Berlin zone, for that is where the troops retreating under the blows of the Soviet Army were

heading and where divisions taken off the Western Front and from other parts of the country were converging. Since the political situation excluded the possibility of a separate deal between the nazis and the Western powers, and as the rapid approach to the nazi capital by Soviet troops made Germany's capitulation to the USA and Britain alone impossible even from a purely technical standpoint, it was clear that the Berlin operation would mean a stiff, fierce and possibly lengthy battle. For this the American command was not ready.

In any event, what determined the character of the operations of the American armed forces at the last stage of the war was the political plans of the US ruling circles, their strategic calculations, and by no means an agreement with the Soviet Union on the distribution of future occupation zones, as some bourgeois historians assert.

The ruling circles of the United States and Britain, as they themselves subsequently admitted, sought an agreement on zones, because they feared that otherwise the Soviet Union would occupy the greater part of German territory. In approximately mid-1944, the American military "expected all of Germany up to the Rhine to be in Soviet control upon Germany's defeat". Therefore the Department of State felt that "if the prospects were so gloomy [!—B.M.], all the more reason to seek early agreement on future arrangements for Germany".¹³⁹

However, although the United States and Britain were interested in an agreement on zones, they did not adhere to it very much when they felt this to be profitable. None other than Eisenhower admitted after the war that this agreement "did not influence our [American.—B.M.] military plans for the final conquest of the country".¹⁴⁰

The further east the Anglo-American armies advanced, the greater became the desire of some American and British politicians to occupy as much German territory as possible, contrary to the agreement on occupation zones that had been

signed with the USSR earlier. In correspondence with the British general staff, Churchill made it clear that a Western Allied advance deep into the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany should not be only a temporary military measure. "...if we crossed the Elbe and advanced to Berlin, or on a line between Berlin and the Baltic, which is all well within the Russian zone," he wrote, "we should not give this up as a military matter." Churchill was clearly implying that if these positions were to be captured by US and British troops, they could be used as a trump card in further negotiations with the USSR, that is, they would essentially become an instrument of pressure on the USSR.¹⁴¹

In a message to Truman on April 18, 1945, the British Prime Minister went even further. "The occupational zones," he wrote, "were decided rather hastily at Quebec in September 1944, when it was not foreseen that General Eisenhower's armies would make such a mighty inroad into Germany..." From this it followed that the Anglo-American armies must stand on the line they had reached in the "tactical zone".¹⁴²

Montgomery's troops reached the Elbe east of Lüneburg on April 19, in the region of Harburg on April 24, and by the end of April, east of Cuxhaven. The goals that were set for them can be seen from a letter from Churchill to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden (April 19): "It is thought most important that Montgomery should take Lübeck as soon as possible [which meant crossing the Elbe in a northeasterly direction.—B.M.].... Our arrival at Lübeck before our Russian friends from Stettin would save a lot of argument later on. There is no reason why the Russians should occupy Denmark..." Furthermore, it was thought well "to gain the region south of Stuttgart. In this region are the main German installations connected with their atomic research..."¹⁴³

In accordance with these directives, Montgomery asked for the immediate dispatch of reinforcements "to extend his line to the Baltic and block off Denmark from the Soviets".¹⁴⁴

Those reinforcements—Ridgway's airborne corps—were sent posthaste.

General Ridgway wrote openly of the political nature of this action in his memoirs: "We moved at least 30 miles eastward of the line which originally had been set as the point where Allied and Russian forces would meet—and on Montgomery's orders, I clung to that 'Wismar cushion', so that it could be used for negotiating purposes."¹⁴⁵

True, in the centre, General Bradley's troops did not cross the Elbe once they reached it but turned to the southeast. Bradley himself later explained this by saying that he was anxious to occupy all of the US zone of occupation. The idea was that "we would sweep up our own US sector without help from the Red Army".¹⁴⁶

Further south, American troops under General Patton entered Czechoslovakia on April 18. As Harry Truman recalls in his memoirs, "on April 23 our Embassy in London [the US Embassy.—B.M.] received a note from the British Foreign Office in which Eden expressed the view that it would be most desirable politically to have Prague liberated by US forces. The note went on to say that the liberation of Czechoslovakia by a Western ally would be of obvious advantage to us and would also help us in establishing our missions in that country."¹⁴⁷

Churchill made an even more definite statement on April 30 when he wrote Truman: "There can be little doubt that the liberation of Prague and as much as possible of the territory of Western Czechoslovakia by your troops might make the whole difference to the post-war situation in Czechoslovakia, and might well influence that in nearby countries."¹⁴⁸

For his part, Acting US Secretary of State Grew suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the question seriously, for if the American troops reached Prague "it would give us something to bargain with in our dealing with the Russians".¹⁴⁹ On May 4, the Soviet command was informed of the Americans' intention to push through to the

Vltava and the Elbe rivers in Czechoslovakia, that is, to Prague.

The Soviet Supreme Command could not agree to this. Chief of the General Staff A. I. Antonov pointed out in his reply to Eisenhower that both banks of the Vltava would be cleared of the enemy by Soviet troops, for which the corresponding grouping had already been created and had begun carrying out the operations. In view of this statement, the American troops stopped on the České Budějovice—Plzeň—Karlovy Vary line.¹⁵⁰ On May 9, the tank armies of the First Ukrainian Front, speeding to the aid of the population of the Czechoslovak capital which had risen against the fascist occupation, liberated Prague.

Thus, the actual course of the war in Europe does not confirm the theory that the US Government and the American military command had ignored political questions. It was not a matter of an absence of political objectives, but of there being a tremendously long distance between these objectives and their realisation. The results of the Second World War in Europe were by no means the consequence of any mistakes made by American leaders.

¹ George F. Kennan, "Russian Revolution—Fifty Years After. Its Nature and Consequences", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 1, October 1967, p. 18.

² Foster R. Dulles, *The Road to Teheran. The Story of Russia and America, 1781-1943*, Princeton, 1944, p. 241.

³ George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, Philadelphia, 1944, pp. 462-63.

⁴ Francis T. Miller, *History of World War II*, Philadelphia, 1945; Frank Monaghan, *World War II. An Illustrated History*, Vols. I-II, Chicago, 1943; Roger W. Shugg, H. A. Deweerd, *World War II*, Washington, 1947.

⁵ *United States Army in World War II*, Washington, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History.

⁶ *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vols. 1-7. Ed. by W. Craven, J. Cate, Chicago, 1948-58.

⁷ *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, Vols. I-XV. Ed. by S. Morison, Boston, 1947-62.

⁸ See Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*, Princeton, 1957; Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1960; Trumbull Higgins, *Hitler and Russia. The Third Reich in a Two-Front War 1937-1943*, New York, 1966; *The Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power*. Ed. by John L. Snell, Baton Rouge, 1966; James V. Compton, *The Swastika and the Eagle. Hitler, the United States and the Origins of World War II*, Boston, 1967; Robert H. Jones, *The Road to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union*, Norman, Oklahoma, 1969.

⁹ Kent R. Greenfield, *The Historian and the Army*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1954, p. 8.

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¹¹ Raymond J. Sontag, "Reflections on the Yalta Papers", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1955, p. 615.

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¹³ For example, *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941*, Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office As Released by the Department of State. Ed. by Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Beddie, New York, 1948.

¹⁴ Kent R. Greenfield, *The Historian and the Army*, p. 54.

¹⁵ William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, New York, 1953, p. 567; Kent Roberts Greenfield, *The Historian and the Army*, pp. 70, 77, 86.

¹⁶ William L. Langer, "Political Problems of a Coalition", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947, p. 89.

¹⁷ Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy*, New York, 1955, p. 670.

¹⁸ W. D. Puleston, "Revealed—Blunders of World War II", *US News & World Report*, Vol. XXXVIII, February 4, 1955, p. 116.

¹⁹ Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 1939-1945. *Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten*, Darmstadt, 1961, S. 692.

²⁰ Kent R. Greenfield, *The Historian and the Army*, p. 54.

²¹ William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, p. 544.

²² Joseph E. Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, New York, 1941, p. 475.

²³ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and Russians. The Yalta Conference*, New York, 1949, p. 7.

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- ²⁷ Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*, Princeton, 1957, p. 10.
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- ²⁹ *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with the US President and the British Prime Minister During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45* (hereafter referred to as *Correspondence...*), Vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, p. 9 (in Russian).
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- ³² Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. IV, London, 1951, p. 613.
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- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
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- ³⁷ Frederick L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad*, New York, 1947, pp. 432-33.
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- ⁴² Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. III, 1950, pp. 350, 352.
- ⁴³ Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin...*, p. 6.
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- ⁴⁵ Sumner Welles, "Two Roosevelt Decisions: One Debit, One Credit", *Foreign Affairs*, January 1951, p. 193; Frederick Sanborn implied that the United States armed the USSR at the expense of its own army (Frederick R. Sanborn, *Design for War. A Study of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941*, New York, 1951, p. 400).
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- ⁷⁵ *The Foreign Policy of the USSR During the Patriotic War*, Vol. 1, p. 75.
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- ⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 69-70.
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⁸¹ Kent R. Greenfield, *The Historian and the Army*, p. 85.
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⁸³ Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 655.
⁸⁴ Ernest R. May, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Far Eastern War, 1941-1945", *Pacific Historical Review*, May 1955, p. 172; John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance. The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia*, New York, 1947, pp. 263-66; W. D. Puleston, op. cit., p. 122; William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, New York, London, Toronto, 1950, p. 318; Ernest J. King and Walter Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King. A Naval Record*, New York, 1952, p. 606; Herbert Feis, *The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II*, Princeton, 1966.
⁸⁵ Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 505.
⁸⁶ William L. Langer, "Political Problems of a Coalition", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947, pp. 86-87. Japanese historians state that "the use of the atom bomb was for the United States not so much the last military operation in the Second World War as the first serious battle of the cold war" (*History of the War in the Pacific Ocean*, Vol. 4, Moscow, 1958, p. 205, in Russian).
⁸⁷ W. D. Puleston, op. cit., pp. 117, 121.
⁸⁸ William H. Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade*, Chicago, 1962, p. 218.
⁸⁹ *The New York Times*, October 20, 1955, p. 14.
⁹⁰ Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*, Washington, 1953, pp. 272-73.
⁹¹ Ernest R. May, op. cit., p. 155.
⁹² *The New York Times*, October 20, 1955, p. 14.
⁹³ *Correspondence...*, Vol. II, pp. 18, 25-26.
⁹⁴ Ernest R. May, op. cit., p. 158.
⁹⁵ John R. Deane, op. cit., p. 47.
⁹⁶ Ernest R. May, op. cit., p. 160.
⁹⁷ *United States Relations with China*, Washington, 1949, p. VIII.
⁹⁸ MacArthur felt that 60 Soviet divisions were necessary to achieve victory over Japan (*The Forrestal Diaries*. Ed. by Walter Willis, New York, 1951, p. 31).
⁹⁹ Ernest R. May, op. cit., p. 162.
¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 163; see also the testimony of members of the American delegation at Yalta Edward Stettinius and W. Leahy (Edward R.

- Stettinius, *Roosevelt and Russians*, pp. 90-98, 304-05; William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, pp. 293, 311-12, 318).
¹⁰¹ *The American Historical Review*, April 1955, p. 726. Winston Churchill remarked: "I most earnestly desire, and so, I know, does the President, the intervention of Soviet Russia in the Japanese war..." (Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. VI, London, 1954, p. 187).
¹⁰² Henry Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, 1948, p. 619.
¹⁰³ R. J. Sontag, "Reflections on the Yalta Papers", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1955, p. 617.
¹⁰⁴ Herbert Feis, op. cit., p. 503.
¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 502.
¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 636.
¹⁰⁷ Joseph Grew, *The Turbulent Era. A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years: 1904-1945*, Vol. II, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1952, p. 1458.
¹⁰⁸ *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, Vol. 1, New York, 1955, p. 229.
¹⁰⁹ Louis Morton, op. cit., p. 342.
¹¹⁰ *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, Vol. I, p. 411.
¹¹¹ Henry Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, op. cit., p. 618.
¹¹² *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, Vol. I, p. 87.
¹¹³ Louis Morton, op. cit., pp. 337, 347.
¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 347.
¹¹⁵ *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, Vol. I, p. 420.
¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 419.
¹¹⁷ *New York Herald Tribune*, August 10, 1945, p. 18.
¹¹⁸ Hanson W. Baldwin, "Churchill Was Right", *The Atlantic*, July 1954, pp. 24-25.
¹¹⁹ George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*, Chicago, 1952, p. 88.
¹²⁰ Hanson W. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 27. It is not hard to reveal the "origins" of this point of view in the reproach flung by Winston Churchill at the American leaders during the war to the effect that they were obsessed with a desire to achieve the earliest possible military victory, putting questions of political strategy in the second place and thereby "permitting" the USSR to strengthen its positions (Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. VI, pp. 399-400).
¹²¹ Hanson W. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 23.
¹²² Hanson W. Baldwin, *The Great Mistakes of the War*, London, 1950, pp. 24-25; Hans Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*, New York, 1951.
¹²³ Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy*, p. 665.
¹²⁴ Hanson W. Baldwin, "Churchill Was Right", p. 31.

- ¹²⁵ *US News & World Report*, June 22, 1959. Here the magazine quoted the opinion of British Field Marshal Montgomery, who said, in particular: "I think that we could have got further east in Europe than we did.... And one of my great arguments with Ike was that we must get Berlin. You see, to do what I wanted to do, you would have to get possession of the great political centers of Central Europe—Berlin, Prague, Vienna.... My strategy for that was very different to Ike's ... and my view would be that I was greatly influenced always in my thinking and my reading by the fact that the high direction of war must be in political hands.... They [American service chiefs.—B.M.] worked on the philosophy that all military action must be based on purely military decisions and that you mustn't bother about political repercussions."
- ¹²⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, New York, 1951, pp. 396-403; Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, New York, 1951, pp. 531-37.
- ¹²⁷ William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, p. 351.
- ¹²⁸ *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945*, Washington, 1949, p. 3.
- ¹²⁹ Charles B. Marshall, *The Limits of Foreign Policy*, New York, 1954, p. 75.
- ¹³⁰ John J. McCloy, "The Great Military Decision", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947, pp. 64-65; Philip E. Mosely, "Hopes and Failures. American Policy Toward East Central Europe, 1941-1947", *Review of Politics*, October 1955, p. 472.
- ¹³¹ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. VI, p. 400.
- ¹³² Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin...*, p. 491.
- ¹³³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 396.
- ¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 398.
- ¹³⁵ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. VI, pp. 403, 405, 407.
- ¹³⁶ Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, Washington, 1954, p. 446.
- ¹³⁷ Ibid.
- ¹³⁸ It is noteworthy that Churchill, as his secret correspondence shows, was on the whole correctly informed of the actual state of affairs. On April 19, he cabled Eden, who was then in Washington: "This is for your eyes alone. It would seem that the Western Allies are not immediately in a position to force their way into Berlin. The Russians have 2.5 million troops on the section of the front opposite that city. The Americans have only their spearheads, say twenty-five divisions, which are covering an immense front and are at many points engaged with the Germans..." (Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., p. 449).
- ¹³⁹ Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany. New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1950, p. 588.

- ¹⁴⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 396.
- ¹⁴¹ Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., p. 447.
- ¹⁴² Ibid., p. 448.
- ¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 449.
- ¹⁴⁴ Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, New York, 1951, p. 546.
- ¹⁴⁵ *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, New York, 1956, p. 146.
- ¹⁴⁶ Omar N. Bradley, op. cit., p. 543.
- ¹⁴⁷ *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman*, Vol. I, p. 216.
- ¹⁴⁸ Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., p. 442.
- ¹⁴⁹ *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman*, Vol. I, p. 216.
- ¹⁵⁰ See *History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945*, Vol. 5, p. 318 (in Russian).

CHAPTER 6
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
IN THE HISTORICAL LITERATURE
OF THE UNITED STATES

The October Revolution led to fundamental shifts in the whole system of international relations, precipitated a serious crisis in imperialist foreign policy, and proclaimed the principles of peace and international security, equality, and friendship and co-operation among peoples. The struggle for peace is inherent in the Soviet social system; the policy of peace meets the vital interests of the Soviet working people, whose goal is to build communism. L. I. Brezhnev underscored in his speech at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "Our Party, our Soviet state, in co-operation with the fraternal socialist countries and other peace-loving states, and with the wholehearted support of many millions of people throughout the world, have now for many years been waging a struggle on these lines, taking a stand for the cause of peace and friendship among nations."¹

Bourgeois historians acknowledge the successes of Soviet foreign policy and the growth of the Soviet Union's international prestige and influence. University of Pennsylvania Professor Vernon Aspaturian, for example, has noted that "the balance-sheet of Soviet foreign policy over the past fifty years shows an impressive range of accomplishments".² The American literature relating to this question is huge and its boundaries are not so easy to define. Besides special works on the history of Soviet foreign policy proper, its

theory and practice, this theme is touched upon in general works on Soviet history as well as in books devoted to US foreign policy and international relations in general.

Standing out among the questions studied by bourgeois scholars is the problem of the relations between the two systems, and this is supplemented by another central problem of our time—the problem of Soviet-American relations.

AMERICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY ON THE PROBLEM OF
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEMS

The famous Decree on Peace, written by Lenin and adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets on October 26 (November 8) 1917, outlined the general principles of the Soviet state's foreign policy and diplomacy—the principle of the right of nations to self-determination, the equality of large and small nations in settling international issues, the principle of public negotiations and the abolishment of secret diplomacy, the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries, and the principle of prohibiting annexations and indemnities. The principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-political systems occupies an important place in Soviet foreign policy.

The spiritual heirs of the organisers of the armed intervention against Soviet Russia—today's "ultras"—still work actively against peaceful coexistence, rejecting it, so to say, out of hand. Such an utter rejection was contained, for example, in Friedrich and Brzezinski's *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. In it the authors stated that "the possibility for peaceful coexistence of the nations peopling this world presupposes the disappearance of the totalitarian dictatorships [this is how the authors slanderously describe the socialist countries.—B.M.]. Since, according to their own loudly proclaimed professions, their systems must be made worldwide, those who reject the system have no alternative but to strive for its destruction".³

Other bourgeois ideologists, however, considered such an approach too straightforward and ineffective. The successes of the policy of peaceful coexistence and its growing popularity among broad sectors of the world public turned any overly frank attacks against this principle into a kind of boomerang: in the eyes of public opinion, the enemies of peaceful coexistence appeared as advocates of war. Therefore, some opponents of relaxation of tension, not venturing to openly oppose the concept of peaceful coexistence as such and even acknowledging that on the whole it was "not a bad idea", tried to discredit the policy of peaceful coexistence with the help of fallacious "theoretical" and scientific arguments.⁴ One approach was to hold that the concept of peaceful coexistence was in "basic conflict" with the Marxist-Leninist theory.

Thus, in his *Soviet Marxism. A Critical Analysis*, Herbert Marcuse referred to the conditions of peaceful coexistence as being "anomalous" from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, and implied that the concept represents a re-examination, a revision of the theory.⁵ Professor Wladyslaw W. Kulski of Duke University wrote in a similar vein. In his book *Peaceful Co-Existence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy*, the groundlessness of which has been noted by Western criticism, he held that acceptance of the concept of peaceful coexistence was a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism.⁶

George Kennan also added his bit to the false views on the principle of peaceful coexistence by calling in question the fact that the Soviet state from its very inception had proclaimed peaceful coexistence as the basic principle of its foreign policy and that such a position is determined by the very nature of the social and political system in the Soviet Union.⁷ Some bourgeois authors have tried to disassociate the idea of peaceful coexistence from the name of V. I. Lenin.⁸

All this testified to the refusal of bourgeois scholars to reckon with historical facts and the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism.

The uneven development of the world socialist revolution, the inevitability of its victory at first in a few countries or in one country alone, wrote Lenin, meant that "the others will for some time remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois".⁹ Consequently, the era of the proletariat's social revolution inevitably presumes the coexistence of the two systems. Whether coexistence is peaceful or not peaceful depends on the balance of class and political forces in the world arena. When Lenin was asked what were the obstacles to peace with America, he answered: "None on our part; imperialism on the part of the American (and of any other) capitalists."¹⁰

As early as 1919, at the height of the military intervention of the capitalist powers against the Soviet state, Lenin foresaw a new historical period, a "period of the coexistence side by side of socialist and capitalist states".¹¹ The subsequent developments showed the correctness of Lenin's and the Communist Party's foreign policy concept.

The attempt to separate the principle of peaceful coexistence from Marxism-Leninism was only one side of the theoretical position of its opponents. The other side included attempts to oppose the principle of peaceful coexistence to the principle of proletarian internationalism. Here, some authors joined directly with the "Left"-wing revisionists. John Armstrong, for example, asserted that in the foreign policy course of the CPSU, "the old dedication to world revolution ... has almost vanished. In its place is the constantly reiterated theme that ... its (USSR) wishes must be followed and its controls accepted because it is the world's strongest country".¹² The myth that the Soviet Union had returned to the "traditional nationalism" of prerevolutionary Russian policy was repeated also by Adam Ulam, who held that the old "Russian nationalism" had made its resurgence in Soviet times in proletarian internationalism.¹³

The record refutes these contentions again and again. The historical experience of the Soviet state testifies to the fact

that the national and the international in its foreign policy are and always have been inseparable.

Lenin regarded internationalism and international class solidarity as the basis of the foreign policy of Soviet power. According to a statement issued by the Soviet Government in November 1918, "a genuine peace of the peoples can be built only on those principles which correspond to fraternal relations among the working people of all countries and nations and which were proclaimed by the October Revolution and defended by the Russian delegation at Brest."¹⁴ The foreign policy of the Soviet Government is in keeping with the logic of historical development.

From the outset, the Soviet Government proclaimed that the principles of its foreign policy were internationalism in relations with peoples waging a struggle against imperialism and colonialism, and peaceful coexistence in relations with capitalist countries. There is no conflict between these two principles. Leonid Brezhnev stressed in the Report of the CC CPSU to the 24th Congress: "Our policy has always combined firm rebuffs to aggression with the constructive line of settling pressing international problems and maintaining normal, and, wherever the situation allows, good, relations with states belonging to the other social system. As in the past, we have consistently stood up for the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states, regardless of their social system."¹⁵

Asserting the principles of peaceful coexistence does not hamper the struggle for social progress, democracy and socialism; on the contrary, it creates the most favourable possibilities for this struggle.

A contention one meets very often in reactionary historiography is that the policy of peaceful coexistence is forced, not conditioned by objective factors, and temporary. Michael Gehlen has suggested that peaceful coexistence was a policy of adapting to the "non-communist" world, the result of a so-called liberalisation, an ideological relaxation of Soviet society.¹⁶ Other bourgeois scholars have

asserted that peaceful coexistence was an invention of a most recent period, designed to deceive "naive" statesmen in the West. Coexisting on the same globe with the USSR, Philip Mosely summed up, "is dangerous rather than exhilarating."¹⁷

A theme pursued in a number of sovietological works was that Soviet foreign policy was "unstable" and "hypocritical". The methodology of Kremlinology, its tendency to study not what actually existed, but what was presumed to exist, provided unlimited opportunities for all kinds of conjectures about Soviet foreign policy. Books like A. Weeks' *The Other Side of Coexistence. An Analysis of Russian Foreign Policy* and A. Berzins' *The Two Faces of Coexistence* relied on just this kind of conjecture.¹⁸ In view of the successes of the policy of peaceful coexistence, however, such works invariably fall into discredit.

History has shown that ideological differences do not make peaceful coexistence of different systems impossible. "There is nothing new," wrote George Kennan, "in the prolonged peaceful residence, side by side, of ideologically antagonistic systems. Many of the present peaceful relationships of international life, outside the Communist orbit, have evolved from ones which were originally relationships of profound ideological antagonism."¹⁹

Unquestionably, the present international situation has no parallel in world history in its complexity. It should not be forgotten that the socialist system, which abolished the exploitation of man by man for the first time in history, is fundamentally different from all the systems preceding it. This difference, however, does not mean that the controversy between capitalism and socialism can be settled by force of arms. Systems are chosen by the peoples not imposed on them from the outside. As we know, attempts forcibly to change the social system in one or another country from without come not from the USSR but from the aggressive circles of the imperialist powers. Such attempts were undertaken during the military intervention against Soviet Rus-

sia. Nazi Germany sought to do the same thing when it attacked the USSR in 1941.

The Soviet Union has always been, and still is, in favour of peaceful co-operation and competition between socialism and capitalism. The socialist system and its intrinsic laws of social development reject war as an instrument of foreign policy. As Leonid Brezhnev stressed in his appearance on American television during his visit to the United States in June 1973, peaceful nature of the Soviet Union's foreign policy "follows from the very essence of our society. And it is no accident that the very concept of peaceful coexistence, which in our day is increasingly becoming the generally acknowledged basis for the development of relations between states with different social systems, was worked out by the founder of the Soviet state, Vladimir Lenin".²⁰

Of course, the coexistence of capitalist and socialist countries is by no means a question of principle or policy. It is simply an objective fact, and no one can deny that for over half a century now the two types of state have been existing together on this earth. The problem of the times is not coexistence in general, but *peaceful* coexistence.

After all, during the Civil War and during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet state coexisted with capitalist countries, but that coexistence was not peaceful: the Soviet people had to rebuff the armed onslaught of world capitalist reaction. In the 1920s and 1930s, coexistence was only relatively peaceful, since in the policy of the leading capitalist powers there were already quite a few elements of a state of affairs which was later to be called the cold war.

Among the tasks standing before mankind the most important is to ensure peace, to put an end to the arms race, that threatens to grow over into a world armed conflict, and to stop interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

In its policy, the Soviet Government proceeds from the acknowledgement that peaceful coexistence of capitalism and socialism is fully possible if there is a mutual desire to co-operate, if there is a readiness to meet commitments assumed, if the principle of equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states is observed.

Characteristically, individual bourgeois writers have long admitted the practical need for a policy of peaceful coexistence. A realistic appraisal of the balance of forces between capitalism and socialism has compelled them to do so. In the atomic age, security can be assured only on the basis of "mutual accommodation", stated John Herz after making an analysis of the international situation. "I believe," he said, "that accommodation has a chance and therefore can—and must—be tried, for with almost everything dividing the blocs, there is yet one interest they have in common: to avoid mutual annihilation..."²¹

Denna Fleming wrote that the United States has no other alternative except to live on the same planet with the Soviet Union and to learn to settle differences without war.²²

The recent successes of the policy of détente and international co-operation provide fresh convincing evidence of the power and viability of the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE MYTH ABOUT A "SOVIET THREAT"

From the time of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the myth about a Soviet threat (this concept included "danger" both of direct aggression and of subversive activities on the part of the USSR) was one of the basic ideological and political weapons of imperialism. It underlay the foreign policy doctrine of anti-Sovietism and was (sometimes in an expanded interpretation, when the centre of gravity was

shifted to a "threat" from "world communism") the main ideological basis of the policy of anti-communism, as well as of such of its manifestations as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO and SEATO.

Like any other myth, the myth of a Soviet threat conflicted with the real facts, so that there can be no talk of its having any scientific validity. For the creation of the myth about a Soviet threat, reactionary ideologists resorted to their usual method—the distortion of facts.

The most widespread device for "proving" the reality of a "Soviet threat" was the thesis of communism's allegedly aggressive nature. Drawing their "arguments" from revisionist sources, the ideologists of imperialism strove to portray the international communist movement as a "conspiracy". For example, Gabriel Almond tried to draw a parallel between Blanquists and Lenin,²³ and Stefan Possony declared the founders of Marxism to be the organisers of a world "communist conspiracy",²⁴ although it is a well-known fact that the great teachers of the proletariat were always against conspiracy and adventurism.

Bourgeois ideologists held that Marxist theory recognised force and only force, and that Communists built all their calculations not on the free spread of ideas, but on plots and subversive activity. Typical was a book-series on "Communism in American Life" published during the cold war under the general editorship of Clinton Rossiter. The books in this series painted a fantastic picture of a diabolical "communist conspiracy" threatening America.²⁵

John Somerville, a progressive American philosopher, points out that for a long time the mass media portrayed the Communist as an unprincipled man who craved and was ready to use force and violence in any circumstance, as a terrorist and an individualist who did not think of the welfare of the majority or of improving this welfare, but worked in small conspiratorial groups with the sole aim of bringing about the Soviet Union's "dominance" over the world. This picture, Somerville writes, was of course not based on a

knowledge of the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. He points out that Marxism always rejects any attempt at revolution made by a minority. In many works, especially in the works of Lenin, it is emphasised that before a socialist revolution can take place, the majority must support its principles. Anyone who seriously studies Marxism-Leninism, says Somerville, is well aware of this.²⁶

Developing the myth about a "world communist conspiracy", Berzins went so far as to say that all armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War had been organised by Moscow.²⁷ The obvious absurdity of Berzins's assertions compelled his colleague, Kulski, to say: "Does the author really believe that the Russian Communists masterminded the Chinese-Indian, the Indian-Pakistani, or the federal Nigerian-Biafran hostilities...?"²⁸ It should be noted that in a number of cases American authors spoke not of "the hand of Moscow", but of "the hand of America". Thus, Paul Seabury, discussing the situation in postwar Europe, noted in his book *The Rise and Decline of the Cold War*: "But in 1948 the American hand played heavily in Italian general elections..."²⁹

The lack of factual and logical grounds for positing a "communist threat" compelled individual American writers to express their doubts long ago. Take the following remark from a collective work on US foreign policy: "The temptation is for Western, particularly American, political leaders to blame communist machinations for Western failures..."

"If communism were to disappear overnight, the international problems of the contemporary world would remain baffling."³⁰

Anti-communist historiography falsely interpreted the historical role of the Soviet Union and the character of its foreign policy, alleging that it seeks to impose socialism throughout the world by interference in the internal affairs of other peoples. The so-called theory of "export of revolution" played an important role in this. Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush declared, for example, that the goal of Soviet

foreign policy allegedly consisted in the forcible spread of communism.³¹ John Spanier took a similar position, implying that the aim of Soviet foreign policy is to win a "global" victory.³² In his book, *The Soviet Design for a World State*, Elliot Goodman tried to show that the Soviet state sought world hegemony. Neither the Marxist-Leninist theory nor the actual historical facts gave any grounds for such a conclusion; characteristically, Goodman portrayed the confidence of the Soviet people in the historical inevitability of the change of social formations as indicative of a sinister plan to gain world dominance.³³ Richard Pipes described Goodman's book as "an unhealthy encroachment of politics on scholarship".³⁴ And William Welch called Goodman's case "unconvincing".³⁵

Some historians tried to make the myth about Soviet aggressiveness convincing by citing the theory of "continuity" and associating the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR with the foreign policy course of the tsarist empire, about which we spoke earlier. One of those using this approach was Louis Fischer, who held that in its foreign policy the Soviet Union "followed in the same channels" as were used by the tsarist empire.³⁶ Aaron Klieman spoke of Soviet foreign policy objectives which "originate in traditional Russian aspirations".³⁷ And some authors spread the thesis that the Soviet Union takes a "colonial attitude" towards the developing countries.³⁸

The propaganda campaign to establish the myth of a Soviet threat was highly intensive. Along with the holding of conferences and symposiums, a whole series of works were published which spread the myths of "Soviet expansionism", "Red imperialism", etc.³⁹ In one such book the statement was made, for example, that the Soviet Union's objective was nothing more nor less than the "conquest" of the United States with the help of propaganda.⁴⁰ A team of experts on foreign policy—Robert Strausz-Hupé, William Kintner, James Dougherty, and Alvin Cottrell—worked out the theory of a strategy of "protracted conflict" allegedly used by

international communism against the West, and actively promoted this theory.⁴¹ The fable about Soviet aggressiveness was spread in college courses of Russian history and in various sovietological publications designed for the general reader. But despite the intensive propaganda campaign, doubts in the possibility of convincing the peoples of the alleged Soviet Union's "aggressiveness" were expressed in the American literature. As early as 1956, Chester Bowles wrote about the popularity of the Soviet Union's peaceful policy, noting at the same time that there was growing disapproval of US foreign policy.⁴²

Norman Graebner, in his book *The New Isolationism*, remarked that the US policy of brinkmanship was unpopular and gave grounds for saying that it was responsible for the then existing international tension. "To the extent that American intransigence has won few friends in the world," he added, "it has not strengthened this nation in its relation to the Soviet Union."⁴³

Carl Oglesby and Richard Shaul made the following criticism of US foreign policy: "The main nut and kernel of American foreign policy . . . is to ensure the availability of fertile frontiers to American business. . . . America wants . . . [the] world to run under the management of her own business people. Others do not. They have acquired powers of resistance in the East. Therefore there is an East-West struggle, in our time called the Cold War."⁴⁴

Reactionary historiography, however, along with spreading the myth of a Soviet threat, stubbornly insisted that US foreign policy was an especially peaceful policy and contained no imperialist aspirations or expansionist tendencies.

"Is there an American imperialism?" asked Dexter Perkins, a well-known historian of US foreign policy. Appealing to history, he strove to substantiate the thesis that there was no imperialism in the United States. ". . . the Americans have, on the whole, not been an imperialist nation, and they are not one today."⁴⁵ W. W. Rostow suggested discarding

the concept "imperialism" as inapplicable to the American system.⁴⁶ "Peace, friendship, and a hands-off policy..." declared Richard Leopold, "was the way of life in the New World; whereas war, intervention, and broken promises characterized the Old."⁴⁷

Since there is no, nor has ever been, imperialism in the United States, argue some bourgeois historians, there have also been no compelling motives for forcible seizure of territory or for aggressive wars. US territorial expansion, they say, took place peacefully, by means of "rounding out" its borders, and if the United States has been involved in wars from time to time, it was exclusively for the purpose of defense or for the sake of liberating oppressed peoples.

At the same time, Louis Morton, an historian with highly conservative views, admits: "Yet it is difficult to find any period in American history when the nation was not at war, and much of its territory was won by conquest."⁴⁸

"In the realm of foreign affairs, at least," wrote William Appleman Williams, "the United States has not proved that Karl Marx was wrong. America has been a colonial power. America has practiced administrative colonialism on a significant scale. America has built an informal empire of massive proportions. And America is now face to face with the proof of Marx's thesis that such empires create their own increasingly effective opposition both from within and from without.

"It would appear to be the greater part of wisdom, to say nothing of safety, to admit that Marx was right."⁴⁹

Historical facts convincingly prove the complete groundlessness of the myth of a "Soviet threat".

It was no accident that the first decree of the socialist state was the Decree on Peace, which declared the continuation of the aggressive war then in progress to be "the greatest possible crime against humanity".⁵⁰ The Soviet Government addressed the peoples and governments of all the countries involved in the imperialist war with an appeal to conclude a just and democratic peace.

The struggle for peace is inherent in the very nature of the Soviet social system; it meets the vital interests of the Soviet working people, whose aim is to build a communist society, and the interests of the working people of all countries. The policy of peace and friendship expresses a general law of socialism, a social system that has no interest in aggressive wars.

From the first years of its existence, the Soviet state has worked for peace, taken issue against imperialism and imperialist wars, condemned aggression, colonialism, seizure by one nation of another's territory, and interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and has stood up for the right of every nation to self-determination. Marx's foresight about the creation of a society, "whose International rule will be *Peace*, because its national ruler will be everywhere the same—*Labour*!"⁵¹ has come true in the foreign policy practice of the Soviet state and other socialist countries.

Contrary to the assertions of anti-communist historiography, the Soviet Union does not practice the export of revolution. In accord with the basic propositions of the Marxist-Leninist theory, revolutions are the result of the development of the class struggle within the country; they are not made "to order", particularly to an order coming from abroad. Marxism has always strongly condemned this kind of Blanquist, Left-adventurist tactic.

The Soviet Union also vigorously opposes the export of counter-revolution. The foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at preserving and strengthening peace in the whole world, at developing relations of co-operation with all countries, regardless of their social system.

THE EVOLUTION OF BOURGEOIS HISTORIANS' VIEWS ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

As we mentioned earlier, there is a certain connection between bourgeois historiography and the policies of the US ruling circles: the more important an area of research is at

a given moment, the stronger is its dependence on politics.

In the history of Soviet-American relations the tendency of bourgeois historiography to adapt to current circumstances has manifested itself above all in the evolution of the evaluation of these relations. Let us take as an example the US intervention against Soviet Russia. There is a large literature on this subject which gives a fairly clear reflection of the turns in American policy towards the USSR.

As we know, after the Great October Socialist Revolution world imperialism organised an armed struggle against the Soviet Republic. The intervention by the United States, Germany, Britain, France, Japan and other countries brought suffering and privation to the Soviet people. But the attacks of world imperialism acting in support of the overthrown exploiter classes were rebuffed and the revolutionary cause triumphed.

Some bourgeois writers have given a rather arbitrary appraisal of those events. In accordance with the thesis that the United States was a peace-loving country, they sought to represent US counter-revolutionary interference in the affairs of Soviet Russia as "disinterested" aid. Such an interpretation is found in one of the first works on Soviet-American relations.⁵²

The Second World War led to a complete re-examination of the line that American historiography had taken with respect to the Soviet Union. We may take as an example *A History of Russia* by George Vernadsky, first published in 1929, and republished in 1930, 1944, 1951 and 1954 in revised editions. It is interesting to note that in the 1944 edition Vernadsky wrote: "Only now, after Russia has for nearly three years withstood a terrible test by blood and fire, have we come to understand something of her real strength."⁵³

The cold war period led to an obvious "stiffening" of the position taken by bourgeois historiography. In the 1950s several works on the intervention were published in the United States⁵⁴ criticising the American statesmen of those

days for having failed to prevent the October Revolution. George Kennan, for instance, expressed regret that the US Government had given ineffective support to the Provisional Government.⁵⁵ A similar thesis was defended by Robert D. Warth in his book *The Allies and the Russian Revolution*.⁵⁶

Some American historians have criticised the US ruling circles for not having made use of the peace slogan, popular among the peoples of Russia, and for having urged Kerensky's government to continue Russia's participation in the war. "...It may be questioned," wrote Kennan, "whether the United States government, in company with the other Western allies, did not actually hasten and facilitate the failure of the Provisional Government by insisting that Russia should continue the war effort, and by making this demand the criterion of its support."⁵⁷

Warth made a similar statement.⁵⁸ And Louis Fischer has asserted that "Russia's reluctance to quit the war and Allied insistence that she stay were the biggest single factor in the downfall of the Provisional (Kerensky) government".⁵⁹

These historians virtually ignored the class character of the anti-Soviet policy pursued by the imperialists and insisted that the allies' Russian policy had been determined chiefly by strategic motives related to their war against Germany and not at all by counter-revolutionary objectives. George Kennan wrote: "Had the world not been in the midst of a great war, then at its crucial stage, and had the Bolsheviks not inaugurated their external relations by issuing a provocative and offensive decree announcing in effect the departure of Russia from the ranks of the anti-German coalition, there might have been more readiness in Western countries to reflect on the deeper social and political realities behind the Bolshevik success and to examine from a longer range the problems of policy which this event presaged for the Western governments. As it was, the revolution in Petrograd came to be regarded from the start in the Western

countries primarily in its relationship to the fortunes of war."⁶⁰

Continuing this line of reasoning in the second volume of his work on Soviet-American relations, Kennan wrote that the United States and its allies were concerned primarily about the possibility of Russia's falling under German domination. He presents the intervention itself not as an attempt to strangle the workers' and peasants' power in Russia, but as a military measure against ... Germany. According to Kennan, the intervention was not an act of struggle against the world's first socialist state, but an attempt to restore the Eastern Front.⁶¹ This thesis was also put forward by George A. Brinkley in his history of the Civil War and intervention and by John Thompson in a book on the so-called Russian policy of the Western states.⁶²

But what was "provocative and offensive" about the Decree on Peace, which proposed that "all belligerent nations and their governments should at once begin negotiating a just, democratic peace", a peace without annexations or indemnities?⁶³ It was the refusal of the US, British and French governments to respond to Soviet Russia's call that compelled the Soviet Government to negotiate with Germany and sign the Brest Peace Treaty, which was extremely unfavourable to Russia.

In his letter to American workers, Lenin wrote: "It was the Anglo-French and the American bourgeoisie who refused to accept our proposal; it was they who even refused to talk to us about a general peace! It was *they* who betrayed the interests of all nations; it was they who prolonged the imperialist slaughter!"

"It was they who... refused to take part in the peace negotiations and thereby gave a free hand to the no less predatory German capitalists who imposed the annexationist and harsh Brest Peace upon Russia!"⁶⁴

The statement that the intervention was aimed against Germany was so unconvincing that far from everybody took it seriously. Curiously enough, in an article published in

1967, Kennan refuted his own theory by stating that the view that the capitalist countries sought to overthrow Soviet power had not been taken entirely out of thin air.⁶⁵

The records available to researchers show beyond doubt what the real aims of the intervention against Soviet Russia were. "Any movement [against the Bolsheviks.—*B.M.*] ... should be encouraged even though its success is only a possibility,"⁶⁶ said Robert Lansing, US Secretary of State, in 1917. The anti-Soviet intervention began immediately after the October Revolution. At first it took the form of backing the internal counter-revolution. William Williams wrote that the cornerstones of Washington's policy in those days were: "(1) as long as the Bolsheviks remained in power the United States would refuse to establish normal intercourse and would under no circumstances recognise Lenin's government; (2) Washington would do all in its power to aid any serious and conservative leader or group whose aim was the destruction of the Soviet Government."⁶⁷

It is necessary, of course, to distinguish between the policy of the imperialist circles and the position taken by the American people. America's working masses expressed their attitude towards the proletarian revolution by a powerful movement of protest against the intervention policy. In December 1917, American workers held a large meeting in Seattle at which they took a decision to support the Russian proletariat and expressed the hope that the time was not far off when they would prove their proletarian solidarity in practice. They pledged to spread truthful information about the October Revolution and its decrees.

The "Hands Off Russia" movement against the anti-Soviet intervention involved broad sections of the American people. The working people of America expressed their sympathy for the peoples of Russia in mass protest petitions, in solidarity demonstrations, and by refusing to load arms for the interventionists. The movement of solidarity with the Russian revolution became even more vigorous after the emergence of the Communist Party of the United States. The

Communist Party's first major campaign, launched in September 1919, was to mobilise American workers for a struggle to put an end to the blockade of Soviet Russia and stop the intervention.

* * *

An evolution caused by changes in the political situation is also observable in the literature on Soviet-American relations during the Second World War. Whereas during the war works were published in the United States which approved of Soviet-American co-operation, the appraisals given in the cold war period were altogether different, and opposition to the idea of co-operating with the USSR became the prevailing tendency. This evolution in American bourgeois historiography was accompanied by severe criticism of the foreign policy pursued by the Roosevelt Administration during the war.

Historians like Robert Sherwood, William Langer, Herbert Feis, S. Everett Gleason and others set the tone for writings about Soviet-American relations and introduced the greater part of the facts into the literature. The basic concept of semi-official historiography was the contention that the United States had sincerely tried to co-operate with the USSR, but that in view of the Soviet Union's unwillingness to meet its obligations after the war, the world found itself in the cold war. The conclusion flowing directly from this was that the Soviet Union could be dealt with only "from positions of strength". The propositions of the semi-official school were developed and popularised by the most prominent specialists on international relations in the United States: Samuel Bemis, Thomas Bailey, Dexter Perkins, Julius Pratt and others.

Differing considerably from the semi-official historiography was the neorevisionist trend (represented by Charles Beard, Harry Barnes, George Morgenstern, Charles Tansill, William Newmann, and others), which appeared in the late

1940s at the height of McCarthyism. The neorevisionists used as their starting point the views of the former head of the American military mission in Moscow, John Deane, who held that the United States had gone too far in its co-operation with the USSR and called the military alliance of Russia and America "the strange alliance".⁶⁸ While Deane's criticism was aimed basically against the United States' unsuccessful approach to the Soviet problem, the neorevisionists questioned the advisability of an alliance with a "potential" enemy, saying that it was not only a strange but an erroneous alliance. The neorevisionist historians lashed out against the foreign policy pursued by the United States in the period of 1933-45 primarily for not having reached an agreement with the aggressive powers against the USSR. George Croacker, for example, wrote that "we find Franklin D. Roosevelt almost invariably charging ahead on the side of Soviet Russia. In fact, his support was the *sine qua non* of its successful launching. His mission, which he performed implacably, was to put weapons in Stalin's hands and, with American military might, to demolish all of the dikes that held back the pressing tides of Communist expansion in Europe and Asia."⁶⁹

Reflecting the evolution of American foreign policy, the neorevisionists opposed the idea of international co-operation. The works of neorevisionist historians reflected the political views of the reactionary circles of the United States in an extreme, one might say exaggerated, form. In turn, neorevisionism became an active weapon of the reactionaries in the political struggle. *The New Republic* magazine noted that the output of the neorevisionist historians would be easily dismissed "were it not such useful material for demagogues in the 1952 campaign".⁷⁰

But this bluntness was one of the reasons for the decline of the neorevisionist school. Its primitive devices caused general irritation, as well as irritation among colleagues of the neorevisionists. Samuel Morison, for example, accused them of unobjectiveness and political intrigues and of de-

liberately distorting facts for the benefit of partisan interests.⁷¹ Herbert Feis laconically noted that the difference between historical science and their school was like "the difference between history and police court history".⁷² Progressive historians also denounced the neorevisionists. This school, wrote Herbert Aptheker, "ignored the reality of fascism, denied its aggressiveness and sought to justify a McCarthyite Republicanism".⁷³

Neorevisionism was edged out by the so-called real politics school (Hans Morgenthau, Robert Osgood and others), which reduced all international relations to the matter of maintaining a balance of forces. Representatives of this school felt that American government leaders before and during the war did not understand this and acted in accordance with moral abstractions having no relationship whatever to reality. As a result of this erroneous position, the real politics school asserted, the balance of forces had changed in favour of socialism.⁷⁴

During the cold war years, along with criticism of a policy of co-operation with the USSR, the tendency to make unobjective appraisal of Soviet foreign policy increased.

Some bourgeois historians asserted that during the war the United States sincerely supported the USSR, gave it colossal assistance, and made extraordinary concessions⁷⁵, but hopes for co-operation with the USSR proved to be "false".⁷⁶ The postwar schism between the Allies, stressed Robert Sontag, "is not of our making".⁷⁷ This conclusion best of all suited those who opposed international co-operation and favoured international tension.

The interpretations indicated above find no confirmation either in the actions of the American Government itself during the war, or in the materials and documents which came to light after its conclusion.

As concerns the Soviet Government, its entire position proceeded from the common interests of the Allies. The Soviet Union not only bore the main brunt of the struggle

against the Hitlerite armies, but assisted its Allies with material resources. At the 1941 Moscow conference of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, Averell Harriman confirmed, on behalf of the Anglo-Americans, the receipt of large shipments of Soviet raw materials which were to considerably help the Allies in the production of armaments.

The Soviet Union responded unhesitatingly to Allied appeals for support when the interest of the joint struggle with the fascist powers demanded it. The broad Soviet offensive in the East which was specially timed to coincide with the Allied landing in Normandy, to a large degree promoted the success of that operation. On July 7, 1944, Eisenhower wrote to Harriman: "I have been tracing Red Army progress on my map. Naturally I got a tremendous thrill out of the rate at which they are demolishing the enemy's fighting power. I wish I knew how to express properly to Marshal Stalin and his Commanders my deep admiration and respect." Later, too, as Herbert Feis notes, the advances of the Soviet armies "had surpassed expectations.... This is what the Allies on the Western Front were counting on, this great push from the east which would make the Germans unable to meet their scheduled thrusts to and across the Rhine."⁷⁸

In late autumn of 1944, the Anglo-American offensive ground to a halt. Seeing the dangerous situation the Allied troops were in, General Bradley warned Eisenhower in December 1944 that the United States could still lose the war.⁷⁹ Literally a few days later, the Germans dealt a heavy blow to the Anglo-American troops in the Ardennes, placing the Allies before the possibility of catastrophe. Seeing this and taking into consideration requests made by the United States and Great Britain, the Soviet Armed Forces moved up the date of their contemplated offensive from January 20 to January 12, 1945. On January 18, Roosevelt wrote Stalin: "Many thanks for your encouraging message of January 15 regarding your conference with Air Marshal Tedder and the offensive of your armies on the Soviet-

German front. Your heroic soldiers' past performance and the efficiency they have already demonstrated in this offensive give high promise of an early success to our armies on both fronts."⁸⁰

Taking part in the grandiose offensive extending from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians were 150 Soviet divisions with strong artillery and air support. The Soviet armies breached the German front and threw the Hitlerite troops back hundreds of kilometres. The German offensive in the West halted, and the Allies straightened out their situation. Such was one example of the USSR's attitude to its duty as an Ally.

Participants in wartime negotiations with the USSR cite evidence opposite to the later assertions by bourgeois historians about it being "impossible" to co-operate with the USSR. In speaking of negotiations with the USSR, Admiral William Leahy, for example, wrote: "...on almost every political problem ... the Russians had made sufficient concessions for an agreement to be reached..."⁸¹ And Secretary of State Cordell Hull noted in his memoirs that "President Roosevelt and I... felt we could work with Russia".⁸²

American statesmen have stressed that during the war the Soviet Union meticulously observed its commitments. "...The Russians were magnificent Allies," wrote former Secretary of War Henry Stimson. "They fought as they promised..."⁸³ "Russia had kept every military agreement made before that time," stressed Leahy.⁸⁴

Soviet-American relations were complicated and difficult during the war. However, they convincingly showed that belonging to different socio-economic systems is not an insurmountable barrier to effective co-operation.

* * *

How bourgeois historians treat the subject of the origins of the cold war can serve as an example of the use of histo-

riographical concepts for the purpose of supporting US foreign policy. It is a well-known fact, and one confirmed by numerous published documents and studies by objective scholars, that the postwar tension in relations between the USSR and the USA was caused by the anti-communist course adopted by reactionary circles who abandoned the policy of co-operation with the Soviet Union and set the task of re-examining the results of the Second World War. The apologetic literature strove to conceal this fact and to place the responsibility for the beginning of the cold war on the Soviet Union. The orthodox point of view of bourgeois historians on the origin of the cold war was that it was "the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression".⁸⁵

Exponents of different theories of international relations joined efforts to prove this unobjective conclusion. The geopoliticians tried to holster the myth about the aggressiveness of the USSR with references to Russia's strategic position and her consequent "expansionist ambitions". Supporters of the theory that ideology exercised overriding influence on foreign policy sought the sources of "Soviet expansionism" in the Manifesto of the Communist Party of 1848. And adherents of the concept of continuity referred to the "old Russian imperialism and nationalism", which had allegedly turned into "Bolshevist messianism". The groundlessness of such views we brought out earlier. It is important to note here, however, that among American historians there are those who take issue with the theory of Soviet "expansionism". Such scholars (Denna Fleming, William Williams, David Horowitz, Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko and others) point to the substantial growth of aggressive tendencies in US foreign policy after the death of Franklin Roosevelt, and to the use of atomic blackmail and pressure on the Soviet Union as important causes of the cold war.⁸⁶

In his book *The Cold War and Its Origins*, Denna Fleming, on the basis of a detailed study of international relations over the last fifty years, came to the following conclusion:

the responsibility for the onset and continuation of the cold war lies with the West. This conclusion of Fleming's is extremely important. As we said earlier, some bourgeois authors have worked hard trying to prove that almost from the day it was founded the Soviet state threatened the West. Professor Fleming sweeps away this irresponsible interpretation. From the moment of its birth in 1917, he writes, the Soviet state was "reacting defensively against the march of events in the West that it could not control". It was the imperialist countries that organised a military intervention against Soviet Russia, and then tried to isolate and strangle the Soviet state economically. From the very beginning, the offensive side was the West, and not at all the Soviets.⁸⁷

Fleming examines in detail certain stages in the foreign policy course followed by the United States—the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO and other military blocs, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and others. Despite the efforts expended, the United States could not stop the development of the powerful processes which had changed the modern world: the growth of the world socialist system and the upsurge of the national liberation movement. With the arms race the ruling circles of the USA tried to create a "position of strength". However, as Fleming notes, in the second half of the 1950s the balance of forces decisively changed in favour of socialism. Thus, the author comes to this conclusion: the United States began the cold war and it also lost it.⁸⁸

In their book *The Limits of Power*, which was published in 1972, historians Joyce and Gabriel Kolko state: "The United States' ultimate objective at the end of World War II was both to sustain and to reform world capitalism. The tension between doing both eventually prevented America from accomplishing either in a shape fully satisfactory to itself. The task confronting Washington was to dissolve the impact not merely of World War II on the structure of the world economy but of the depression of 1929 and World

War I as well—to reverse, in brief, most of the consequences of twentieth-century history.... The goal was monumental, and always beyond attainment!"⁸⁹ The myth about a Soviet threat was used by the ruling circles of the USA to justify their own expansionist course. This is why the reactionaries rejected attempts made by the USSR to normalise relations with the United States.

"...any Soviet offer to negotiate," the authors state, "assumed the nature of a threat rather than an opportunity to Washington after 1946, for it diminished the artificial, increasingly contrived sense of national crisis which was far more essential to containing Congress and the American people than Bolshevism. This heightened consciousness of danger, as Washington's only reliable mechanism for administering foreign policy, alone precluded a *détente* with Moscow."⁹⁰

For his part, Senator William Fulbright, who was the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, criticised US policy for being based, in his words, on "favourite myths" and not on realities.

"In its efforts to cope with the Soviet challenge, the West, I think, has too often devised its policies in terms of facile, and misleading, analogies with the conflicts of the past, tending at times to perceive identity of motive and design where there is only similarity in appearance or detail."⁹¹

Kenneth Thompson also wrote of the inclination of US statesmen "to base their policies on some 'grand simplification' drawn from a narrow segment of historical experience".⁹²

Indeed, many postulates of American foreign policy rested on a highly arbitrary interpretation of history, on a distorted picture of objective reality. Let us turn, for example, to the policy of containment of communism, enunciated in his time by President Truman. From what theoretical premises did it stem? As can be seen from the works of its chief

theorist, George Kennan, it was based on the old, prewar bourgeois "theory" which portrayed the Soviet land as a colossus with feet of clay. Kennan, we might recall, once felt that the USSR would never be able to produce "real evidences of material power and prosperity". His thinking then was based on the myth of the superiority of the capitalist over the socialist system and was permeated with a kind of determinism—a belief in the almost automatic demise of the Soviet system, given the appropriate US policy.⁹³ Kennan's doctrine was an eloquent example of wishful thinking.

Kennan's ideas were discussed in hundreds of books and articles. Some historians demanded that the arms race be intensified under the pretext of "containing" the Soviet Union and creating a "situation of strength". Others pointed to the groundlessness of Kennan's theories about Soviet-American relations. William Williams underscored the fact that the USA inaugurated a policy of "containment" not in 1947, but right after the Great October Socialist Revolution, and that it had already then shown itself to be unproductive.⁹⁴

Kennan's theoretical forecasts did not come true, but they did have an influence on US foreign policy. Rexford Tugwell, a well-known political figure who stood close to President Franklin Roosevelt, eloquently described the results of the containment policy. By its very logic, the containment policy, wrote Tugwell, brought the United States into conflict with the national liberation movement and drew the country into military conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. "The policy once begun, wars with Communists on the Asian mainland were inevitable. Confrontation with Russia having been undertaken, it proved difficult for Truman's successors to abandon it. Instead, the confrontation was enlarged, and this would go on until Johnson faced failure in 1968 and Nixon, because of Johnson's forced abdication, was obliged to find means for liquidation. Seldom had people paid a higher price in dissension at home and

lost opportunity abroad for decisions made in pursuit of futile aims."⁹⁵

Widespread in the US historical literature at the height of the cold war was the theory that an almost inborn, "natural" hostility existed between the peoples of the USSR and the USA. It was most consistently reflected in a book called *America Faces Russia*, by Thomas Bailey, who, in examining the history of Russian-American relations virtually reduces it, by means of a tendentious selection of facts, to a succession of conflicts and frictions.⁹⁶

Attempts by means of references to history to substantiate the thesis that tension and cold war between the USSR and the USA are "natural" prove unavailing. For history, on the contrary, shows many examples of co-operation between the two countries. As F. R. Dulles noted: "... Russia actually favoured the independence of the United States."⁹⁷ During the American War of Independence the Russian Government, having declared armed neutrality, rendered significant support to the young republic. This fact was cited often enough. In the nineteenth century, Russian-American co-operation was in many cases highly effective, and it was then that the idea of Russia and America being "natural allies" first arose. It was stressed that the interests of these two powers conflicted nowhere, while geography and the international situation dictated their drawing closer together. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, the two nations were destined to be friends.⁹⁸

Curiously enough, the concept of "natural allies" outlived Jefferson and the nineteenth century and all the radical changes in the historical destinies of the two countries. We come across it again at the height of the Second World War, when after a period of strained relations in the prewar years, the USA and the USSR became Allies. F. R. Dulles wrote in 1944: "Our traditional friendship has not been based upon sentiment and casual gestures of good will, but upon each nation's realistic appraisal of its own national interests. The record is a reasonably consistent one from

the days of our early co-operation in defence of freedom of the seas to those of our united action against the menace of fascism."⁹⁹

Of course, the history of Russian-American relations contains examples of another kind as well. As early as the nineteenth century these two countries represented different political regimes and they differed widely in the prevailing world outlook of their respective ruling social classes. The ideological differences between them are now, understandably, much more substantial than they were then. But ideological differences are one thing, while interstate relations are something else entirely. In the sphere of interstate relations there are no insurmountable contradictions, no unresolvable differences between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Another spurious device used by the cold war advocates was to draw an "historical" analogy between the policy of the USSR and that of Hitler Germany. Kenneth Thompson, noting the inclination of some Western figures to refer to the "lessons of history", classified the following assertion as among the historiographical clichés they used: "Parleys with Hitler were fruitless; talks with the Russians are doomed to fail."¹⁰⁰

Those who expounded such views always managed to pass over historical facts which contradicted them, ignoring the many examples of effective co-operation between the two countries.

The crisis of the cold war policy forced even those who stood at its sources to re-examine their position. The evolution of George Kennan's views is characteristic. In 1954, in his *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, he wrote that the course towards war is absolutely senseless, since "this Soviet problem... is not suitably to be resolved by war".¹⁰¹ In 1957, in lectures delivered in Britain, he spoke out against the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. Touching on the question of negotiations with the USSR, he stressed: "...I think we must beware of rejecting ideas just because

they happen to coincide with ones put forward on the other side... it would be wrong to assume that its utterances never happen to accord with the dictates of sobriety and good sense."¹⁰² In a book that came out in 1961, he wrote that the existence of weapons of mass destruction "adds another dimension of absurdity to the idea that the devices of outright war would be a suitable means of protecting the Western community from the kind of challenge with which Russian Communism has confronted it..."¹⁰³ In 1966, he came right out against the policy of anti-communism, stressing that anti-communism was antithetical to the best interests of the United States. He also came out against a policy of US "global messianism" and spoke in favour of establishing control over nuclear weapons and ultimately eliminating them.¹⁰⁴ Finally, in an article published in 1972, Kennan called on American diplomacy to make use of the new possibilities being opened up for the development of co-operation with the USSR.¹⁰⁵

In this connection it would be appropriate to recall what William Fulbright wrote in one of his works: "If there is any single lesson in the history of nations that can profitably be brought to bear on the problems of our own time," and also "it is that we [that is, the USA.—B.M.] must be cautious in our prescriptions and modest in our aspirations."¹⁰⁶ A realistic policy must proceed from an acknowledgement of the objective realities of a constantly changing world and the necessity of finding new ways that meet these realities, from the need to be guided by historical experience.

The recent progress in Soviet-American relations is clear evidence how beneficial a realistic approach to international affairs is. Due to the active Soviet policy and initiatives as well as to realism displayed by the American side important and constructive agreements were made which led to the end of confrontation and promoted positive co-operation. A major role in achieving these changes was played by the talks between the leaders of the USSR and the USA.

The whole course of events in the international arena testifies to the fact that states with different systems now have opportunities to resolve outstanding issues, however complex they may be, not by means of war, but by means of negotiations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and equality.

- ¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, p. 37.
- ² Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Moscow's Foreign Policy", *Survey*, No. 65, October 1967, p. 35.
- ³ Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965, p. 365.
- ⁴ The low level of scholarship of many works on this theme has been pointed out by sovietologists themselves. One American reviewer, for example, wrote of Michael P. Gehlen's book, *The Politics of Coexistence: Soviet Methods and Motives*, published by the Indiana University Press, that "Soviet specialists will find in this book little that is new", adding that "the entire book is marred by a pseudoscientific vocabulary" (*The Russian Review*, October 1967, pp. 409-10).
- ⁵ Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism. A Critical Analysis*, New York, 1958, p. 93.
- ⁶ Wladyslaw W. Kulski, *Peaceful Co-Existence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Chicago, 1959, p. 75.
- ⁷ George F. Kennan, "Peaceful Coexistence: A Western View", *Foreign Affairs*, January 1960, pp. 172-74.
- ⁸ Wladyslaw W. Kulski, op. cit., p. 188; Julian Towster, "The Dogma of Communist Victory", *Current History*, November 1959, p. 258.
- ⁹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 79.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 366.
- ¹¹ Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 39.
- ¹² John A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present*, New York, 1961, p. 346.
- ¹³ Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence. The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967*, London, 1968, p. 4.
- ¹⁴ *Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, p. 566 (in Russian).
- ¹⁵ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 29.
- ¹⁶ Michael P. Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence: Soviet Methods and Motives*, Bloomington, 1967, pp. 64, 151-52, 153, 202.

- ¹⁷ Philip E. Mosely, "The Meanings of Coexistence", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1962, p. 45.
- ¹⁸ A. Berzins, *The Two Faces of Coexistence*, New York, 1967; A. Weeks, *The Other Side of Coexistence. An Analysis of Russian Policy*, New York, 1970.
- ¹⁹ George F. Kennan, op. cit., p. 177.
- ²⁰ *Pravda*, June 25, 1973.
- ²¹ John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, New York, 1959, p. 248.
- ²² D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960*, London, 1961, Vol. I, pp. XIII-XIV.
- ²³ Gabriel A. Almond, *The Appeals of Communism*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1954, p. 11.
- ²⁴ Stefan T. Possony, *A Century of Conflict. Communist Techniques of World Revolution*, Chicago, 1953.
- ²⁵ David J. Saposs, *Communism in American Politics*, Washington, 1960; Ralph Lord Roy, *Communism and the Churches*, New York, 1960; Theodore Draper, *The Roots of American Communism*, New York, 1957; Theodore Draper, *American Communism and Soviet Russia: The Formative Period*, New York, 1960.
- ²⁶ John Somerville, "Some Problems Concerning the Concept of Revolution in the Development of American Philosophy", *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1960.
- ²⁷ Alfred Berzins, op. cit., pp. 303-04.
- ²⁸ *American Political Science Review*, March 1968, p. 313.
- ²⁹ Paul Seabury, *The Rise and Decline of the Cold War*, New York, 1967, p. 49.
- ³⁰ *American Diplomacy in a New Era*. Ed. by Stephen Kertesz, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1961, pp. 2-3.
- ³¹ Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Chicago, 1966, p. 10.
- ³² John W. Spanier, *World Politics in an Age of Revolution*, New York, 1967, p. 65.
- ³³ Elliot R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State*, New York, 1960.
- ³⁴ *The American Historical Review*, October 1962, p. 187.
- ³⁵ William Welch, *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy. An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals from the Academic Community*, New Haven, 1970, p. 66.
- ³⁶ Louis Fischer, *Russia's Road from Peace to War. Soviet Foreign Relations 1917-1941*, New York, 1969, p. 456.
- ³⁷ Aaron S. Klicman, *Soviet Russia and the Middle East*, Baltimore, 1970, p. 1.
- ³⁸ *The Soviet Union and Latin America*. Ed. by J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover, New York, 1970, p. 3.

- ³⁹ Stefan T. Possony, op. cit.; *The Threat of Soviet Imperialism*, Ed. by C. Grov Haines, Baltimore, 1954.
- ⁴⁰ Donald Dunham, *Kremlin Target: USA Conquest by Propaganda*, New York, 1961.
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CONCLUSION

Since the Great October Socialist Revolution bourgeois historiography in the United States has produced a vast literature containing tendentious interpretations of Soviet people's history. Seeking to bring more people under its influence, sovietological historiography has resorted, as we have seen, to highly sophisticated methods. It has made use of various, sometimes very intricate, theories and concepts. But the impressive façades of bourgeois historical science have often cloaked its inability to provide a scientific explanation of the past. Works of bourgeois historiography, especially those on so important a subject as Soviet history, have frequently been acts in the ideological struggle of the two systems.

Positive developments in Soviet-American relations have substantially shaken the dogmatic theoretical conclusions found in the sovietological literature, as well as the practical anti-communist recommendations sovietologists have urged upon statesmen. Reactionary sovietologists in the United States are in the midst of a confidence crisis. It is no accident, therefore, that far from orthodox voices are beginning to sound from their midst. Increasingly, bourgeois researchers now speak in terms of re-examining old dogmatic notions about the USSR and the socialist community and of ceasing to ignore the existing balance of forces in the international arena. This refers not only to progressive researchers, but

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also to those realistic bourgeois scholars who call for abandoning illusions with respect to the USSR. One of these "persistent" illusions, according to Townsend Hoopes of Yale University, is the belief commonly held in America that the United States possesses absolute moral, political and technological superiority over the Soviet Union.¹

But the process of re-examining the dogmas established in American sovietology under the influence of the cold war was, of course, chiefly determined by postwar developments in the USSR, such as economic and social changes, strides in industrial development and in raising the living standards, and the scientific and technological revolution which found its embodiment in space exploration. Under the new circumstances, even far from radical authors felt compelled to write of the "new image" of the USSR. The old view of the Soviet Union, said Harry Schwartz, "has given way to a picture of Russia as the land of the sputniks, a world scientific leader..."² Bourgeois scholars increasingly noted the growing influence and prestige of the Soviet Union. "The history of Russia in the fifty years since 1917," wrote a British author, "is the story of the survival and the transformation of a vast, backward nation into a great modern power. In scale, suffering, and achievement it is an epic of which the Russian people, who have displayed extraordinary fortitude, dynamism, and power of survival, is the hero."³

Some prominent American scholars have long been pointing to the futility of the hopes of reactionaries for an erosion of the socialist system. "...We shall, under present prospects," stressed Philip Mosely, "be dealing with a Soviet system that is growing rapidly in economic, scientific and military strength..."⁴ Grayson Kirk, President of Columbia University, wrote: "...The Soviet Union must be regarded as a viable political and economic entity with which our country necessarily will coexist for an indefinite time... Today... its internal effectiveness, stability and popularity are greater than at any time in its history."⁵ In *The Soviet System and Modern Society*, published in 1968, George

Fischer admitted that it would be groundless to count on the collapse of Soviet socialist society.⁶

Hence, some American writers now describe anti-Sovietism and anti-communism as artificial in character. In his book, *The Big Two. Soviet-American Perceptions of Foreign Policy*, Professor Anatol Rapoport remarks that unlike the USSR, which has a dynamic ideology bringing peoples into unity, American society with its "individualistic ideology" lacked a sense of national purpose after the Second World War. To maintain it, the conservative forces urgently needed a new enemy.⁷ They chose the Soviet Union to be such an enemy; anti-communist propaganda immediately proclaimed it the "chief threat" to the American way of life. It is obvious, however, that anti-Sovietism runs counter to the true national interests of the United States.

Businessmen in the capitalist world frequently urge taking a realistic look at the fact that a powerful socialist system exists. Samuel Pizar, a prominent expert on commerce, stressed in his book *Coexistence and Commerce*: "...the economic systems of both communism and free enterprise will survive into the indefinite future. Neither side will voluntarily dismantle its own social structure or try to overwhelm the other with military force. This stalemate between the two contending spheres of our politically divided world holds the relatively cheerful prospect of coexistence and, with luck, constructive co-operation and competition.

"I see this pattern as developing simply because the alternatives are unacceptable to anyone. To move towards an ultimate test of strength would be to court mutual annihilation. To reject the option of ampler economic intercourse would be to invite needless waste."⁸

But, unfortunately, the momentum of old anti-communist notions sometimes continues to exert its negative influence. Some sovietologists, while afraid to oppose improvement of Soviet-American relations directly, spare no effort to revive the atmosphere of distrust that poisoned the international situation in the past. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote

in 1972 that the new relationship developing between the Soviet Union and the United States is nothing but the "early policy of containment... recast into a more complicated structure".⁹

William Williams, a realistic American historian, warned as far back as the late 1950s that it was dangerous to use history for politico-ideological purposes. Comparing history to a mirror "in which, if we are honest enough, we can see ourselves as we are as well as we would like to be", he said that "the misuse of history is the misuse of the mirror..." and that it would be wiser not to delude oneself.¹⁰ Williams' warning should be heeded. So long as the danger he spoke of exists, it will be necessary to critically examine those dogmatic misrepresentations that are sometimes passed off as historical fact. All who oppose détente and advocate continuance of the arms race and a return to the cold war should be firmly rebuffed not only for the sake of science, but in the all-important interests of world peace.

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